The integration of special operations and general purpose forces by Kershaw, Michael M.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1994-12
The integration of special operations and general
purpose forces
Kershaw, Michael M.
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/42828





MAY 1 01995\ -
G 
THE INTEGRATION OF SPECIAL 
OPERATIONS AND GENERAL PURPOSE 
FORCES 
by 
Michael M. Kershaw 
December, 1994 
Thesis Advisor: Gordon H. McCormick 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
19950509 052 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Fonn Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average I hour per response. mcluding the time for reviewing mstruction. searchmg 
existing data sources. gathering and maintaining the data needed. and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this 
burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information. including suggestions for reducing this burden. to Washington Headquarters Services. 
Directorate for Information Operations and Reports. 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington. VA 22202-4302. and to the Office of Management 
and Budget. Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
I. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
December 1994 Master's Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE THE INTEGRATION OF SPECIAL 5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
OPERATIONS AND GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES 
6. AUTHOR(S) Michael M. Kershaw 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING 
Naval Postgraduate School ORGANIZATION 
Monterey CA 93943-5000 REPORT NUMBER 
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
II. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect 
the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION/ AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) 
Special Operations Forces (SOF) are frequently employed to conduct missions not within the limited boundaries of unilateral 
special operations. These operations often involve cooperation with general purpose forces (GPF) and are often under their 
command. This thesis argues that these cooperative efforts are better examined as integrated operations, rather than special or 
conventional operations. These operations require SOF to conduct specialized tasks facilitating the introduction of follow-on 
GPF to complete the mission. 
This thesis develops a theory of integrated operations by examining six operations, previously considered under 
conventional wisdom as either special or conventional. It rejects much of the myth which surrounds these operations and offers 
a revisionist interpretation of the necessary and sufficient conditions for success in these endeavors. The thesis then goes on to 
compare cases of these special units using organizational theory to determine the sources of integration. The cases examined 
indicate a causal relationship between organizational factors related to command and training and a special unit's ability to 
integrate with GPF. The thesis concludes by recommending the realignment of select SOF in the current force structure to better 
meet the challenges of future integrated operations. 
14. SUBJECT TERMS Special Operations Forces; Integration; Contingency 15. NUMBER OF 
Operations; Command and Control; Ranger Operations; German Airborne PAGES 194 
Operations. 
17. SECURITY CLASSIFI- 18. SECURITY CLASSIFI-




16. PRICE CODE 
SECURITY CLASSIFI- 20. LIMITATION OF 
CATION OF ABSTRACT ABSTRACT 
Unclassified UL 
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 298-102 
11 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
THE INTEGRATION OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS 
AND GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES 
by 
Michael M. Kershaw 
Captain, United States Army 
B.S., United States Military Academy, 1984 
Submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 
Accesion For 
NTIS CRA&I I OTIC TAB 
Unannounced 0 






Avail and I or 
Special 
ill'' 




NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
December 1994 
ordon H. McCormick, Thesis Advisor 
Thomas C. Bruneau, Chairman 




Special Operations Forces (SOF) are frequently employed to conduct missions 
not within the limited boundaries of unilateral special operations. These operations 
often involve cooperation with general purpose forces (GPF) and are often under 
their command. This thesis argues that these cooperative efforts are better 
examined as integrated operations, rather than special or conventional operations. 
These operations require SOF to conduct specialized tasks facilitating the 
introduction of follow-on GPF to complete the mission. 
This thesis develops a theory of integrated operations by exammmg six 
operations, previously considered under conventional wisdom as either special or 
conventional. It rejects much of the myth which surrounds these operations and 
offers a revisionist interpretation of the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
success in these endeavors. The thesis then goes on to compare cases of these 
special units using organizational theory to determine the sources of integration. 
The cases examined indicate a causal relationship between organizational factors 
related to command and training and a special unit's ability to integrate with GPF. 
The thesis concludes by recommending the realignment of select SOF in the current 
force structure to better meet the challenges of future integrated operations. 
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vi 




2. Integrated Operations 
B. SCOPE 
C. THEORY 
1. Theory of Integrated Operations 
2. Organization Theory 
D. CASE STUDIES 
1. Cases . 
2. Case Selection 
3. Methodology .. 
II. GERMAN OPERATIONS (1937-1942) 
A. BACKGROUND . . . . . . .. 
1. Assault Detachment Koch 
2. Eben Emael 
3. Holland to Greece 
4. The Assault Regiment 
5. Operation MERCURY 
6. Maleme Airfield 
B. ANALYSIS ..... . 
1. Integrated Operations 
2. Organization Theory . 
a. Institutionalization 
b. Functional Specialization 
c. SUMMARY 
III. AMERICAN RANGER OPERATIONS (1942-1944) 
A. BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . .. 
1. The 1st Ranger Battalion 
































3. Cisterna ..... 
4. The Provisional Ranger Group 
5. Point du Hoc and Omaha Beach 
B. ANALYSIS ..... 
1. Integrated Operations 
2. Organization Theory . 
a. Institutionalization 
b. Functional Specialization 
c. SUMMARY . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . 











A. BACKGROUND . 85 
1. The 1st and 2d Battalions, 75th Infantry 
(Ranger) 85 
2. Special Operations Commands 87 
3. Grenada . . . . . . 87 
4. Operation URGENT FURY 92 
5. Grenada to Panama . . 96 
6. The 75th Ranger Regiment and USSOCOM 97 
7. Operation BLUE SPOON 98 
8. Torrijos-Tocurnen 100 
B. ANALYSIS ...... . 
1. Integrated Operations 
2. Organization Theory . 
a. Institutionalization 
b. Functional Specialization 
C. SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . 
V. CONCLUSIONS . 
A. INTEGRATED OPERATIONS 
1. Operational Environment 
















c. Time . . 
d. Command 
3. SOF in Integrated Operations 
B. ORGANIZATION THEORY 
1. Institutionalization 




APPENDIX. MAPS, PHOTOGRAPHS, AND DIAGRAMS 
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . 















LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Assault Detachment Koch. ·24 
Figure 2. Command relationships: Operation MERCURY. 30 
Figure 3. The Assault Regiment. 33 
Figure 4. The 6615th Ranger Force (P). 62 
Figure 5. The 3d Division (reinf). 64 
Figure 6. The 1st Division (reinf). 67 
Figure 7. The Provisional Ranger Group. 69 
Figure 8. Command relationships: URGENT FURY. 89 
Figure 9. Ground forces on Grenada. 
Figure 10. Command relationships: BLUE SPOON. 







Special Operations Forces (SOF) are frequently employed in 
ways that extend beyond the limited boundaries of unilateral 
special operations. These operations often involve cooperation 
with general purpose forces (GPF) and are often under their 
command. This thesis argues that these cooperative efforts are 
better examined as integrated operations, rather than special or 
conventional operations. Integrated operations require SOF to 
conduct specialized tasks facilitating the introduction of follow-
on GPF to complete the mission. This requires that they be broken 
out and studied as a unique subset of the range of operations. 
To limit the scope of this study, this thesis focuses on light 
infantry units conducting short duration strike missions at the 
operational level of war. This thesis does not analyze the use of 
SOF in conventional roles, nor does it address SOF integration in 
indirect actions. Its findings, however, address both SOF and GPF 
structure and the principles of integrated operations described 
within apply across the range of operations. 
This thesis develops a theory of integrated operations by 
examining six cases, considered under conventional wisdom as either 
special or conventional. Specifically, this thesis examines the 
German airborne seizures of Eben Emael in Holland and Maleme 
airfield on Crete; U.S. Army Ranger operations at Cisterna, Italy 
and Point du Hoc in Normandy; and contemporary Ranger operations to 
seize the airfields of Point Salines on Grenada and Torrij os-
Tocumen in Panama. It rejects much of the myth which surrounds 
these operations and offers a revisionist interpretation of the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for success in these endeavors. 
Integrated operations occur in a rapidly changing and 
demanding operational environment. They are, in fact, two distinct 
engagements, having an initial, or "special", phase as well as a 
more ;'conventional" phase. In between lies a critical "transition" 
phase, often crucial to SOF ln terms of sustaining mission 
achievements and combat power. Integrated operations are as rapid 
in execution as they are lengthy in preparation and place high 
xiii 
demands on planners and leaders. Finally, SOF conducting 
integrated operations perform their missions under restrictions not 
normally associated with unilateral special operations, and 
consequently, must be more robust. 
The thesis goes on use organization theory to determine the 
sources of effective integration. The cases examined suggest that 
a causal relationship exists between organizational factors related 
to command and training and a special unit's ability to effectively 
integrate with GPF. Specifically, each unit was analyzed in terms 
of institutionalization and functional specialization. Autonomous 
organizations experienced difficulty in integrating operations with 
GPF because of bureaucratic rivalries and overspecialization. SOF 
employed in immature organizations experienced high levels of 
integration, but suffered heavily from misuse. The current 
division of SOF and GPF into distinct organizations has increased 
effective integration in deliberate operations. However, 
organizational barriers still exist which hinder the full 
integration of forces within the more demanding arena of 
contingency operations. 
The thesis concludes by recommending the realignment of select 
SOF in the current force structure to better meet the challenges of 
future integrated operations. While the SOF command should 
maintain administrative and training control over select SOF 
designated for these operations, GPF commanders should gain greater 
operational control over these forces. Removing these barriers 
present in the current force structure would increase capability, 
further integrate training and enhance cohesion. Amid the current 
reorganization of military forces, these changes would better 
prepare SOF to meet the increasingly demanding challenges of the 




Special Operations Forces (SOF) exist to conduct 
specialized military operations which, 
... achieve military, economic or psychological 
objectives by unconventional means in hostile, 
denied, or politically sensitive areas. 1 
While there are other reasons for maintaining specialized 
elite units, such as leader development and doctrinal 
innovation, the necessity of conducting these specialized 
missions remain paramount in justifying the creation and 
maintenance of a permanent SOF presence 1n the force 
structure. 2 Although they are often considered separate from 
General Purpose Forces (GPF), SOF often operate with them. 3 
Few SOF units possess the support structure for sustained 
operations and most depend on GPF for at least strategic 
mobility and logistical support. This is recognized in 
current doctrine which states that special operations can be 
conducted across the range of operations, " ... independently or 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint 
Sgecial (Washington, D.C., 28 October 1992), p. GL-20. 
2 Eliot A. Cohen, Commandos and Politicians 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 29-34. 
Partly because of their role in bolstering public 
morale, and partly because of the natural tendency of 
upstart units to tout their own accomplishments, the 
literature on the subject of SOF is numerous and tends to 
focus exclusively on the units themselves, personalities and 
their actions. For the use of SOFas symbols see Cohen, pp. 
60-65 and for the "legend" of SOF see Lieutenant Colonel 
Shaun M. Darragh, "Rangers: The Long Road to Recognition," 
Sgecial Warfare (April 1988), p. 22 and David W. Hogan, Jr., 
Raiders or Elite Infantry (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood 
Press, 1992), pp. 14-15, and 234-235 (Hereafter cited as 
Hogan, Raiders) . 
1 
ln conjunction with conventional forces." 4 Beyond this SOF 
and GPF are frequently employed together to accomplish 
missions as part of larger operations. These cooperative 
efforts, or "integrated operations", are the subject of this 
study. 
Why should we look at integrated operations? First of 
all, since their inception, special units have been frequently 
called on to operate with GPF in cooperative efforts. 
Military history is filled with examples of both successes and 
failures in conducting integrated operations. The German army 
in World War II employed Brandenburg units to seize targets of 
direct importance to the advance of regular forces, 
particularly Panzer divisions.
5 Similarly, the U. S. Navy 
developed Marine raider battalions to spearhead amphibious 
operations, conduct raids and operate behind enemy lines in 
support of larger operations.
6 These are operations which 
special units traditionally perform, although perhaps not 
considered "classic" or unilateral special operations by 
contemporary doctrine. 7 
4 The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint 
Special Operations (Washington, D. C.,28 October 1992), p. 
I-3. 
5 Edward N. Luttwak,et al., A Systematic Review of 
'Commando' (Special) Operations,1939-1980, p. II-189, for 
principles of employment of Brandenburg units. See also 
James Lucas, Kommando (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985) 
and Dr. Russell H. S. Stolfi, The German advance through 
Duenaburg, Latvia, p. 41, for specific examples of the 
employment of these units during operations. 
See Charles L. Updegraph, Jr., Special Marine 
Corps Units of World War II (Washington: Historical 
Division, USMC, 1972), pp. 2-4, for a discussion of the 
missions assigned to the Marine Raider Battalions and the 
concept for their employment. 
7 See Major Glenn M. Harned, Army Special Operations 
Forces and the Airland Battle, MMAS Thesis,US Army Command 
and General Staff College, 1985, pp. 100-104, for a 
2 
Second, the changing international security system is 
forcing both SOF and GPF to explore new missions, often in the 
same operational environment. Similarly, declining resources 
and overall force structure compel not only intraservice 
cooperation, but also cooperation between SOF and GPF in 
arenas once considered to be within the exclusive purview of 
the Adaptive Joint Force 
not only multiservice 




cooperation, but also the employment of SOF on conventional 
platforms as part of a larger joint package. 8 The question 
then is not whether SOF and GPF will continue to conduct 
integrated operations; rather the question is what role will 
SOF play in these integrated operations? 
1. Definitions 
Before examining the role of SOF in integrated 
operations, terms will be defined. Special operations will 
first be defined, in order to place integrated operations 
within the parameters of current doctrine. Second, 
conventional operations, and how they differ from special 
operations, will be reviewed. Integrated operations lie 
between special operations and conventional operations in the 
range of operations. Special operations are, as already 
noted, 
discussion on 
the difference between strike operations and 'Special Light 
Infantry Operations' which details why one category is a 
special operation and the other is conventional. 
See Admiral Paul David Miller, "The Military After 
Next", Proceedings, (February, 1994) , pp. 41-44, for the 
exercising of Special Operations Forces with Joint Task 
Forces. See also General Wayne A. Downing, "Naval 
Postgraduate School Thesis Topics", Memorandum for 
Superintendent, Naval Postgraduate School, 1 June 1994, 
enclosure 1, p. 1, for current questions concerning AJFP and 
SOF's role in integrating with conventional forward based 
forces. 
3 





and paramilitary forces to achieve 
political, economic or psychological 
by unconventional means in hostile, 
politically sensitive areas. 9 
Special operations differ from conventional operations, 
... in degree of risk, operational technique, mode 
of employment, independence from friendly support 
and dependence on detailed operational intelligence 
and indigenous assets. 10 
Since some conventional operations are often high risk and 
employ operational techniques and modes of employment often 
associated with SOF, these operations would appear to be a 
starting point for an examination of integrated operations. 
In order to fully consider the cases available and 
account for the increasing specialization implied by the term 
SOF today, a broader definition of SOF will be utilized. 
Special units will be considered which possess a specialized 
capability outside the norm of the period for infantry units. 
A unit possessing high morale, esprit, combat readiness or 
experience, although fitting the definition of elite, in the 
absence of special capability, will not qualify as a special 
unit for the purposes of this study.
11 Specialized capability 
will be defined as unit training in airborne assault, 
amphibious raiding, infiltration behind enemy lines or other 
specialized techniques beyond the capabilities of infantry 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint 
Special Operations (Washington, 28 October 1992), p. GL-20. 
10 United States Special Operations Command, 
USCINCSOC Operational Concept (MacDill AFB, FL: 
USSOCOM/SOJS, 28 July 1989), p. 1-8. 
11 See Roger Beaumont, Military Elites (New York: 
Boobs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1974), pp. 2-5, for a 
discussion on the different types of military elites. 
4 
units of the period. Therefore, the terms SOF and special 
units will be used interchangeably to refer to units which 
meet the requirements of the above definition. 
2. Integrated Operations 
What then are integrated operations? Integrated 
operations are those in which SOF and GPF are employed to 
accomplish interdependent tasks necessary for the successful 
completion of the overall mission. Unlike unilateral special 
operations, in which SOF accomplish missions independent of 
general purpose forces, integrated operations require SOF to 
seize or destroy a critical target and hold key terrain until 
relieved by GPF. The SOF mission is also generally critical 
to the introduction of follow on GPF. This concept was 
epitomized by the use of Marine Raiders to conduct amphibious 
operations across terrain believed inaccessible to larger 
units. During operations in the Solomons in World War II, the 
1st, 3rd and 4th Marine Raider Battalions spearheaded landings 
for larger Army units of the 43rd Infantry Division on the 
, 
Russell islands and New Georgia in examples of integrated 
operations. 12 
Integrated operations also differ from conventional 
operations in that SOF are employed in their specialized 
roles, as opposed to being used in conventional roles to 
support a GPF mission. Special units frequently are used as 
"shock troops" to support or enhance a conventional operation. 
Commanders are often prone to use special units in this role 
because of their high morale and readiness over a requirement 
for specific capability. This use, or misuse, of special 
12 See Updegraph, for details of these operations. 
See also Henry Shaw and Major Douglas Kane, Isolation of 
Rabaul (Washington: Historical Branch, USMC, 1963), pp. 52-
53, and John R. Miller, Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul 
(Washington: Center of Military History, 1959), pp.81-85, 
99-106, and 129-131, for official accounts of these 
integrated operations presented from the service standpoint. 
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units is much argued and heavily documented.
13 For the purpose 
of this study, the mere cooperation of SOF and GPF will no
t 
constitute an integrated operation if SOF are employed i
n 
conventional roles. The employment of the Marine Raider
s 
again provide an effective case in point. The commander o
f 
the 1st Marine Division committed the 1st Raider and 1s
t 
Parachute Battalions to the defense of a key ridge guardin
g 
the approach to Henderson field on Guadalcanal in November o
f 
1942. Although the Raiders were immortalized for their
 
successful stand ln spite of tremendous casualties, thi
s 
engagement is an example of the use of special units in 
a 
conventional role in a perimeter defense. It is not, by th
e 
parameters of this study, an integrated operation. Thi
s 
example highlights an issue that will be examined later, th
e 
dual nature of evaluating a special units mission in terms o
f 
tasks accomplished and casualties suffered. 
Integrated operations generally require that SOF be 
augmented by GPF in some manner. Since SOF are designed t
o 
conduct special operations, they require 
firepower, mobility or protection assets 
augmentation of 
based on their 
assigned mission. One extreme example is the case of the U
. 
S. Army Rangers in the Mediterranean theater in World War II
. 
The Rangers gradually acquired heavier weapons, such as ligh
t 
artillery and heavy mortars, as they increasingly wer
e 
assigned tasks requiring both specialized capabilities an
d 
13 See David W. Hogan, Jr., U. S. Army SQecial 
OQerations in World War II (Washington, D.C., Center of 
Military History, 1992), pp. 136-138 (Hereafter cited as 
Hogan, US Army SOF in WWII), for a discussion of the misuse 
of SOF in the concluding chapter of his work. See also 
David Hogan, Rangers Lead the Way?: The Problem of Misuse 
of U.S. Army Ranger Units in World War II, unpublished 
manuscript, Center of Military History. 
6 
heavier fire support. 14 The 2d Ranger Battalion, 1n its action 
at Point du Hoc during the Normandy invasion, made extensive 
use of naval gunfire support. These examples highlight the 
complementary nature of SOF and GPF. Since integrated 
operations require special units to operate closely with GPF, 
SOF will generally require some form of augmentation to 
sustain themselves until linkup or relief. 
Finally, integrated operations are defined by tasks, not 
by unit. The integration of special and conventional tasks is 
the essence of an integrated operation. It has been shown 
that SOF are often assigned conventional missions within the 
context of larger operations. Similarly, certain general 
purpose forces can also be assigned special tasks within the 
context of an integrated operation. Since the focus of this 
study is on the roles that SOF can play in integrated 
operations, such operations will not be considered. 
From the standpoint of SOF, integrated operations require 
them to conduct specialized missions, usually with some 
augmentation, to facilitate or allow the introduction of 
follow on GPF necessary to accomplish the overall mission. 
This study will use this definition to select cases to develop 
a theory of integrated operations. 
B. SCOPE 
What type of integrated operations will be considered? 
All operations, whether special, integrated or conventional 
vary by duration, scale and mission. In order to limit the 
scope of this study, direct action or strike missions by light 
infantry type units, of short duration, and conducted at the 
operational level of war will be examined. It will be shown 
14 See Dr. Michael J. King, Rangers: Selected Combat 
Operations in World War II (Leavenworth: Combat Studies 
Institute, 1985), pp. 22, 27-28,and 32, for details on the 
"upgunning" of Darby's Rangers. 
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that these missions, for which there is a wide selection of 
cases available for study, will figure heavily in future 
cooperative efforts between SOF and GPF. Additionally, 
although beyond the scope of this study, the principles of 
integrated operations and the lessons learned from 
organization theory should be applicable across the wide range 
of integrated operations and the special units which 
participate in them. 
Integrated operations can be either limited or sustained 
ln duration. The employment of SOF to conduct Unconventional 
Warfare (UW) or Foreign Internal Defense (FID) often requires 
the integration of forces over an extended campaign to 
accomplish its objectives. Examples of such sustained 
integrated operations are the employment of the Chindits and 
Merrill's Marauders in Burma in World War II in unconventional 
long range penetration roles in conjunction with advances of 
larger conventional forces. The employment of U. S. Army 
Special Forces in Southeast Asia during the Second Indochina 
conflict is an example of sustained employment in the role of 
foreign internal defense. These operations, however, were 
carried out by SOF elements fundamentally different from those 
assigned short duration missions. They relied on language 
skills and cultural knowledge as well as special military 
skills to accomplish their missions and therefore bring 
different variables into consideration. Although SOF's role 
in FID and UW have continued since their institutionalization, 
SOF continues to find itself heavily involved in short 
duration, strike operations. 
defined as, 
These operations have been 
... sensitive special operations, normally limited 
in scope and duration, conducted against targets 
that have political or strategic significance. 
8 
Strike operations include the attack of critical 
15 targets ... 
This study will focus on strike operations generally conducted 
in three days or less, the period most units can be employed 
without requiring extensive external sustainment. 
Similarly, integrated operations can be conducted across 
the range of operations, from strategic to the tactical level. 
According to doctrine, however, SOF are optimally used at the 
strategic or operational levels of war. 16 Strategically, SOF 
generally operate independently or with GPF support to 
accomplish tasks for a theater or national command. 17 Joint 
Pub 3-05 defines the operational level as, 
The level of war at which campaigns and major 
operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to 
accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or 
areas of operations. Activities at this level link 
tactics and strategy by establishing operational 
objectives needed to accomplish the strategic 
objectives, sequencing events to achieve the 
operational objectives, initiating actions, and 
applying resources to bring about and sustain these 
events. 18 
Under current doctrine, SOF does not perform missions in 
direct support of tactical commanders. 19 The operational 
level, therefore, not only holds numerous examples of 
15 Major Glenn Harned, "Special Operations and the 
Airland Battle", Military Review 65 (September 1985), p. 76. 
16 Department of the Army, Doctrine for Special 
Operations Forces, FM 100-25 (Washington: Headquarters, 
Department of the Army, 1991), p. 2-3. 
17 Harned, MMAS Thesis, p. 141-143, defines the 
strategic role for SOF in the theater deep battle effort. 
18 Joint Pub 3-05, p. GL-16. 
19 Harned, MMAS Thesis, p. 146. 
9 
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integrated operations, but lS, doctrinally, the level of war 
at which SOF and GPF are most likely to cooperate. This 
level, then, will be the focus of this study. 
SOF can be tasked with a variety of different missions to 
accomplish strategic and operational goals. Currently, 
special operations consist of five prlmary missions: 
Unconventional Warfare (UW) , Foreign Internal Defense (FID) , 
Direct Action (DA) I Special Reconnaissance (SR) and 
Counterterrorism (CT) . This study will examine the role of 
special units in performing missions which closely approximate 
the definition currently used for Direct Action. Although it 
is recognized that both air and naval components of SOF can 
also perform such actions, the focus of this study will be on 
light infantry type units. Light infantry refers to units 
utilizing manportable weapons and doctrine emphasizing small-
unit actions, mobility, surprise and closequarters combat.
20 
Their means of infiltration are varied and include amphibious, 
foot and airborne techniques. SOF units assigned to these 
missions have a high state of readiness and extensive 
specialized training. 
This study will, therefore, examine cases of light 
infantry units conducting short duration strike missions at 
the operational level of war. By examining these cases of 
integrated operations, we will be able to develop a theory of 
integrated operations and discuss the expected effects of 
organizational factors on mission success. 
C. THEORY 
This study proposes to develop a theory of integrated 
operations which sheds light on their nature and the potential 
roles for SOF. Second, hypotheses taken from organization 
20 This definition of light infantry to describe 
elite forces is taken from Cohen, p.18. 
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theory will examine the role of SOF in more detail, 
highlighting the role played by functional specialization and 
institutionalization in determining SOF's ability to integrate 
with GPF and accomplish the mission. This study will approach 
these questions from a special operations perspective. 
Although GPF obviously cannot be ignored in this study, the 
findings and recommendations of this paper will primarily be 
directed at SOF. 
1. Theory of Integrated Operations 
What is the nature of integrated operations? Integrated 
operations are, by definition, cooperative efforts. SOF units 
utilize their special capabilities to seize critical terrain 
which facilitates the follow-on of GPF. This highlights the 
most important characteristic of integrated operations, their 
duality. SOF capitalize on initiative, concentration and 
speed to gain an initial advantage over an opponent. This 
advantage, however, is fleeting. Without augmentation and 
timely arrival of GPF, opponents can regain the initiative 
through maneuver, bringing heavier firepower and greater 
numbers to bear against a lightly armed, numerically inferior 
and relatively immobile, defending SOF. So while the initial 
phase of the operation is conducted in a "special" 
environment, time and superior resources allow the enemy to 
turn it into a "conventional" environment, in which the 
advantage of numbers, firepower and initiative rest with the 
defender. 
This duality leads to the second characteristic of 
integrated operations; they are three phased operations. The 
first, as already mentioned, pits an attacking SOF against a 
defending enemy in a "special operation". In the end, 
however, the final objective is to introduce GPF who, 
capitalizing on the advantage gained by the SOF, employ 
"conventional" means to achieve combat superiority over their 
opponent. The middle phase is one of transition. The goal of 
11 
the planner is to keep this phase to a minimum. Ideally, SOF 
is relieved by GPF shortly after attaining its objectives. 
Relief, even if not under pressure, is a difficult and complex 
task for even the most well trained and familiar units. 
Relief, under pressure, of dissimilar units is an even a 
greater challenge. This, compounded by the changing nature of 
the combat environment, makes the transition phase potentially 
the most likely to see the frictions of war affect the 
attacking force. Clausewitz, 1n his chapter on the 
unification of forces in time calls this potential period, 
... the phase of confusion, the condition of 
disarray and weakness - in brief, the crisis that 
occurs in every engagement, even on the victorious 
side. 21 
The third characteristic of integrated operations is the 
changing nature of command functions. Initially, preparation 
for employing SOF demands detailed plans while execution is 
somewhat inflexible. Command functions are radically altered 
as GPF are introduced. Flexibility then is in much greater 
demand and detailed plans are overcome by events. Thus the 
command functions of planning and execution require 
fundamentally different approaches as the operation evolves. 
Therefore, integrated operations are three phased, occur 
across a changing combat environment and require dynamic 
command philosophies. Using the cases in this study, the 
nature of how these characteristics define integrated 
operations will be highlighted and further defined. 
21 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and 
Peter Paret, eds., (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1984), p. 206. 
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2. Organization Theory 
How can organization theory identify factors that affect 
mission success? Organization theory can be used to examine 
large, functionally specialized bureaucracies, a 
characteristic of most modern military organizations. 22 
Organization theory predicts that increasing specialization 
and institutionalization act against the rational setting of 
joint priorities among differing organizations. 23 Although 
Posen is specifically speaking to political-military 
integration, he notes a similar autonomy within the branches 
of the services. 24 This thesis hypothesizes that the ability 
of SOF and GPF to integrate their operations has a critical 
effect on mission success or failure. By examining the case 
causal links between studies, we can determine the 
organizational factors and mission success. 
Institutionalization is often associated with the 
structure of administration and command. Functional 
specialization is closely related to a unit's ability to train 
for an assigned mission. A units ability to accomplish 
assigned tasks is more often associated with its capabilities, 
which appear to be closely related to its functional 
specialization, than the level to which it is 
institutionalized. However the literature on the misuse of 
SOF constantly discusses appropriate level of command, 
institutional support and commanders misperceptions of SOF 
capabilities, all functions of the relative 





Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine 
Cornell University Press, 1984), p. 42. 
Posen, p. 51. 
Ibid., p. 54. 
25 For "misperceptions"' see Cohen, pp. 58-60; for 
"unity of command" and "organizational support" problems see 
Hogan, pp. 133-137; for "absence of a unity of command" see 
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In examining the special units employed 1n the cases, 
functional specialization will be measured by looking at the 
skills possessed by the unit and the amount of training it had 
to undergo to prepare for the mission. Were forces assembled 
"ad-hoc" in order to create a capability to accomplish the 
assigned task? What tasks were these units specially trained 
for and did other units of similar capability exist within the 
force structure? Finally, was there sufficient time to 
accomplish the organization and training of the unit? 
units, in short, can vary according 




training. trained, ad-hoc, and 
untrained with differences allowed for in time. 
Institutionalization will measure the level of the unit's 
command and control during engagements presented in the cases 
analyses. Did the unit have a mature, growing or immature 
tactical headquarters? Who handled replacements, casualties 
and other administrative needs? To what level of headquarters 
was the unit responsible? Was it placed under the operational 
control of local commanders or were missions planned and 
controlled by special headquarters familiar with their 
capabilities?26 This factor will also address the bureaucratic 
nature of organizations, their propensity to further their own 
agendas and friction between with organizations. 
The ability of these factors to influence mission success 
1n these critical operations has potential ramifications for 
how SOF train and organize. While it remains difficult to 
predict the changing nature of the threat and likely 
contingencies, SOF should be trained and organized to best 
suit the needs of the operational environment in which they 
King, pp. 74-75. 
26 Harned, MMAS Thesis, pp. 148-149, poses the 
question of whether SOF need a unified special operations 
command or would they be better employed under the 
operational control of theater commanders. 
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are expected to operate. If some portion of SOF will be 
involved ln integrated operations in the future, an 
improvement in organization and training could better prepare 
them for those contingencies. 
D. CASE STUDIES 
The cases were selected using the definition of 
integrated operations already presented. They were further 
restricted by the scope of this thesis, _specifically, to short 
duration strike operations, conducted by light infantry type 
units at the operational level of war. These three cases were 
chosen from integrated operations conducted in the modern era, 
1940 to the present, a period which has seen both the frequent 
employment of SOF, and, critical to this study, their 
institutionalization. 27 Second, they feature SOF mature in 
their organization, as opposed to ad hoc formations which may 
have later developed into standing forces. This will allow 
the full employment of organization theory in assessing both 
specialization and institutionalization. Since organizations 
are dynamic, the cases selected examine multiple operations. 
A minimum of two examples of operations are included in each 
case study. Finally, the cases selected vary longitudinally 
over time, spanning from early World War II to 1989. 
1. Cases 
Three cases were selected. The first covers the German 
Parachute Corps in early World War II and examines two 
integrated operations: the assault on the Eben Emael fortress 
and the Albert Canal bridges in Belgium and Operation MERCURY, 
the airborne assault on Crete. The second case is one of the 
U. S. Army's first experiments with SOF, the World War II 
Rangers. The two Ranger actions examined are the infiltration 
attack at Cisterna in the Anzio beachhead and the assault on 
27 Cohen, pp. 18-20. 
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Point du Hoc during the Normandy invasion. The final case is 
a contemporary organization, the current U. S. Army Rangers. 
The two cases examined feature the Rangers conducting forced 
entries onto the island of Grenada and the isthmus of Panama. 
2. Case Selection 
The cases selected offer differing approaches to 
organizing for and conducting integrated operations. Two 
different countries, Germany and the United States, are 
examined, as well as differing services .. The German Parachute 
Corps fell under the control of the Luftwaffe (German Air 
Force) while the World War II Rangers were an Army unit 
originally patterned on the British Commandos and organized 
for amphibious raiding. The current Rangers are Army ground 
forces first and foremost, specializing in, among other 
things, airborne assault. 
Each case looks at a different approach to the control of 
special units. The German Parachute Corps were controlled in 
an autonomous and independent manner from 1940 - 1942. The 
World War II Rangers were controlled in a very decentralized 
manner, often under the tactical control of local commanders. 
The modern Rangers have operated under an extremely 
centralized control system, often responding directly to the 
national command authority. 
The cases examine success and failure. Three of the 
operations saw mixed results, reflecting the dual nature of 
operational success in terms of tasks accomplished and 
casualties incurred when employing a special operations force. 
Additionally, ln some of the cases, success or failure 
initially did not necessarily predict the outcome of the 
overall operation. 
The cases were selected to fully develop the theory of 
integrated operations and test the hypothesis. Organization 
theory is concerned with the causal forces of purpose, people 
and environment. Purpose can be derived from operational 
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concepts and plans. People introduce uncertainty for 
commanders and their subordinate leaders. The environment, in 
terms of enemy forces, objectives and overall balance of 
forces, can present obstacles to control, coordination and 
rationality. 28 Using comparative case analysis, comparisons 
can be made over space and time in order to explain factors 
influencing mission success and failure. Other factors such 
as strategic culture, combat soldier style, opposing units and 
moral forces must still be considered. The cases selected, by 
offering a wide variation of approaches to integrated 
operations, will test the validity of the theory and present 
evidence to either refute or support the hypotheses. 
3 • Methodology 
Each case will be introduced with a brief background 
discussion of the special operations unit involved, initially 
focusing on purpose in terms of organizational development. 
Two characteristics of these units will be examined in detail, 
functional specialization and institutionalization. 
Functional specialization will be measured by the degree of 
training the unit underwent in order to achieve combat 
readiness for the assigned mission. Institutionalization will 
measure the administrative, training and command organizations 
that support the employment of the force and their degree of 
centralization. 
Second, in order to determine the causal role of people 
within these organizations, key leaders of both the special 
units and their commanders will be examined. This will 
demonstrate the crucial role played by leaders at both levels 
in determining the tasks which make up these integrated 
operations. 
28 Posen, pp. 42-44, explains the causal forces of 
purpose, people and environment in organization theory. 
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Each of the situations facing the special units will then 
be examined to determine the role environmental factors played 
1n determining the mission of the unit. Specifically, enemy 
forces, resources available and stage of conflict will be 
considered. Engagements will be examined, looking first at 
preparation and then execution. Each engagement will be 
examined in terms of factors which contributed to mission 
success or failure and, specifically, where these missions 
failed, either initially or in attaining their final 
objectives. Overall success for the special unit will be 
measured by two variables: accomplishment of assigned tasks 
and casual ties incurred. These dual measures of success 
recognize the nature of SOF as an non-renewable specialized 
asset. Organizational adjustments, leader changes and other 
lessons learned in action will be discussed in between the two 
engagements. 
Finally, the organization and its experiences will be 
analyzed, focusing on the nature of each integrated operation. 
The validity of the hypotheses will then be assessed, 
evaluating the effects of organizational factors on success or 
failure, as well as the relative impact of the two factors. 
Upon completion of all three case studies, a comparative 
analysis of these integrated operations and the two hypotheses 
will be conducted. Alternative explanations will be offered 
and evaluated against the evidence of the study. In the 
conclusion, this study will offer an assessment of SOF' s 
current ability to conduct integrated operations and 
recommendations supported by evidence gained from testing the 
hypotheses on reorganization. 
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II. GERMAN OPERATIONS (1937-1942) 
A. BACKGROUND 
The Germans developed several special units during the 
interwar years in preparation for World War II, and created 
others during the war to cope with various contingencies. To 
conduct unconventional operations, special reconnaissance, and 
small scale direct action missions, Brandenburg units were 
formed under the direction of the intelligence branch (Abwehr) 
of the German High Command (OKW) . These units often seized 
key terrain, such as bridges, to facilitate the advance of 
GPF. 29 For missions requiring larger units inserted by 
airborne means, however, the Germans frequently used elements 
of the Luftwaffe's Parachute Corps. 
The German Parachute Corps originated from both Luftwaffe 
and Army parachute units raised in the interwar period. By 
1939, however, all parachutists were placed under Luftwaffe 
control although differences in airborne doctrine between the 
Army and Air Force were still evident. The 7th Parachute 
Division, under General Student, was given overall 
responsibility for training and employing this new force and, 
later, the Army redesignated the 22d Infantry Division as a 
unit specifically designed for airlanding operations 
(Airborne) in support of parachutists. By the opening of the 
war against Poland in September 1940, the 7th Parachute 
Division consisted of two parachute rifle regiments (FJR), as 
well as supporting transport and glider units. 
Poland saw only the limited use of parachutists in 
airlanding roles late in the campaign. Airborne doctrine, 
however, was soon tested in Norway. The army desired to 
employ paratroopers on strategic missions in conjunction with 
army units. Parachute units were to be employed in mass 
29 Lucas, Kommando, pp. 9-11. 
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behind enemy lines 1n support of the schwerpunkt, or main 
effort of the army. The Luftwaffe envisioned employing 
parachutists 1n small simultaneous drops against targets 
nominated by air commanders. These units would conduct 
sabotage and threaten enemy communications from dispersed 
perimeters creating an "oil drop" effect. As the situation 
developed, the most promising perimeters would be reinforced 
to create a schwerpunkt. In April of 1940 the 1st Parachute 
Regiment (lFJR) participated 1n the invasions of Denmark and 
Norway, seizing key bridges, airfields and establishing 
blocking positions against reinforcing allied forces. These 
elements were relieved by advancing ground forces and 
reassembled for the upcoming invasion of the West.
30 
1. Assault Detachment Koch 
German airborne leaders decided in June 1939, in 
anticipation of the upcoming campaign in the West, to 
establish an assault detachment within 7th Parachute Division. 
This element would be specially trained and use special 
equipment. Although all its members would be trained 
parachutists, its primary means of infiltration would be by 
glider. Gliderborne assault detachments presented several 
advantages to parachute units. First of all, gliders could 
infiltrate covertly onto an objective, once released from 
their tow planes. Second, gliderborne troops were capable of 
landing 1n a concentrated pattern avoiding the dispersion 
caused by parachuting from transports. Additionally, 
gliderborne troops could carry not only personal weapons, but 
also heavier weapons normally requiring special drop 
procedures from transports. Finally, although parachutists 
30 James Lucas, Storming Eagles, (London: Arms and 
Armour Press, 1988), pp. 8-15, discusses the doctrinal 
debate over the employment of parachute and glider troops, 
as well as their origins and operations in Denmark and 
Norway. 
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were employed in Denmark and Norway, gliders were still 
relatively new and untried, thus the western allies were less 
suspicious of glider than parachute attacks. 31 
Assault Detachment Koch was formed in November 1939 from 
a company of I Battalion/1FJR, the pioneer platoon of II/1FJR 
and a glider unit. It was soon assigned the mission of 
neutralizing the Belgian Fortress of Eben Emael and the three 
bridges over the Albert Canal to allow army motorized units 
rapid advance into Belgium. (Map 1) 
2. Eben Em.ael 
The Eben Emael fortress was designed to provide artillery 
support to Belgian defenses along the Albert Canal and Meuse 
River. It was located approximately 15 miles from the Dutch-
German border near the junction of the Albert Canal and Meuse 
River. (Map 2) The fortress possessed two batteries of 
artillery in hardened positions for offensive and defensive 
fires. In accordance with the Belgian plans, specific gun 
positions within the batteries were sited and assigned to fire 
in support of specific areas. Positions 12 and 18 were dual 
75mm guns and sited to provide fires to the three bridges over 
the Albert Canal north of the fortress. Additionally, 
positions 23, 24 and 31 were revolving cupolas capable of 
firing in any direction. Position 24 possessed two 120mm 
guns, the largest artillery in the position, capable of firing 
12 miles in any direction. 32 (Map 3) 
Defensively, the fortress was protected by both natural 
and man-made defenses. The fortress was protected on its 
eastern side by sheer cliff walls made by the excavating of 
the Albert Canal and on the northwestern side by a moat. The 
defensive battery was cited to provide defensive fires against 
31 Lucas, Storming Eagles, p. 17. 
32 James E. Mrazek, The Fall of Eben Emael, 
California: Presidio, 1970), pp. 29-30. 
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(Novato, 
a ground attack on the perimeter of the fortress. Casemates 
were cited on the perimeter of the fort and along the cliffs 
of the Albert canal to protect the perimeter. Finally, 
tertiary batteries of four antiaircraft machine gun dugouts, 
two casemated machine gun positions and an observation post on 
position 31 were designed to support the perimeter defenses by 
providing fires on the surface of the fort.
33 (Map 4) 
The schwerpunkt of the German offensive was in the 
Ardennes sector where the motorized corps of Panzer Group 
Kleist would force a breakthrough for Army Group A. The 
German advance into Holland and Belgium by Army Group B was a 
secondary attack, designed to quickly overrun the Low 
countries and draw French and British mobile forces forward 
out of prepared positions. A rapid advance in this sector 
would reinforce the Allied preconceptions of a German main 
effort through this region, drawing forward vital reserves. 
This would allow Army Group A, moving through the difficult 
terrain of the Ardennes, to concentrate against second rate 
French units in fixed positions as it forced a crossing of the 
Meuse. Sixth Army was tasked as part of Army Group B to 
advance through Holland into Belgium. The bulk of 7th 
Parachute Division and the 22nd Airborne Division were tasked 
with supporting the advance of the northernmost 18th Army into 
the defended interior of Holland. They were specifically 
tasked with seizing key bridges, airfields and attacking 
critical nodes in support of the advance of ground forces 
using parachuting, airlanding and close air support. 
Assault Detachment Koch was given a separate mission of 
neutralizing the fortress of Eben Emael and seizing the three 
bridges over the Albert Canal in support of the advance of 6th 
Army. Fourth Panzer Division (4 PzDiv) was given the 
responsibility for linking up with the parachutists at the 
33 Mrazek, p . 3 0 . 
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bridges and was supported by a special purpose unit (zbV 100) 
of the Brandenburg Regiment who would seize the bridges over 
the Meuse in Maastricht and spearhead the advance to the 
Albert Canal. Sixth Army assigned a special battle group 
composed of Infantry Regiment 151 ( IR 151) and Engineer 
Battalion 51 with reducing the fortress and securing the Canne 
bridge. 34 Artillery support for the Assault Detachment was 
provided by Luftwaffe Flak Battalion 'Aldinger' (two batteries 
of 88mm guns) advancing with the ground units and close air 
support (CAS) was provided by Henschel 123's (Hs 123) of an 
elite training unit (II/LG2) and Junkers 87's (Ju 87) of Dive 
Bomber Group Two (StG 2). Aerial resupply was preplanned and 
would be to be conducted by Heinkel 111's (He 111) . 35 
Eben Ernael itself was authorized a garrison of 1,200, but 
only some 650 were available for the defense of the fortress 
at the time of the attack. On 10 May 1940, the offensive 
(1st) battery was assigned 206 personnel of whom some 25 
percent were absent. The defensive (2d) battery was assigned 
242 with 79 men absent. With the 223 men of the relief force 
located at Wonck, about four miles away, total forces 
available to the garrison were about 650 men broken down as 18 
officers, 62 noncommissioned officers and 570 enlisted. The 
fort, the bridge at Canne and the locks at Lanaye were under 
the command of the fortress commander, Major Jottrand. 36 The 
two northern bridges were under the control of Commandant 
Giddeloo whose headquarters were located at the caserne of 
Lanaeken. 37 
34 Telford Taylor, The March of Conguest, 
Simon and Schuster, 1958), p. 214. 
35 Cajus Bekker, The Lufwaffe War Diaries, 
City, New York: Doubleday and Co., 1968), p. 99. 
36 Mrazek, p. 30-31. 




Assault Detachment Koch was divided into four elements 
for the operation. Each element was assigned to a specific 
target. (Figure 1) Additionally, the Luftwaffe would support 
the seizure of the two northern bridges by a strike on the 
Belgian headquarters in Lanaeken by four Ju 87's at H-Hour. 
CPT Koch and his command element accompanied the Concrete 
assault group. Each group was further divided into squads, 
both infantry and engineer, which received specific missions. 
Granite detachment comprised ten squads each assigned one 
position on the fortress as well as one alternate target. 
(Map 5) 





Granite Concrete Steel Iron 
11 gliders 11 gliders 9 gliders 10 gliders 
85 men 96 men 92 men 90 men 
(det HQ 
38 men) 
Figure 1. Assault Detachment Koch. 
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The operation commenced at 0330 10 May when 41 Junkers 52 
transports (Ju 52) lifted off towing 41 DFS-23 0 gliders 
carrying some 436 men of the assault detachment. At least two 
gliders of the Granite force, one carrying the element leader, 
broke tow lines and failed to insert at H-hour. Nowhere was 
surprise complete. The Belgians were alerted as early as 0030 
by the movement of German units towards the border. By 0315 
the surface defenses of the fort were manned and warning shots 
by the fort's battery commenced shortly before the assault 
force lifted off from airfields inside Germany. The bridges 
were similarly alarmed and at H-hour all were manned as well 
as the northern command post (CP) at Lanaeken. Shortly after 
the first gliders touched down, the four Ju 87's hit the 
northern CP, killing Commandant Giddeloo and twenty of his 
headquarters personnel. 
command. 38 
The northern bridges were without 
Major Jottrand arrived at the fortress sometime before 
0100 and, upon receiving reports of the attack, ordered the 
bridge at Canne and the lock at Lanaye to be blown. Failing 
to hear the expected explosions, he again called the bridge. 
Although the officer in charge was absent and the 
noncommissioned officer in charge reluctant to act, Major 
Jottrand ordered him to destroy it. Thus, as the last gliders 
of detachment Iron touched down, the Canne bridge collapsed 
into the canal. 39 
The Germans reported anti-aircraft fire from the forts 
batteries but the nine remaining gliders of the Granite force 
landed without losses. Within 20 minutes the sappers knocked 
out the two gun positions sited to fire the north as well as 
several others. Although the squad assigned to knock position 
24 failed to reach the objective, SGT Wenzel, the platoon 
38 
39 
Ibid., p. 109. 
Ibid., pp. 82-84. 
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sergeant, disabled the guns with hand-placed demolitions. 
40 
Detachments Steel and Concrete enjoyed similar successes. The 
Veldwezelt bridge was captured within 10 minutes of landing by 
LT Altmann's Steel detachment and the Vroenhoven bridge was 
seized with similar alacrity by LT Schacht. Concrete's bridge 
was ready for traffic less than an hour after landing. 
41 
Captain Koch was soon in contact with all elements but Iron 
after establishing his CP in a blown casemate near the 
Vroenhoven bridge. Thus, approximately one hour after H-hour, 
the detachments had successfully accomplished the first part 
of their mission. (Map 6) 
With two of three bridges in their hands and the fortress 
artillery neutralized, the Assault Detachment consolidated and 
secured their objectives against Belgian counterattack. The 
Granite force received reinforcements, scheduled and 
unscheduled, when additional demolitions were dropped on the 
fort by He 111' s and LT Witzig's glider landed near the 
Granite CP at 0630. During the next 19 hours the engineers 
reduced more positions and defended their foothold on the 
surface of the fort, with close air support hitting both 
fortress positions and ground reinforcements. Engineer 
Battalion 51 established radio contact with the Granite force 
when CPT Koch passed the engineers their frequency. 
42 lead 
40 Mrazek, pp. 104-107. 
41 Schacht, Gerhart, "A first hand account of the 
German Airborne Assault on Eben Emael", German Military 
Science Review (May 1953), copy in US Army Military History 
Institute, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, no page numbers, only 
notes, p. 2. 
42 Major Charles E. Kirkpatrick, "The Attack on Eben-
Emael, A Conversation with Oberst a.D. Rudolf Witzig," 
(washington: Center for Military History, unpublished 
interview, 1988), p. 38. (Hereafter cited as Witzig 
interview) 
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elements, after two failed crossings, first established 
physical contact between 2400 and 0200. 
Within three hours all resistance ceased in the vicinity 
of the Vroenhoven bridge and the first elements of Brandenburg 
unit zbV 100 liked up there at 1230. At the blown Canne 
bridge site, elements of Iron detachment crossed to the west 
bank and established a foothold on the far side at 1600. By 
late afternoon, elements of the engineer battalion reached the 
blown bridge. Lead elements of 4 PzDiv reached the two 
northern bridge sites as early as 1430 that afternoon and by 
2130 its rifle brigade was in possession of the bridges. That 
evening the engineers crossed the canal and, by midnight, the 
main body of the engineer battalion was on the far side. 43 
Belgians on the perimeter defenses stubbornly resisted 
the combined group of assault engineers and glidermen who 
attempted to reduce their positions throughout the early 
morning. The gliderborne sappers, who interdicted position 17 
to support the first engineer assault crossing, now assisted 
in reducing positions on the western side of the fortress. 
Positions 4, 3, 6, 13 and 30 were attacked by combined groups 
of Witzig's men, infiltrated engineers and the heavy guns of 
the engineer battalion positioned near Loverix at dawn. By 
0830, the Granite force was relieved and turned its positions 
over to the engineers. The engineers and IR 151 completed 
reduction of the fort, which surrendered at 1145. 44 (Map 7) 
Apart from the blown bridge at Canne, Assault Detachment 
Koch achieved almost perfect success. Casualties totaled 25 
killed and some 65 wounded. The Granite force lost six killed 
43 Schacht, p. 5 and Mrazek, p. 147. 
44 Mrazek, p. 16. 
27 
and 20 wounded overall, with two killed and
 12 wounded ln the 
first fifteen minutes of the assault.
45 
3. Holland to Greece 
Assault Detachment Koch quickly returned to 
base where it 
remained while the campaign in the west co
ncluded. The 7th 
Parachute and 22nd Airborne Divisions 
concluded their 
operations in Holland as they were relie
ved by advancing 
ground forces. Experiences in Belgium and
 Holland validated 
the German use of gliders as a compo
nent of airborne 
operations, as missions in Holland suffere
d heavy losses in 
both transports and special purpose units
. 46 Additionally, 
parachutists found themselves outgunned 
after the initial 
phase of the operation as they held critica
l positions against 
the more heavily armed Dutch. This experien
ce led the Germans 
to develop lightweight light artillery and 
anti-tank guns for 
employment in future operations.
47 Planning and reorganization 
followed as the Germans capitalized on the
se lessons learned 
and prepared for the invasion of Englan
d. The Luftwaffe 
created the XI Air Corps under recently pro
moted LTG Student, 
severely wounded in Holland, to control al
l airborne forces, 
including transports a~d specialized troops. The e
xisting 
formations expanded with the 7th Parachu
te Division being 
brought up to full tables of organizatio
n with three full 
parachute regiments and associated s
pecialist troops. 
Specialized troops directly under control 
of Corps included 
the Parachute Engineer and Machine Gun Bat
talions as well at 
the Assault Regiment, the successor to 
Assault Detachment 
Koch. Although plans for invading England w
ere shelved, a new 
45 Ibid. I p. 109. 
46 Bekker, 142. 
47 Lucas, Storming Eagles, p. 38. 
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challenge unfolded as the Germans turned towards the Balkans 
in 1941. 
4. The Assault Regiment 
The success of Koch's detachment convinced the Germans of 
the value of a specialized assault unit within the Parachute 
Corps. The detachment was therefore expanded to form the 
Assault Regiment. Command of this elite unit was placed in 
the hands of MG Meindl, a former artilleryman who commanded 
airborne units with distinction in Norway. Major Koch, 
recently promoted after his performance in Belgium, led the 
first (I Bn) of the four battalions of this unit which was 
organized to spearhead airborne operations through a 
combination of glider and parachute tactics. All battalions 
were authorized to be manned at levels above normal for even 
the elite parachute corps and, additionally, the regiment's 
fourth battalion consisted exclusively of airborne heavy 
weapons and engineers. Volunteers for the unit were drawn 
from experienced parachutists and others selected from 
volunteers throughout the army. 48 
5. Operation MERCURY 
Luftwaffe leaders began considering an airborne assault 
on the island of Crete as early as October 1940 in support of 
proposed German operations in the Mediterranean. 49 The Germans 
forward deployed a airborne brigade group based on the 2FJR, 
for airborne operations during Operation MAITA, the campaign 
48 For details on the Assault Regiment see Ian 
Stewart, The Struggle for Crete, (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1966), pp. 161 and 165. For the expansion of Assault 
Detachment Koch see Roger Edwards, German Paratroops in 
World War II (New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1974), p. 
80. 
49 Callum MacDonald, The Lost Battle: 
(New York: The Free Press, 1993), p. 59. 
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Crete 1941, 
in Greece. 50 As the Germans advanced through Greece, the 2FJR 
seized the bridge over the Corinth Canal on 27 April 1941 by 
combined parachute and glider assault in an attempt to trap 
retreating Commonwealth forces. Although the combined assault 
was successful, the bridge was blown immediately after seizure 
by the British and the drop was too late to trap a large 
number retreating troops. (Map 8) 
Hitler issued his directive to take Crete on 25 April 
1941, code named Operation MERCURY. The Luftwaffe was tasked 
with overall command, with the army and navy playing 
supporting roles. (Figure 2) 
Operation MERCURY 
7th Para Div (+) 
Gen Sussman 
5th Mtn Div (+) 
Gen Ringel 
Transport Group 
650 Ju 52/70 gliders 
Corps Troops 
Transport 




150 dive bombers 
200 fighters 
2 recon groups 
650 total aircraft 
Figure 2. Command relationships: Operation MERCURY. 
50 Lucas, Storming Eagles, p. 41. 
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As opposed to the Luftwaffe's desire for a solely 
airborne operation, Hitler insisted on a seaborne echelon for 
the invasion. Also, the entire operation was subordinate to 
and designed not to conflict with the upcoming BARBAROSSA 
operation. 51 The Luftwaffe designated the 4th Air Fleet, under 
General Lohr, as the headquarters responsible for the assault. 
Lohr had at his disposal the XI Air Corps (Student) providing 
assault troops, VIII Air Corps (Richtofen) for air support and 
army elements from the reinforced 5th Mountain Division (MG 
Ringel), to replace his airlanding element, the 22d Airborne 
Division, which was unable to reach Greece. The Navy provided 
transport for the seaborne echelon with chartered and captured 
Greek sailing vessels and liaison with the Italian Navy 
provided surface escorts. 
As the campaign in Greece concluded and forces redeployed 
for their upcoming roles in BARBAROSSA, the Germans received 
only scanty intelligence on the island and its defenses. 
Aerial reconnaissance revealed little activity, few defenses 
and gave scant detail on the terrain of the island. The 
Germans believed the island was defended by an under strength 
division while evacuees from the Greek campaign were being 
taken off at night. When combined with the shattered remnants 
of the Greek Army evacuated from the mainland and a minuscule 
RAF force, the Germans felt confident of their success. 52 
The German debate on operational technique for the 
assault centered around their previous doctrinal debate and 
bureaucratic politics. General Lohr wanted to employ assault 
elements in a schwerpunkt to seize a critical airfield, then 
introduce follow-on forces and roll up the island defenses. 
He preferred Maleme airfield area for the location of the 
initial attack. Lieutenant General Student, on the other 
51 MacDonald, p. 62. 
52 Stewart, p. 89. 
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hand, favored an almost simultaneous drop of his entire 
airborne force in a coup de main to seize the three critical 
airfields and port area. Student, only recently recovered 
from his wounding in Holland, but very much in favor, 
aggressively pursued an airborne-exclusive option for taking 
the island. The resulting compromise, favoring Student's 
alternative but limited by lift capability, envisioned a 
sequential assault from west to east, beginning with 
simultaneous attacks on Maleme by Group West and Canea-Suda 
Bay by Group Center, designated as the main effort. Eight 
hours later, drops would occur on the two eastern airfield at 
Heraklion and Retimo. Follow on forces were scheduled for 
introduction in all areas. 
The Assault Regiment was tasked with the seizure of 
Maleme airfield as well as detaching two glider companies to 
knock out critical nodes for the capture of Cania for Group 
Center. (Figure 3) Major General Meindl, commander of the 
Assault Regiment, also commanded Group West. His forces were 
to be inserted at H-hour by both parachute and glider after 
extensive airstrikes on the Maleme airfield and surrounding 
defenses. Follow on forces included a seaborne echelon with 
a reinforced battalion of mountain infantry with heavy weapons 
scheduled to land on D+ 1 on the Maleme beaches and an 
airlanding echelon also consisting of mountain infantry and 
motorcycle elements to be brought in a soon as he secured the 
airfield. Meindl's plan envisioned seizing critical nodes 
around the airfield by gliderborne assault with parachute 
elements landing off the objective, assembling and launching 
a concentric attack to seize the airfield itself. Detachments 
would be dropped to block his unprotected west and southern 
flanks. 
After detaching two companies to Group Center, Meindl 
allocated I Battalion(-) under Major Koch and elements of III 
Battalion under the Regimental Operations Officer (Ia), Major 
32 
Braun to the gliderborne seizure of critical points around the 
airfield. II Battalion under Major Stentzler would be dropped 
west of the Tavronitis river and provided the western security 
detachment while the bulk of III Battalion under Major 
Scherber would drop east of the airfield. The bulk of IV 
Battalion under CPT Gericke would drop west of the river and 
support the attack on the airfield with heavy weapons from 
that direction while providing its pioneer company for 
southern security. 53 
Maleme Airfield 
I I I 
A MG Meindl COL Ramcke 
l 
I 
I [ii:J (+) II ~~,I Ill ~ IV [)(I 
Braunl>~<l Stentzler Scherber Gericke Bridge West of East of West of Airfield Airfield River 
Koch ~<I Hill107 
Plessen~ AA 
Figure 3. The Assault Regiment. 
The Germans not only grossly underestimated the number and 
caliber of troops defending Crete but also provided the 
53 Stewart, p. 162. 
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Commonwealth forces almost near perfect intelligence through 
Ultra decrypts. With some 40,000 troops in varied states of 
efficiency from the Greek campaign, General Freyberg, the New 
Zealander who commanded the Commonwealth forces on the island 
employed a full brigade to defend the Maleme area. The 
British command in the Mediterranean were fully aware of the 
impending airborne assault from decrypted signals, however, 
Freyberg was somewhat limited in positioning his forces due to 
possibly compromising the ULTRA secret. 54 
The 5th NZ Brigade under Brigadier Hargest was charged 
with defense of the area and 22d Battalion under LTC Andrew 
occupied the airfield and key terrain in its vicinity. Only 
the area west of the Tavronitis river remained unguarded. In 
support of 5th Brigade were assorted units fighting as 
infantry, such as the Field Punishment Center, 7th Field 
Company (engineers) and 19th Army Troops Company as well as 
Royal Air Force (RAF) personnel stationed at the airfield 
itself. Artillery support was provided by three troops of 
improvised artillery consisting of three Italian 75mm 
howitzers, two British 3.7-inch howitzers and four French 75mm 
guns respectively. In support were two and a half troops of 
Light Anti-Aircraft (AA) (ten bofors guns) and Royal Marine 
detachments manning two 3-inch AA guns and two 4-inch coast 
defense guns. Finally, two Infantry (I) tanks of the 7th 
Royal Tank Regiment (RTR) were dug in above the airfield as a 
reserve. 55 Although the New Zealanders had lost a great deal 
of equipment, particularly among heavy weapons and signals, 
54 MacDonald, pp. 138, 144 and 160. 
55 D. M. Davin, Crete (Official History of New 
Zealand in the Second World War 1939-45, (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1953), pp. 64-5. 
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22d Battalion had a strength of 20 officers and some 600 
enlisted on 20 May 1941. 56 
The Germans employed extensive aerial preparation for the 
assault on Crete and Maleme airfield. Aerial preparation 
began on 14 May with strikes against RAF operations at the 
three airfields, AA positions and British shipping. By 19 
May, the commander of VIII Air Corps, General Richtofen 
announced that only a few AA positions remained, the Luftwaffe 
now possessed air superiority over the island and could strike 
at will. 57 
6. Maleme Airfield 
H-Hour over Maleme airfield for the Assault Regiment was 
0715 (British time) and was preceded by an hour of scheduled 
airs trikes by fighters and bombers of the VIII Air Corps. 
Although these strikes inflicted heavy casualties on the light 
AA around the airfield and restricted movement of ground 
units, the New Zealand ground defenses were little affected by 
these attacks. 58 
The initi~l insertion of the Assault Regiment met with 
several mishaps. (Map 9) The glider detachments were the 
first to land and suffered heavy casualties. The Plessen 
detachment successfully knocked out the light AA guarding the 
river mouth but lost its commander and was repulsed by C 
Company. The survivors regrouped under direction of a doctor 
under cover of the riverbank. Similarly, the Braun detachment 
captured the river bridge and overran the RAF camp on the edge 
of the airfield but was repulsed by D Company and likewise 
lost Major Braun killed. The Koch detachment met with the 
least success, coming down on the slopes of Hill 107 where it 
56 Davin, p. 98. 
57 MacDonald, p. 79. 
58 See Stewart, pp. 147-152 for a graphic depiction 
of the pre-assault bombardment. 
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was decimated by the New Zealanders in 
Major Koch was severely wounded and 
dug in positions. 
survivors of his 
detachment sought cover of the river south of the bridge under 
command of the detachment medical officer.
59 
The drop of the supporting parachute elements met with 
mixed results. The II Battalion dropped accurately west of 
the river and assembled successfully with few casual ties. 
Similarly, IV Battalion landed intact with three companies 
west of the river. Its pioneer company. landed further to the 
south near its security position. To the east, III Battalion 
dropped somewhat north of its planned Drop Zone (DZ) along the 
coast, right into the middle of the remainder of 5th Brigade. 
The bulk of the battalion, some 400 men, were lost in close 
quarters action shortly after landing. All officers were 
either killed or wounded, including the battalion commander. 
Only small elements of two companies, scattered in the drop to 
the south and west were spared.
60 The coup de main to seize 
the Maleme airfield had failed. 
As he gathered reports from his units, MG Meindl realized 
his initial assault failed and proceeded with plans to attack 
the airfield concentrically with his parachute battalions. 
Early in the engagement, however, he was wounded. 
Nonetheless, he directed Major Stenzler with two companies 
from II Battalion to move to the south for an encircling 
attack on the hill while he personally directed the three 
companies of IV Battalion and survivors of the glider assault 
force in a direct assault exploiting the limited success of 
capturing the river bridge.
61 Although this attack made some 
limited gains, overrunning a platoon of C Company and bringing 
59 Ibid., pp. 163-4. 
60 Ibid., p. 165. 
61 Ibid., p. 165. 
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pressure on Hill 107 from the south, by nightfall 22d 
Battalion still held its positions overlooking the airfield. 
(Map 10) Stenzler's flanking move was held up by a platoon of 
21st Battalion posted above the river on the southwest slope 
of the hill. It was unable to reach the base of the hill 
until late in the evening, where it halted, exhausted. Late in 
the afternoon at 1700, LTC Andrew sent the two I tanks into 
action with makeshift infantry support, consisting of his 
reserve platoon augmented with volunteer anti-aircraft 
gunners, causing a panic among German defenders at the 
bridge. 62 One tank suffered mechanical malfunction and 
withdrew while the other bottomed out and was abandoned after 
passing under the river bridge and heading north under fire 
from all directions. The makeshift infantry and dismounted 
crews withdrew with heavy casualties. 63 Nonetheless, promised 
reinforcements from both 21st and 23d Battalions were expected 
as well as from the 28th (Maori) Battalion in reserve at 
Platanias yet to be engaged. 
By dusk, 22d Battalion remained in control of Hill 107 
and Maleme airfield. Both the coup de main and concentric 
assault had been repulsed at Maleme as well as in other 
sectors. Back in Athens, LTG Student received reports from 
his units with alarm. The situation at Maleme was echoed by 
the other sectors where casualties were heavy and gains few. 
Nowhere did the Germans control the needed airfield. A failed 
landing attempt on Maleme airfield at midday by two Ju 52's 
carrying an airfield control party confirmed what the Assault 
Regiment reported. Nonetheless, that night Student decided to 
shift his main effort to Maleme. Early the following morning 
he sent another Ju 52 with CPT Kleye to make a personal 
reconnaissance. Although his aircraft was somewhat damaged 
62 Ibid., p. 172-3. 
63 Davin, p. 110. 
37 
during his short stay, Kleye confirmed the tenuous hold of the 
remnants of the Assault Regiment on the western end of the 
airfield. Student marshalled his remaining reserves, two and 
a half companies allocated during planning as well as two 
additional companies from II/2FJR who were bumped from the 
initial drop into Heraklion. These reinforcements were placed 
in charge of Student's liaison officer to the Mountain 
Division, Colonel Rarncke, a grizzled World War I combat 
veteran and late corner to the paratroopers at age 51. Student 
planned to drop them the next day to assist the Assault 
Regiment in seizing the airfield to allow immediate airlanding 
of the mountain infantry. 64 That night, also, the first 
seaborne flotilla was delayed removing the possibility of 
scheduled seaborne reinforcement. 
Unknown to the Germans, however, decisions were being 
made which were to give them control of the key terrain 
overlooking the airfield. Shortly after midnight, LTC Andrew 
ordered the remnants of his A and B Companies off Hill 107 and 
pulled them back closer to the 23d Battalion. Almost 
simultaneously, two relief companies, one from the 23d and one 
from the 28th approached 22d Battalions positions. The 23d 
Battalion company occupied positions vacated by Andrew but, 
with no one to support, withdrew back to their own perimeter. 
Similarly, the Maori company advanced along the coast road to 
eastern side of the airfield. Unable to link up with any 
elements of 22d Battalion, they retired back along the coast 
road. Lieutenant Colonel Andrew made the decision to withdraw 
his battalion which, due to poor communications, he believed 
almost wiped out. He failed to receive promised 
reinforcements and contact had been lost with his forward 
companies. At approximately 043 0, the last members of D 
64 MacDonald, p. 196. 
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Company, vainly searching for their battalion CP, withdrew 
from the hill to the positions of 23d Battalion. 65 (Map 11) 
Sometime during the early morning, but no later than 
0800, elements of the Gericke and Stentzler groups linked up 
atop Hill 107. Captain Kleye's Ju 52 also landed that morning 
and, at 0800, six Ju 52s set down near the mouth of the river 
with an unauthorized delivery of ammunition and arms. One of 
these aircraft also evacuated the wounded commander of the 
Assault Regiment. 66 (Map 12) They were followed shortly by 
a drop of a parachute anti-tank company which landed 
unmolested west of the river. Gericke used these 
reinforcements to clear the airfield, a task he was unable to 
accomplish until 1600. At 1530 a second group of parachutists 
from II/2FJR began dropping east of the airfield. These 
parachutists suffered the same fate as the III battalion the 
day before. Falling on top of the New Zealand Engineers and 
the 28th Battalion, they were virtually annihilated, only a 
party of some 80 men reaching Pirgos that evening. A second 
group, consisting of two and a half companies under Colonel 
Ramcke, landed west of the river at about 1900 near the 
Regimental CP where Ramcke took charge of the battle. 
Meanwhile at 1700 hours, with the airfield still under 
artillery fire, lead elements of the II Battalion/100 Mountain 
Infantry Regiment (II/100) and the Regimental Headquarters 
under Colonel Utz began ai~landing at Maleme airfield. By 
darkness, with all but 12 aircraft landing at the airfield and 
over 20 aircraft wrecked from crashes or artillery fire, 
Colonel Ramcke had sufficient forces in the airhead to begin 
offensive operations. 67 (Map 13) 
65 Accounts of the failed reinforcement and withdrawl 
of 22d Battalion can be found in Stewart, pp. 176-180. 
66 MacDonald, p. 204. 
67 Ibid., pp. 207-209. 
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Even with the destruction of the seaborne echelon that 
night by the Royal Navy, the balance was beginning to tip in 
the favor of the Germans. An early morning attack by elements 
of the 20th and 28th Battalions supported by three light tanks 
managed to reach the edge of the runway near the beach but 
failed against unlimited enemy a1r support and stubborn 
defense by isolated parachutists. Airlanding of mountain 
infantry continued during the attack with some coming straight 
off the transports into a desperate defense of the airhead. 
By the end of the day there were some 137 wrecked transports 
around the field, which was kept clear by an airfield clearing 
party using a captured Bren gun carrier and prisoners of war. 
A less organized counterattack by elements of 21st Battalion 
at 0700 made progress almost to the banks of the Tavronitis 
before being driven back by the fresh mountain infantry. 
Continued introduction of three mountain infantry battalions 
into the airhead on the 22d and the arrival of General Ringel 
increased pressure on the New Zealand southern flank. Led by 
Colonel Utz, the mountain infantry enveloped the defenders out 
of their positions along the high ground and out of artillery 
range of the airfield. These units also effected linkup with 
isolated elements of Group Center. With the failure of this 
counterattack to retake Maleme airfield, the battle of Crete 
was for all intents and purposes over. (Map 14) 
Although the battle on Crete lasted until 1 June, the 
role of the Assault Regiment as an airborne spearhead ended 
with the introduction of the 5th Mountain Division. In fact, 
General Student was de facto relieved of his responsibilities 
for the battle by his superiors in favor of General Ringel 
because of the initial failure of his plan. 
68 Casualties 
during the operation were higher than the Balkans campaign to 
date with some 4, 000 total killed. Casualties among the 
68 Ibid., pp. 209-210. 
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airborne units were particularly heavy. The Luftwaffe 
reported some 2,164 killed or missing and 2,097 wounded. 69 Of 
its approximately 2,130 men, the Assault Regiment reported 50 
officers and 1,000 men killed. 70 Losses included the brigade 
major and one battalion commander killed as well as tqe 
regimental commander and one battalion commander seriously 
wounded. All the officers of II Battalion were either killed 
or wounded and some companies were annihilated in the 
fighting. Elements of the Regiment saw limited action on the 
eastern front individually, but it saw no further actions as 
a unit. Its battered remnants were used as cadres for the new 
2d Parachute Division which was raised under General Ramcke in 
Brittany in 1943. 71 German airborne units saw no further large 
scale employment in airborne roles for the remainder of the 
war. Although their establishment would grow to Army size and 
eventually include eleven parachute and even armored 
formations, they were primarily employed as shock troops, 
defending key positions against allied attacks. They were 
used sparingly in small groups for airborne operations in 
Tunisia, Sicily, Italy, the island of Leros in the Rhodes and 
finally in the Ardennes during the ill-fated 
counteroffensive. 72 
69 Conrad Seibt, "The Crete Operation", in World War 
II German Military Studies, Volume 13 (New York: Garland 
Publishing, 1979), p. 97. 
70 Losses for the Assault Regiment taken from 
Stewart, pp. 161 and 476. 
71 Lucas, Storming Eagles, pp. 172-3. 
72 Ibid., pp. 170-6. 
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B. ANALYSIS 
Both Eben Emael and Maleme Airfield are examples of 
Also, both illuminate the German 
of integrated operations from an 
integrated operations. 
approach to the conduct 
organizational standpoint. 
The operation to capture the fortress at Eben Emael is 
often cited as a "classic" special operation.
73 Conversely, 
the airborne assault on Crete, was cited by many as "the 
graveyard of the German parachutists" and a misapplication of 
the airborne concept. 74 Eben Emael, however, was less of a 
unilateral special operation than an integrated operation. 
Maleme airfield likewise saw employment of the same unit to 
seize a critical node for introduction of further follow-on 
forces which were necessary to conquer the island. Both are 
thus better examined under the paradigm of integrated 
operations. 
1. Integrated Operations 
The success at Eben Emael was in part responsible for the 
decision to plan for and execute Operation MERCURY. Assault 
Detachment Koch's success, as well as experience in Holland, 
gave the Germans confidence 1n their operational capability to 
conduct integrated operations using select elements of the 
Parachute Corps. The German Army correctly ascertained, as 
had the Allies, the folly of fixed fortification against 
73 For two examples see McRaven, pp. 41-113, and 
Lucas, Kommando, pp. 53-69. McRaven calls the operation 
" ... one of the most decisive victories in the history of 
special operations ... " in his thesis which deals mainly with 
special operations of a direct action nature conducted at 
the strategic or operational level of war. Lucas, in his 
study of German special operations in World War II, devotes 
an entire chapter to a detailed account of the seizure of 
the fort. 
74 These views are widespread in the literature 
associated with the battle, from both sides. For an example 
see Stewart, pp. 484-8. 
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modern, mobile warfare. In fact, the purpose of the entire 
advance into Holland was to draw forward allied mobile 
reserves to establish conditions under which the German 
schwerpunkt could exploit the needed breakthrough in the 
Ardennes. 75 The "sickle" plan allowed the Germans to avoid the 
Maginot line defenses, draw the allied mobile reserve out of 
position and focus the German heavy point of Panzer Group 
Kleist against second rate French units defending the weaker 
defenses of the Meuse. 
The seizure of Albert Canal bridges and neutralization of 
Eben Emael similarly avoided direct assaults on fortified 
areas until insuring a rapid advance of armored columns 
facilitated by gliderborne, parachute and unconventional 
assets. The mission of the assault detachment first and 
foremost was to seize the Albert Canal bridges, the bridges in 
Maastricht being allotted to zbV 100. 76 Granite's mission was 
to neutralize artillery fires on the bridges. As Witzig 
himself stated, "No one wanted more from us than silencing the 
artillery on the fort. "77 He also noted the Belgian batteries 
were entirely inadequate for the task. He stated, " ... the 
75mm guns could not reach the bridges they were supposed to 
protect. That's crazy." 78 Only the 120mm guns in the central 
cupola could reach the bridges, 
good were only two guns 
and Witzig noted, " ... what 
for the three bridges?" 79 
75 For the overall concept of the German plan in the 
West see Taylor, pp. 216-218. For a revisionist 
interpretation of the objectives of the "sickle" plan see 
R. H. S. Stolfi, Hitler's Panzers East, (Norman: Oklahoma 
University Press, 1993). Finally, for the intent of the 
Eben Emael operation within the overall context of the 
advance into Holland see Witzig interview, p. 21. 
76 Schacht, p. 3. 
77 Witzig interview, p. 20. 
78 Ibid., pp. 41 and 54. 
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Additionally, the Germans assigned a special task force, drawn 
from General Headquarters ( GHQ) and Army reserves to the 
relief of the Iron and Granite detachments. Infantry Regiment 
151 was a 61st Infantry Division unit, being held in Army 
reserve and Engineer Battalion 51 was a GHQ unit. 8° Fourth 
Panzer Divis ion, spearhead of Hoepner's XVI Panzer Corps, 
tasked its rifle brigade to linkup with the Steel and Concrete 
detachments and facilitate the follow on of the panzer 
columns. 81 Therefore, the entire operation was directed at 
facilitating the advance of the Panzer Corps rapidly into 
Holland, a task which demanded first, seizing and protecting 




also correctly assessed that more 
would be needed to hold the positional 
gains achieved by the assault detachment. The scheduled drops 
of supplies and heavy machine gun sections at the bridges, the 
availability of CAS after the initial assault and the pushing 
forward of the Flak battalion to deliver artillery fires all 
were designed to assist the special units in holding their 
positions against conventional counterattacks by Belgian 












80 See Taylor, p. 214 for overall task organization. 
Ian Hogg, German Order of Battle. 1944 (London: Arms and 
Armour Press, 1975), p. 90 lists the units as well as their 
sub-units and W. Hubatsch, 61.INF Division (Bad-Nauheim: 
Podzun-Verlag, 1961), p. 140, details the organization of 
division elements for the operation. 
81 Taylor, p. 214. 
82 See Mrazek, Witzig interview, p. 36 and Schacht, 
pp. 1 and 3 for accounts of German CAS during the operation. 
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Additionally, the Flak battalion provided particularly 
effective counter battery fire against Belgian artillery which 
took the bridge at Veldwezelt under fire shortly after its 
capture by the Steel force. 83 The Germans were especially 
successful in maintaining the positional advantage gained by 
their special units until arrival of follow on forces. 
In the intervening phase of transition, however, the 
Germans suffered heavily and felt their positional advantage 
slipping. With the exception of the. Iron detachment, all 
elements of the assault detachment accomplished assigned tasks 
within an hour of landing. The Iron detachment suffered 
particularly heavy casualties, including its commander, as it 
was forced to cross the canal under fire to secure the far 
bank for arrival of the engineers. 84 Granite detachment's 
initial casualties were slight, two killed and 12 wounded, and 
linkup appeared imminent when the first force reached Witzig 
between 1000 and 1200 hours the first day. These 
reinforcements were from the other lost glider carrying the 
squad originally assigned to destroy position 24, which had 
landed in Germany. Sergeant Maier's squad proceeded to the 
bridge overland, arriving on the east bank of the Albert Canal 
where they made contact with Witzig. Actual relief by the 
engineers did not occur until the following day at 0800, 
costing the detachment another four killed and eight wounded. 
The engineers also suffered casualties in crossing the canal 
and assaulting the entrance to the fort. 85 It was during this 
Interestingly, the assault detachments had no radio 
communications with the supporting aircraft, relying on 
scheduled targets, visual signals and prioritized targets of 
opportunity. 
83 Schacht, p. 4. 
84 Ibid. I p. 4. 
85 Witzig interview, p. 56. 
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period, after the emotional surprise of the glider assault had 
worn off and the Belgians began to mount conventional 
counterattacks and counterbarrages, that accounts reflect the 
slim degree by which the Germans held onto gains on the 
surface of the fort. 86 Early relief at the other bridges, as 
early as 1300 hours by some accounts, narrowed this 
vulnerability for the other detachments.
87 
Operation MERCURY and, in particular, the seizure of 
Maleme airfield was also an integrated operation, albeit on a 
larger scale. The assault element was of regimental 
(approximately 1,860 men) strength, as opposed to the 
battalion SlZe element of some 500 which took part in Eben 
Emael. It featured the gliderborne I Battalion (I Bn) 
employed against critical nodes to facilitate the introduction 
and employment of follow-on forces. Tasks assigned to I Bn 
included knocking out the AA sites at the mouth of the 
Tavorinits river, seizing the river bridge, the camp on the 
south edge of the airfield and Hill 107, all by gliderborne 
assault. The failure of Koch's detachment in particular, had 
severe repercussions for Group West and, ln fact, XI Air 
Corps. The follow on parachute battalions were forced into a 
concentric attack on the airfield without the commanding 
ground of Hill 107 resulting in repulse and heavy losses. The 
minor successes gained in knocking out the AA batteries and 
capturing the bridge, gained with heavy losses, allowed the 
Germans to exploit slight advantages gained initially in the 
conventional struggle for the airfield which followed. 
The Germans suffered from several disadvantages in a 
conventional struggle for the airfield. The New Zealanders 
possessed a superiority of numbers, a limited armor and 
86 See both Witzig interview, pp. 38, and Mrazek, pp. 
123-134. 
87 Schacht, p. 4. 
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artillery capability and an established defensive network 
centered on the critical terrain overlooking the airfield. 
The Germans initially had almost no reserve to throw into the 
fight, having allocated almost their entire force to initial 
insertions or the seaborne element. 88 They additionally proved 
unable to divert any reinforcements to the Maleme area from 
other sectors. The assault regiment, therefore, was forced to 
fight it out with their New Zealand opponents on the first day 
alone. 
German advantages, however, were numerous and quickly 
brought into play. The overwhelming air superiority enjoyed 
by the parachutists hindered the employment of the New 
Zealanders 
nightfall. 
superlor numbers, especially reserves, until 
Similarly, both artillery and armor were 
vulnerable to the roving fighters and dive bombers of the VIII 
Air Corps. Finally, the remaining two battalions of the 
assault regiment were in relatively good shape after landing. 
The VI Battalion, in particular, with its heavy weapons, was 
well suited in providing valuable support to the lightly armed 
parachutists. Therefore the Germans, in spite of their 
mistakes in preparation and initial execution, were postured 
favorably for conducting the mission under more conventional 
terms. 
Before the Germans could bring overwhelming conventional 
combat power to bear, however, they first had to muster their 
limited resources to overcome their initial setbacks. Thus, 
Meindl and, after his evacuation, Gericke, concentrated all 
their efforts on the seizure of Hill 107. All remaining 
assets of the regiment were directed at seizing this key piece 
of terrain. In spite of the disastrous effects of the initial 
drop, the regiment possessed almost continuous communications 
88 Stewart, pp. 254 and 259, note 23. 
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with XI Air Corps in Athens. 89 The New Zealanders, on the 
other hand, were unable to communicate with either their 
higher headquarters reliably, or more importantly, their 
companies defending the airfield. 90 Again, during this period 
of transition in the battle, the frictions of war had 
debilitating impacts on the New Zealand commanders, leading 
them to evacuate Hill 107, virtually conceding the airfield, 
and, in fact, the island, to the Germans. 
Both Eben Emael and Maleme airfield were integrated 
operations. At Eben Emael, special units accomplished 
critical tasks initially, allowing the introduction of follow 
on GPF which completed the overall mission and fulfilled the 
intent of the mission. At Maleme airfield, special units 
failed to seize the decisive initial advantage and, during 
much of the transitionary phase of the battle, the issue was 
1n doubt. However, the employment of follow on forces, first 
1n the form of the parachutists, heavy weapons and CAS, 
exploited small gains made by the special unit. Finally, the 
arrival of the mountain infantry provided the overwhelming 
combat power to secure the airfield and, eventually, the 
island. 
2. Organization Theory 
The Germans successfully employed forces that were 
institutionally autonomous from GPF and, in fact, from other 
SOF. They were employed by special headquarters until linkup 
with follow on GPF. The units were specialized in their 
training, although other, more specialized SOF, were available 
in the case of Eben Emael. Additionally, at Maleme airfield, 
the original plan envisioned the Assault Regiment remaining 
under control of XI Air Corps until completion of the 
campaign. 
89 Ibid., p. 253. 
90 Davin, p. 104. 
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a. Institutionalization 
Both Assault Detachment Koch and its descendant, the 
Assault Regiment, were controlled by the Luftwaffe. Personnel 
were drawn from the Parachute Corps and administered by their 
higher tactical headquarters, 7th Parachute Division and then 
XI Air Corps. Operationally, they were controlled separately 
from other tactical units of their size, but remained under 
control of special headquarters. During Eben Emael, Koch was 
under control of VIII Air Corps until linkup and the XI Air 
Corps controlled the Assault Regiment until the arrival of MG 
Ringel, commander of the mountain troops at Maleme airfield. 
The growth of the Assault Detachment into the Assault Regiment 
implies the Germans recognized the need for such elements to 
be outside the tactical chain of command, yet permanently 
organized. 
Even in inception, Koch's detachment was in no way 
an ad hoc unit. Built around his own parachute company, it 
was more appropriately, a task organized unit. Witzig's 
platoon, the only engineer platoon in the embryonic division, 
was only administratively attached to II Bn/FJR1 for lack of 
any other supporting headquarters. He later remarked, " ... it 
was not particularly difficult to separate from II 
Bn/FJR1 ... and attach myself to Koch's command." 91 
Additionally, in spite of poor intelligence on the target, it 
had more than adequate preparation time. Witzig considered 14 
days the minimum training period necessary to complete the 
mission. 92 In fact, they had over seven months. 
The Assault Regiment was an expanded version of 
Koch's element which benefited from many of the lessons 
learned at Eben Emael and in Holland. Designated as Corps 
troops, the regiment was commanded by a Major General (German 
91 Witzig interview, p. 6. 
92 Ibid., p. 14. 
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equivalent of a brigadier general), organized with more heavy 
weapons than a normal parachute regiment and authorized an 
excess in personnel. It had a fourth battalion, not present 
in a FJR, which possessed specially developed heavy weapons 
including mortars, machine guns, light artillery and anti-tank 
guns, all air deliverable. This gave the regiment a self 
sufficiency not found in normal parachute regiments.
93 
Recognized as the elite within the elite, its missions on 
Crete included not only the Maleme airfield, but it also 
detached two companies to assist Group Center in knocking out 
critical nodes for the seizure of Cania and Suda port. 
Additionally, the Parachute Corps itself became 
highly institutionalized. Successes early in the war gave it 
a preeminent status, particularly with the political 
leadership. Student's aggressive pursuit of the opportunities 
in the Mediterranean indicate he saw further prosecution of 
the war in that theater as beneficial to the growth of the 
strategically mobile airborne arm. The increasing 
institutionalization of Student's organization ran afoul of 
bureaucratic resistance from the more conventionally minded 
GPF commanders, both in the Army and Air Force. Their sights 
were directed on BARBAROSSA and the employment of massive GPF. 
Rising institutionalization and correspondingly aggressive 
pursuit of missions undoubtedly led planners at XI Air Corps 
to plan Operation MERCURY with a significant degree of 
motivated bias. This in turn led to significant planning 
errors. Student placed little faith in his seaborne echelon, 
or the mountain infantry, instead relying on his parachute and 
assault regiments to seize Crete in a coup de main. When this 
failed, integration of follow-on forces was significantly 
jeopardized and successes only gained by bold and daring 
93 
Forces, 
U. S. War Department, Handbook on German Military 
(Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1990), p. 109. 
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action on part of JUnlor leaders and the poor decisions of 
their opponents. 
b. Functional Specialization 
The German forces assigned to these two operations 
were functionally specialized within their parent 
organizations, but not the most specialized units available 
for the mission. For the Eben Emael mlsslon, other, more 
specialized units from Brandenburg Regiment could have 
possibly have been used. This however, would have required 
parachute and glider training for these skills were 
unavailable in the Brandenburg Regiment at this time. 94 
Although the impression is given in much of the literature 
that Assault Detachment Koch was composed of personnel 
specially selected for the Eben Emael mission, interviews with 
the key commanders present a different picture. Koch's force 
was based on his 1st Company from 1FJR, formerly an army mixed 
infantry/engineer company, which had transferred to the 
Luftwaffe. Witzig's platoon, also often characterized as a 
specially selected force, was automatically assigned to the 
mission because, 11 ••• this was a particularly engineer mission 
assaults on prepared fortifications ... II and II ••• simply 
because there were no other engineers ln the airborne 
forces ... 11 95 Brandenburg units, such as those assigned 
seizure of the bridges in Maastricht, were much more 
functionally specialized than the parachutists. Brandenburg 
units were selected from ethnic Germans who possessed 
94 Lucas, Kommando, pp. 43-4 details the training of 
Brandenburg units of this period. They apparently never 
developed the capability to insert units by airborne means, 
with the exception of very small groups (squad or section) 
size. They seemed to have relied on the Parachute Corps or 
SS Parachute Battalions to provide reinforcement for large 
operations. For examples of these type operations see pp. 
99-126. 
95 Witzig interview, p. 2. 
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proficiency in foreign languages, employed disguises and were 
highly trained in sabotage and other direct action tactics. 96 
German parachutists were, however, much more 
specialized than their western counterparts as a rule. Not 
only were they trained in parachuting, they were also required 
to pack their own chutes, a task for support personnel in the 
more logistically equipped western armies. Glider troops were 
considered infantry who used gliders as a means of getting to 
combat in the U.S. and British armies, and, as such, line 
infantry units were converted into glider infantry units with 
additional training. 97 The Germans viewed the glider troops 
as specialized assault elements and, as such, established them 
as an elite within an elite. Parachute training was a 
prerequisite for joining the Assault Regiment and entrance 
required an additional selection beyond that normally 
experienced by even the elite parachutists. 
After Eben Emael, Koch's unit was expanded into the 
Assault Regiment. The glider troops of I Bn, led by Koch 
himself, were viewed as an elite within an elite. They were 
trained in both glider and parachute infiltration, equipped 
for specialized assau;Lt tasks and were trained in combat 
demolitions in addition to their infantry and infiltration 
training. 
As a result of the experience in Crete, however, the 
Germans modified their approach to training and organizing 






Lucas, Kommando, pp.43-4. 
James E. Mrazek, The Glider War, (New York: 
Press, 1975), pp. 103-7. Training for glider 
in the United States Army was conducted by the 
St. 
of Infantry and glider troops received no incentive pay as 
did their paratrooper counterparts. There was, Mrazek 
states on p. 107, " ... no great enthusiasm amongst the new 
glider troops." 
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commanders expressed a need for more infantry training, 
stating that parachutists should be trained infantry first, a 
parachutist second. Additionally, they recommended employing 
larger gliders to bring in heavy weapons and even tanks.to 
support the lightly armed troops who inevitably faced heavy 
counterattacks from firepower rich conventional forces. 98 
Thus, while creating very specialized units within 
the Parachute Corps, the Germans attempted to integrate forces 
within this autonomous organization. By mixing the highly 
specialized gliderists, parachutists and heavy weapons, as 
well as multiple means of delivery, the Germans tailored a 
force capable of conducting independent operations. Their 
high degree of specialization, however, as stated in their own 
after action reports, reduced their ability to integrate with 
GPF. 
C. SUMMARY 
The German experience in integrated operations at Eben 
Emael and Maleme airfield highlight the use of special units 
to seize critical nodes facilitating the introduction of 
follow on forces. While some form of moral surprise was 
undoubtedly achieved at Eben Emael, the robustness of the plan 
and actions of key leaders were critical in its success. More 
than adequate preparation time allowed the Germans to innovate 
a bold and audacious plan, allowing them to achieve numerical 
superiority at the decisive point, an advantage they were able 
to sustain until the arrival of follow-on forces. With less 
than adequate time, poor preparation and a motivated bias to 
conduct MERCURY, the Germans gained an impressive victory but 
at a prohibitive cost. Their coup de main, launched against 
an alert and informed enemy, was unable to achieve numerical 
98 W. Gaul, The German Occupation of Crete (Operation 
'MERKUR'), unpublished report (Naval Postgraduate School 
Library, Monterey, CA: undated), p. 27. 
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superiority at the critical points. The Assault Regiment was 
forced into a conventional struggle for the airfield. The 
surviving leaders of the regiment however, demonstrating the 
robustness of such units, ruthlessly exploited minor gains, 
securing a means to introduce GPF, turning defeat into 
victory. 
The unit employed in both cases was highly specialized (too 
specialized according to one review of the Crete experience) 
and employed under near autonomous command and control. In 
Belgium, control of the special units reverted to GPF control 
at linkup. In Crete, however, the use of the parent special 
headquarters to control the entire operation was shelved for 
a more integrated approach. Rising institutionalization 
created bureaucratic problems for the fledgling organization, 
placing them in a position to pursue missions in a manner for 
which they were ill-suited. Difficulties in integrating 
forces occurred both within their service and across service 
lines. The doctrinal advantages of such an organization, in 
developing innovative tactics and techniques of integrated 
operations, were lost at Maleme airfield. 
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III. AMERICAN RANGER OPERATIONS (1942-1944) 
A. BACKGROUND 
The American military's first experiments with special 
units in World War II were, in part, inspired by the British 
Commandos. The British employed this special unit in 
amphibious raids against the German-held coastlines in France 
and Norway. The United States Army and Navy observed the 
activities of the British Combined Operations Headquarters 
(COHQ) after Dunkirk with more than just polite interest. The 
Navy was working to solve the problem of securing bases for 
the fleet in the impending conflict with Japan in the Pacific. 
The Marine Corps, one of the Navy's proponents for amphibious 
warfare, was changing from a small, flexible force of 
companies and battalions which performed counterinsurgent 
duties in the Banana Wars, to larger, more conventional units 
capable of conducting amphibious assaults against enemy held 
islands. 99 The Army likewise recognized that it would have to 
adapt to this global conflict. The army would expand from a 
frontier constabulary into a modern, mechanized force capable 
of bringing war to the German and Japanese homelands. 
100 
Amphibious warfare would play a key role in both theaters 
and the COHQ was testing tactics and techniques the American 
military knew would be useful. Additionally, the COHQ and the 
Commandos were one of the few tools by which Britain could 
take the war to occupied France until she was ready to reenter 
the continent. With the Pearl Harbor attack, military 
cooperation between the two states increased. With a 
procession of defeats at the hands of the Japanese, domestic 
99 Jeter A. Isely and Philip A. Crowl, The U.S. 
Marines and Amphibious War (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1951), pp. 21-44 and 71. 
100 Russell F. Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981), p. 727. 
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political pressures for an American response encouraged senior 
military planners to create American "Commandos". 
101 Out of 
these dual military and political demands would rise two of 
Americas first experiments with special units: Army Rangers 
and Marine Raiders. 102 The Raiders were first developed for 
amphibious raiding requirements and inspired alternatively by 
Chinese Communist guerrilla tactics, Marine experiences in 
Latin America as well as the actions of the Cornrnandos.
103 The 
Raider experience was short but eventful, with raider 
battalions seeing action on Makin, Guadalcanal and a score of 
lesser islands during the Solomons campaign. The Marine Corps 
eventually disbanded the Raiders as requirements for 
amphibious operations in the Pacific demanded larger, more 
heavily armed units for assaults against fortified islands. 
The Army, however, would choose to hold onto and temporarily 
expand its special units, finding different missions for them 
to perform. 104 
The Army saw the Rangers' purpose as twofold. General 
Marshall tasked Colonel Lucian Truscott, American Liaison to 
COHQ, to fashion an American force to participate in 
amphibious raiding alongside the Commandos and gain combat 
experience. 105 Marshall's concept envisioned battle 
experienced soldiers returning to their original units to 
101 David W. Hogan, Jr., The Evolution of the Conce:gt 
of the U.S. Rangers. 1942-1983, Duke University doctoral 
dissertation (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Micorfilms 
International, 1986), pp. 48-51. 
102 Roger A. Beaumont, pp. 51 and 60. 
103 See Jon Hoffman, Once a Legend (Novato, 
California: Presidio, 1994), pp. 131-164 and Updegraph, pp. 
2-4 for a summary of the origins the Raiders. 
104 Hogan, US Army SOF in WWII, pp. 17-18. 
105 King, pp. 5-8. 
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teach tactics and techniques to the mass army being assembled 
in the United States, an army that would have to eventually 
perform a forced entry onto the European continent and 
confront the battle hardened German Army. 106 Thus, no 
permanent headquarters for this force would be established. 
The "Rangers", as Truscott named them, were trained at the 
Commando depots and employed by COHQ. A small contingent 
accompanied the Commandos on the Dieppe raid on 19 August 
1942. Shortly thereafter, in September, the 1st Ranger 
Battalion, under Major William Orlando Darby, completed 
training and was ready for employment. 
1. The lst Ranger Battalion 
As preparations for Operation Torch increased and cross 
channel raiding opportunities diminished, the existing Ranger 
force was tasked to participate in the invasion of North 
Africa. Assigned to Task Force Center under Major General 
Terry Allen and the 1st Infantry Division (liD), 1st Ranger 
Battalion spearheaded landings at Azrew by knocking out 
coastal batteries and capturing key French fortifications. 
They were selected for this mission because of their special 
training in amphibious operations, mountain climbing, night 
attacks and infiltration. 107 The battalion task organized to 
accomplish several missions. Two companies would seize Fort 
de la Pointe, with B Company establishing a beachhead 
perimeter and A Company conducting the assault. The remainder 
of the Battalion would seize Fort Superieur, with C, E and F 
Companies forming the assault force and D Company using four 
81mm mortars in support. 108 On 8 November, the Rangers 
106 Hogan, dissertation, pp. 40-41. 
107 COL (ret) Jerome J. Haggerty, U. S. Army Rangers 
ln World War II, Fordham University doctoral dissertation 
(Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International, 1982), p. 
111. 
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executed their assault tasks with success against token French 
resistance. Shortly thereafter, General Allen tasked LTC 
Darby to provide liD units with support in reducing French 
garrisons at LaMacta and St. Cloud. These missions were 
conventional in nature, capitalizing on the Rangers high 
morale and flexibility rather than their specialized 
ability. 109 
The Rangers were withdrawn to garrison Azrew on 12 
November and soon after recommenced their training regime. 
With almost three months out of action, Darby increased 
training on infiltration skills, emphasizing the use of 
colored lights and rapid movement in columns. 
110 After 
receiving and training replacements, the battalion(-), under 
liD control, conducted a night raid on the Italian outpost of 
Sened on 1·1 February, killing or wounding 75 Italians and 
capturing 11 at the cost of one killed. 111 After skirmishing 
with Italian units from defensive positions, the Rangers were 
placed in Corps reserve. Shortly thereafter, however, II 
Corps ordered liD to attack towards Gafsa and El Guettar. The 
Rangers again used their night infiltration techniques to 
their advantage capturing Gafsa almost unopposed with Combat 
Teams (CT) 16 and 18 of liD. Their next attack was another 
infiltration and night raid on the Djebel el Ank Pass. With an 
accompanying heavy mortar company, the Rangers successfully 
infiltrated along a previously reconnoitered route and 
attacked the Italian garrison from behind in coordination with 
an advance by CT 26. Suffering only one officer wounded, the 
108 Haggerty, p. 114. 
109 King, p. 14. 
110 King, pp. 14-15 and Haggerty, p. 118. 
111 King, p. 15. 
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Rangers and infantry took over 1000 prisoners. 112 The Rangers 
were withdrawn before the Kassarine counterattack, but were 
involved with the liD in defensive battles against the German 
counterattack from 23-27 March. In April, the Rangers were 
detached from liD and reverted to Corps control. After this, 
the Rangers underwent a major reorganization. 
2. The Ranger Force 
Acting on recommendations from field commanders and 
Ranger leaders, the Chief of Staff of the Army authorized an 
expansion of the Rangers. The 3d and 4th Battalions were 
formed in North Africa using cadres from 1st Battalion and in 
theater volunteers. The 2d Battalion was raised in the United 
States at Camp Forrest, Tennessee effective 1 April 1943 to 
meet requirements made by COSSAC (Chief of Staff, Supreme 
Allied Commander) planners for employment in the upcoming 
invasion. 113 A second battalion, designated 5th Ranger 
Battalion, was raised at Camp Forrest on 1 September 1943, 
also for the ET0. 114 Meanwhile, the 2d (Provisional) Ranger 
Battalion, formed largely from assets of the 29th Infantry 
Division then in England was redesignated the 29th Ranger 
Battalion. It was disbanded on 15 October 1943 after 
participating in a few raids with Commandos under direction of 
COHQ, and personnel returned to their units. 115 No higher 
headquarters were authorized for the Rangers, despite appeals 
from the field. 116 Lieutenant Colonel Darby controlled all 
112 Ibid., p. 19-20. 
113 Ronald Lane, Rudder's Rangers (Manassas, Virginia: 
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three battalions in North Africa while maintaining command of 
1st Battalion himself. 
The Ranger force was employed on Operation HUSKY in 
accordance with the previous pattern established in North 
Africa. The 1st and 4th Battalions were designated Force X 
and attached to liD for the landings at Gela. After the 
landing, they became involved in the heavy tank-infantry 
fighting in the town during the German counterattack. The 3d 
Battalion, meanwhile, was attached to. 3ID, now under Major 
General Truscott, and silenced enemy gun positions in support 
of the division's main landing at Licata. Afterwards, the 
battalion conducted an infiltration attack on Porto Empedolce 
capitalizing on techniques learned in North Africa.
117 After 
the Sicilian experience, Darby formed a cannon company (four 
halftrack mounted 75mm howitzers) to increase the organic fire 
support of the Rangers. 118 This "upgunning" of the Rangers was 
in response to encounters with German tanks during the Sicily 
landings making the Rangers more compatible with regular 
infantry units. 
The Rangers were soon committed again, this time in 
support of the landings at Salerno. Darby commanded a 
combined Commando-Ranger force, with an ad-hoc staff, landing 
on the northern (left) flank of the invasion on 9 September 
1943 with 2 and 41 Commandos (CDO) attached. The three Ranger 
Battalions landed on Maori beach successfully, but suffered 
heavy casualties in their attack and defense of the Chuzini 
pass. The Rangers suffered 28 killed, 66 wounded and nine 
missing in two weeks of fighting before being relieved by the 
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briefly attached to the 82d Airborne, the Ranger force 
reverted to 5th Army reserve on 8 October. Stiffening German 
defenses and a shortage of infantry soon sent the Rangers back 
into the line. All three battalions were involved in heavy 
fighting before being reunited at Lucrino on December 15th to 
prepare for their next mission: Operation SHINGLE. The 
landing of VI Corps at Anzio by 5th Army was envisioned as an 
amphibious envelopment of the German Cassino line and the 
Rangers were again called to spearhead .the landing. (Map 15) 
3. Cisterna 
The Ranger force for Operation SHINGLE consisted of the 
three Ranger Battalion, the 509th Parachute Battalion, the 
83rd Chemical Mortar Battalion (-) and Company H, 36th 
Engineer Combat Regiment under a new headquarters, the 6615th 
Ranger Force (Provisional). (Figure 4) The Ranger force was 
tasked by VI Corps to assault Yellow beach, reduce coastal 
batteries, seize the port and clear the beach between Anzio 
and Nettuno for follow on landings. 120 Also landing were 
Truscott's 3ID to the south and the British 1st Infantry 
Division to the north. The landings on 22 January were almost 
unopposed in the Rangers sector, with light opposition across 
the beaches. (Map 16) By 25 January, the Rangers were 
attacking to maintain contact between the two divisions as 
they advanced inland. 121 On 2 8 January the Ranger Force was 
attached to 3ID to support the long awaited VI Corps attack 
towards the Alban Hills. 122 This attack was designed to sever 
120 VI Corps, VI Corps Operations in the ETO, 
(Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 
General Reference Branch), p. 2. 
121 Carlo D'Este, Fatal Decision (New York: Harper 
Collins, 1991), p. 148. 
122 Nathan w. White, From Fedala to Berchtesgaden. A 
History of the 7th United States Infantry in World War II 
(Brockton, Massachusetts: Keystone Press, 1947), p. 10. 
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Highway 7, a major German supply route to Tenth Army units 




















The situation facing the 3ID and VI Corps on 26 January 
was somewhat vague. The Corps was aware that German 
reinforcements were moving into the area, correctly 
identifying the two motorized divisions enroute from Southern 
France and even specifying some miscellaneous units. 
123 The 
3ID Division G-2, as late as 29 January, however, reported 
that the Herman Goring Panzer Division plus scattered elements 
from other units were in defensive attitude, positioned 
123 VI Corps, p. 9. 
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loosely and poorly organized. Patrolling was not aggressive 
and the G-2 noted that friendly patrols penetrated the enemy 
outpost line. 124 The 3ID attack was to support the main attack 
by the British division with American armor support to the 
west. The Rangers were assigned the mission of spearheading 
the 3ID attack. 125 (Map 17) The Ranger mission was to, 
... cross LD at 0100 30 January 1944, move rapidly 
by infiltration, seize Cisterna Di Littoria and 
destroy enemy force therein. Hold Cisterna area 
until relieved. 126 
Darby broke his force down into two elements. (Figure 5) 
Two battalions, 1st and 3rd, would infiltrate one hour prior 
to H-hour to capture Cisterna. One hour later, 4th Battalion, 
with armor and artillery support, would attack up the road to 
link up with the Ranger Force and clear a route for 3ID 
elements attacking in support of the Ranger force. Two 
regiments of the 3ID, the 7th and 15th would attack to seize 
objectives in on the roads leading into Cisterna. The 509th 
Parachute Battalion supported the 7th Infantry on the left 
while the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment would conduct a 
diversionary attack on the right along the Mussolini Canal. 
The 30th Infantry was held in reserve by the division 
commander, MG Truscott. H-hour was 0200. 127 
Initially, 1st and 3rd Battalions infiltrated 
successfully behind the German front lines, in spite of 
124 White, p . 7 7 . 
125 D'Este, p. 174. 
126 Haggerty, p. 188. 
127 White, p. 77 and Donald G. Taggart, History of the 
Third Infantry Division in World War II (Washington: 
Infantry Journal Press, 1947), p. 114. 
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unforeseen enemy activity and problems with movement and 
control. Although later reports indicate the Germans spotted 














Figure 5. The 3d Division (reinf). 
infiltrators early on in the attack, the Rangers were able to 
bypass or surprise several German units enroute to Cisterna. 
Movement was difficult and the battalions suffered several 
breaks in contact, possibly due to the high number of recently 
trained Rangers. 128 During one of these breaks, the 3d 
Battalion commander was killed in a chance encounter with a 
128 King, pp. 35 and 40. 
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German tank, which was knocked out. 129 As the 1st Battalion 
approached Cisterna, it encountered German units in strength 
. occupying the town and surrounding area. Reports later 
indicated that enemy units were massing in the area for an 
impending counteroffensive against the beachhead, with at 
least one parachute battalion occupying the town itself, as 
well as numerous tanks and self-propelled anti-aircraft 
guns. 130 Heavy fighting broke out when 1st Battalion attempted 
to assault the town. The 1st Battalion Commander was wounded, 
again in close quarters combat with an armored vehicle, the 
battalion's assault repulsed and the battalion pinned down 
just outside the town. The 3d Battalion was strung out behind 
the lead battalion, in column and still along the ditch, but 
elements of three companies were able to fight their way 
forward. Unfortunately, as the Germans began to mass armor 
and bring artillery into direct fire on the exposed Rangers, 
the expected relief failed to arrive. Both battalions were 
virtually annihilated in close quarters combat, with only six 
Rangers returning to American lines of the 767 who set out 
that morning for Cisterna. 131 (Map 18) 
The 4th Battalion followed the other two battalions but 
proved unable to clear the road to Cisterna, even with tank 
destroyer and cannon company support. Across the rest of the 
3ID front, increasingly tough resistance centered on numerous 
farmhouses which were well supported by armor and artillery. 132 
Casualties were heavy among all the assault units and 
particularly in 4th Battalion, which suffered some fifty 
129 William 0. Darby and William H. Baumer, We Led the 
Way (San Rafael, California: Presidio Press, 1980), p. 162. 
130 Taggart, p. 120. 
131 Darby, p. 170. 
132 Taggart, p. 118. 
65 
percent. 133 Although the fighting around Cisterna would drag 
on as the Germans launched an offensive of their own, the role 
of Rangers in specialized fighting was over. 
One fatal action virtually destroyed the Ranger force of 
the entire Mediterranean theater. Survivors of the Ranger 
force were either returned stateside to train other units or 
transferred to the First Special Service Force, a combined 
Canadian-American special force, which soon arrived in the 
beachhead. However, in England, other Rangers were preparing 
for the Normandy invasion which would see Rangers again 
employed in integrated operations. 
4. The Provisional Ranger Group 
As early as July of 1943 COSSAC planners for the Normandy 
invasion determined the need for Ranger units to support the 
invasion. Several subsidiary assaults were planned to support 
the main landings, including tasks assigned to airborne, 
commando and rangers units. The planners identified strong 
coast defense batteries in the vicinity of Grandcamp and 
Maisy, for which they allocated one parachute battalion and 
two ranger battalion. The forces were to conduct a combined 
airborne and amphibious assault to knock out these coastal 
batteries and protect what was then the right flank of a three 
division assault. 134 
Planning continued, including expansion of the assault 
force to five divisions. In January of 1944 a group of 
recently arrived 2d Ranger Battalion officers were called to 
First Army headquarters, the overall command for the American 
component of the invasion force. Here, LTC James Rudder and 
his executive officer, Major Max Schneider were first informed 
133 Hogan, dissertation, p. 144. 
134 US Army War College, "Operation OVERLORD: COSSAC 
estimate", in Selected Readings, AY 1988 (Carlisle, 
Pennsylvania: US Army War College, 1988), p. B-46. 
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of their D-Day mission. Rudder's 2d Battalion would be joined 
with 5th Ranger Battalion to form the Provisional Ranger Group 
which would be allocated to MG Gerow's V Corps for the 
assault. Their mission was, 
... to destroy Coastal batteries at Point du Hoe 
(sic) by simultaneous assault up the cliffs and by 







V Corps initial assault waves 




The Ranger officers conducted their planning for the 
operation using the COHQ planners that were available to 
135 V Corps , p . 4 6 . 
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assist them. 136 The Rangers would be attached to the 116th RCT 
of the 29th Infantry Division, which was temporarily attached 
to the 1st Infantry Division for the assault. (Figure 6) The 
entire V Corps assault element was designated "Force 0' and 
elements supporting the Ranger mission included a battalion of 
the 116th Infantry, an amphibious tank platoon, naval gunfire 
and air support parties. 1
37 Pre H-hour fires on the batteries 
included both aerial bombing and naval gunfire. (Map 19) 
Colonel Rudder and Major Schneider organized the Ranger 
group into three task forces for the reduction of the coastal 
battery on the point and the strongpoint and radar station 
vicinity of Point de la Percee. (Figure 7) Task Force A, 
consisting of D, E and F Companies of 2d Battalion would 
conduct an H-hour assault directly against the Point, scaling 
the 80 foot cliff to seize and destroy the batteries. 
Meanwhile Task Force B, under Schneider and consisting of A 
and B Companies of 2d Battalion and his entire 5th Battalion, 
would await a signal that the assault had succeeded. If so, 
they would land, push inland to cut a highway a mile or so 
from the beach, and hold this position, protecting both the 
point and the right flank of Omaha Beach. If the initial 
assault were unsuccessful, Task Force B would proceed to Beach 
Dog Green, land and attack to seize the point overland. Task 
Force C, consisting of C Company of 2d Battalion was assigned 
the task of knocking out the strongpoint at Point de la Percee 
about 800 meters west of the Vierville draw. They were 
scheduled to follow A Company of the 116th Infantry (A/116) 
ashore at beach Dog Green and up the Vierville draw and, from 
there, attack overland to reduce the strong point. If A/116 
136 US Army War College, "First Army Report of 
Operations", in Selected Readings, AY 1988 (Carlisle, PA: 
US Army War College, 1988), p. A107. 
137 V Corps, p. 33 and Lane, p. 2. 
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proved unable to seize the draw, C Company was to assault 
directly up the cliffs on Beach Charlie with supporting fires 
from an amphibious tank platoon scheduled to land in the first 
wave. (Map 19) 







Figure 7. The Provisional Ranger Group. 




The battery at the Point consisted of six 155mm guns with 
ranges of 22 to 25,000 yards (14 miles) capable of firing into 
the transport areas for both Omaha and Utah beaches. The guns 
belonged to a battery of the 832nd Army Coastal Battalion and 
defended by some 200 infantry of the 726th Regiment of the 
716th Division. The bulk of the battery's defenses were 
oriented toward an overland attack, with minefields, barbed 
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wire and strongpoints positioned to defeat an attack from that 
direction. Additionally, the battery possessed three 20mm 
anti-aircraft batteries and the entire position was directed 
by a concrete observation post which was positioned on the 
edge of the cliffs and dominated the beaches below. The 
battery was bombed extensively by allied air and designated 
the priority target in the pre-invasion fire plan and, as 
such, received attention of the battleship USS Texas and her 
14inch main battery. 138 (Map: 20) 
The Rangers plan was to land D company on the western 
side of the point, with E and F Companies landing on the 
eastern side. Each company was broken down into boat teams 
and assigned specific section tasks for reducing the battery 
and securing the point against counterattack until the arrival 
of Force B. LTC Rudder with a small command element would 
accompany Task Force A while recently promoted LTC Schneider 
commanded Force B. Both elements were accompanied by naval 
gunfire support parties and elements of a joint assault signal 
company. (Map 21) 
Launching as scheduled, the frictions of war soon began 
to take effect on the Ranger group, as they did all over Omaha 
beach that day. On the run in, Force A lost one LCA carrying 
the D Company Commander, which swamped and had to be left to 
the mercy of the sea. Navigational errors by the guide boats 
put Force A off Point de la Percee shortly before H-hour, an 
error corrected by Colonel Rudder but forcing the Rangers to 
make a parallel run up coast to reach their objective. As pre 
H-Hour fires lifted at 0630, HMS Talybont intervened between 
0645 and 0700 with 4-inch and 2-pounder fire on the cliffs.
139 
Under fire from coast defenses, one of the supply boats was 
138 Lane, pp. 72-3. 
139 War Department, Small Unit Actions (Washington: 
Center of Military History, 1982), p. 8. 
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hit by 20mm fire before the destroyer USS Saterlee intervened 
to suppress enemy defenses for the Rangers belated landing at 
0710. With Force A behind schedule, Colonel Schneider waited 
ten minutes past the allotted time before receiving the signal 
to proceed with the alternate plan and land on Omaha Dog 
Green. 
Meanwhile Colonel Rudder's force landed on the eastern 
portion of the Point under fire from Germans on the cliffs and 
automatic weapons located on the eastern end of the position. 
Effective naval gunfire from Saterlee suppressed the enemy and 
the Rangers were up the cliffs using a combination of ropes 
and ladders within 30 minutes. Approximately 15 Rangers were 
killed or wounded on the beach and the Ranger sections 
proceeded with their assignments without consolidating at the 
top of the cliffs. 140 (Map 22) Colonel Rudder sent the signal 
for Colonel Schneider to proceed with_ the alternate plan and 
then lost all radio communications. The advancing Rangers 
discovered the empty casemates soon after arriving on the 
cliffs and continued their advance to the highway. After 
consolidating here, at approximately 0830, two Ranger patrols 
discovered the missing guns and destroyed them using therrnite 
and fragmentation grenades. 141 Thus, by approximately 0900, 
the three Ranger companies accomplished their primary 
assignment, with only light losses, and held an important 
position protecting the right flank of Omaha beach. Up to 
now, the Rangers had suffered some 30-35 casualties of their 
225 man assault force. (Map 23) 
Meanwhile, back on Omaha Beach the initial assault waves 
were encountering heavy resistance centered on German 
strongpoints covering the beach exits. As C Company followed 
A/116 in the leading assault wave onto Beach Dog Green, they 
140 Small Unit Actions, p. 11. 
141 Ibid., pp. 30-34. 
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were able to observe the failure of that costly assault. 
142 
The C Company commander, CPT Goranson, decided to switch to 
the alternate plan, which called for C Company to scale the 
cliffs to attack the position from the seaward side .. 
143 
Landing on the edge of the disaster which was occurring to 
A/116, C Company took heavy casualties crossing the beach, but 
reached the cliffs and made their way up 300 yards eastward, 
picking up a section from B/ 116. Once up the cliffs, C 
Company engaged German defenders manning a strongpoint 
overlooking the draw and, in an engagement lasting most of the 
day, successfully reduced the position with naval gunfire 
support, fulfilling the bulk of their D-day task. 
144 Company 
C lost 39 of 65 Rangers on Omaha Beach that day, almost all on 
the beach. 145 
Companies A and B of 2d Battalion, originally scheduled 
to be the first reinforcing elements to land at the Point, 
landed instead just east of the Vierville draw. Both lost 
heavily landing on Beach Dog White. Company A lost all its 
officers and the B Company commander directed the remnants of 
both companies. One element attempted to attack up the beach 
toward the Point but was halted by strongpoints overlooking 
the draw. They then moved up the bluffs, some of the first 
Americans to do so that day, and with elements of the 116th, 
cleared both the draw and village of Vierville. 
146 Colonel 
Schneider, coming hard on the heels of the 116th' s first 
142 A/116 was stopped virtually at the water's edge by 
heavy defenses covering the Vierville draw. Casualties were 
as high as two-thirds. See War Department, Omaha Beachhead 
(Washington: Center of Military History, 1984), pp. 45-47. 
143 Lane, p. 111. 
144 Ibid., pp. 111-114. 
145 Ibid. 
146 Ibid., pp. 99-107. 
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assault waves with his 5th Battalion, witnessed the disaster 
off the Vierville draw and directed his boats to land east of 
Dog Green. They landed here virtually unmolested and, linking 
up with elements of the 116th and General Cota of the 29th 
Division assaulted to the top of the bluffs. Here they became 
involved in the struggle to clear the village and draw with A 
and B Companies of 2d Battalion, all under the direction of 
General Cota. This was not completed until darkness, with the 
Ranger force occupying defenses protecting the right flank of 
the small beachhead. (Map 24) One platoon however, led by LT 
Parker of 5th Battalion, upon reaching the assembly area, 
believed he had been left behind by the rest of the battalion 
as it proceeded according to plan to the Point. He moved 
west, bypassing enemy resistance, taking some twenty 
prisoners, arriving at Force A's forward positions on the 
highway just before dark at 2100, convinced his battalion was 
right behind him. 147 
The Rangers at the point faced increasing pressure as it 
became evident the landings off Omaha were not proceeding 
according to schedule and the Germans began to react. Colonel 
Rudder, twice wounded himself and confronted with increasing 
German activity against his lightly armed and dispersed force, 
contemplated withdrawing his forward elements into the tighter 
perimeter currently being maintained around the Point by the 
F Company commander, CPT Masny. (Map 25) The forward 
position on the highway consisted of some 60 Rangers and 3 
errant paratroopers from the lOlst Airborne and was positioned 
along the hedgerows south of the highway overlooking a small 
valley to the south. 148 This force was led by lieutenants from 
all three of the companies who co-located in a hasty command 
post. It was this group that LT Parker reached with 23 
147 Small Unit Actions, p. 48. 
148 Ibid. I p. 39. 
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Rangers and news that 5th Battalion was enroute. Meanwhile, 
enemy anti-aircraft positions on both flanks of the battery 
position proved difficult to reduce and were bringing fire on 
the small toehold at the point as well as supporting two 
counterattacks. 149 Only imaginative use of Ranger mortars and 
naval gunfire support, controlled using a navy signal lamp, 
kept the enemy at bay. Finally at 1100, an attached forward 
observer from the 58th Armored Field Artillery Battalion 
directed fires of British destroyer which destroyed the 
eastern position. 150 Nonetheless, believing 5th Battalion 
enroute and consc1ous of his mission, Rudder left the highway 
position in place. (Map 26) 
German counterattacks commenced on the highway position 
at approximately 2330 and by daylight the remnants of the 
forward force had fallen back on the point. Some 40 Rangers 
were lost, many captured in their positions, when the Germans 
penetrated the uncoordinated position and rolled up the 
defenders. Some Rangers hid out for two days before linking 
up with forces on the point. 151 Nonetheless, the failure of 
the relief force and exposed nature of the highway position 
cost Rudder a substantial part of his already reduced 
battalion. 
Reorganizing survivors of the highway position into the 
perimeter around the point, the Rangers used naval gunfire to 
keep the Germans at bay throughout the next day. A flight of 
P-47's threatened to strafe the Point, but was dissuaded by an 





Ibid. I p. 43. 
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Lane, p. 169. 
Two landing 
152 Lane, p. 169 and George Clark, The Narrative 
History of Headquarters Company, p. 61. 
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craft with a platoon from F Company, 5th Battalion and 
supplies reinforced the Point during the day. 153 By nightfall, 
a patrol from 5th Battalion reached the point. They carried 
news that the relief force was located astride the highway 
about 1,000 yards away and would relieve forces on the point 
in the morning. 154 The relieving force, composed of the 116th 
Infantry, the rest of the Ranger Group and tanks of the 743d 
Tank Battalion relieved the point the next day at 1200. Even 
then, a number of Rangers were killed when mistaken for 
Germans by tanks attached to 2d and Jd Battalions of the 
116th. 155 (Map 27) 
Ranger casual ties, like those of most of the units 
involved in the Omaha Beach assault were heavy. The 5th 
Battalion, after an almost bloodless landing, lost 73 of 450 
involved in the fighting. 156 The 2d Battalion reported losing 
77 killed, 152 wounded and 70 missing, some of whom later 
returned. 157 Companies A and B of 2d Battalion lost about half 
their strength, while C Company lost 38 of 64 Rangers in its 
efforts to reduce its objective. 158 The companies engaged at 
the Point lost over half of the 225 Rangers in the assault 
force. Their contribution to the success of the mission was 
substantial as they accomplished all their assigned missions 
153 Lane, p. 166 and Omaha Beachhead, p. 126. 
154 Lane, pp. 167-8. 
155 Ibid. I p. 170. 
156 Haggerty, p. 218. 
157 Clark, p. 62. 
158 Edwin Sorvisto, 2d Ranger Battalion, 'Roughing it 
with Charlie' (Plsen, Czechoslovakia: Novy Vsetisk, 194?), 
p. 29. 
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in spite of casualties that stopped many units ln their tracks 
on D-Day. 159 
The Ranger actions on D-Day were the high point of 
integrated operations for Ranger units employed in Europe ln 
World War II. The remainder of the campaign saw them 
primarily used as security forces for prisoner of war cages or 
headquarters, reinforcements cavalry reconnaissance units or, 
most frequently, line infantry. Both battalions participated 
in the reduction of the fortified city of Brest and the 2d 
Battalion saw extensive fighting in the Huertgen forest. It 
was left to the 5th Battalion to conduct the last integrated 
operation of the campaign, a night foot infiltration to 
facilitate the advance of lOth Armored Division into the Saar-
Moselle region in February 1945. 160 
B. ANALYSIS 
The Rangers were used almost exclusively for integrated 
operations during their brief but eventful existence. Trained 
primarily as infantrymen, they specialized first in amphibious 
raiding, but later widened their capabilities to include night 
foot infiltration. They were controlled almost exclusively by 
GPF commanders, although a special headquarters (COHQ) 
participated in their selection, training and some of their 
mission planning. However, their lack of a permanent 
headquarters insured that operational control remained firmly 
in the hands of GPF commanders, and that they remained 
institutionally immature and bureaucratically weak. 
159 
Schuster, 
Max Hastings, Overlord (New York: 
1984) 1 p.94. 
Simon and 
16
° King, pp. 43-54, uses the 5th Rangers mission at 
Zerf as a case study in his work. 
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1. Integrated Operations 
Both Cisterna and Point du Hoc are critical benchmarks 
for the Rangers of World War II. Cisterna is often cited as 
the classic misuse of a special unit in a conventional role. 161 
The whole campaign at Anzio received extensive criticism, the 
Corps commander was relieved and the battle there dragged on 
until the eve of the Normandy invasion. Cisterna lS seen as 
a severe setback in a poorly run campaign. 162 Point du Hoc, on 
the other hand, is touted as, " ... a textbook example of a 
Ranger-type mission ... " and an example of proper employment of 
SOF. 163 The heavy losses among the force which as saul ted the 
cliffs is often used to support the notion that special 
operations are inherently high risk and dangerous operations. 
Both operations can be better evaluated using the model 
of integrated operations. Initially, the Ranger infiltration 
at Cisterna was highly successful as these two lightly armed 
battalions penetrated German lines much further than the main 
attack by some ten Ranger, parachute and infantry battalions 
with armor support which participated in the 3ID (+) attack. 
Although both battalions experienced difficulties enroute, 
both reached the objective area at daylight relatively intact. 
The 1st Ranger Battalion Commander, when he spotted the heavy 
buildup of German forces, still felt he could modify his 
attack plan and use his positional advantage to assist the 
main attack. 164 Similarly, 2d Bn (-) reached the tops of the 
cliffs at Point du Hoc with relatively small loss. Counting 
161 For "misuse" see Shaun Darraugh, p. 21 and CPT 
Daniel P. Bolger, "Special Operations and the Grenada 
Campaign", Parameters· (December, 1988), p. 49. 
162 King, p. 39, quotes General Mark Clark, then 
commander of the 5th Army, on his criticisms of the 
employment of Rangers in the Cisterna attack. 
163 Hogan, dissertation, p. 165. 
164 D'Este, pp. 163-164, quoting the 1st Battalion 
Commander, LTC Dobson. 
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the personnel lost on the swamped and hit landing craft, the 
Rangers were still able to put some 180 men atop the objective 
of the 225 in the 3 company assault force. The special nature 
of the attack did not stop at the clifftop either. Without 
waiting to reorganize or consolidate, the Ranger sections 
moved out to attack their assigned positions to the limit of 
advance beyond the battery without waiting for orders, in 
spite of the confused and delayed landing. "My platoon 
couldn't wait for nothing ... ", remarked 1SG Lommel, about 
casual ties, and " ... we in Company D depended a lot on 
speed. "165 Not only did this maintain the momentum of advance, 
it made it extremely difficult for the enemy to defend against 
the rangers . 166 By 0 9 0 0, 
... a plan based on confidence in the ability of 
small, pick-up groups to work independently toward 
main objectives ... was rewarded by success. 167 
The heaviest Ranger losses in both these operations began 
once the battle was fought in conventional terms. 
Clearly, the two Ranger Battalions at Cisterna were 
unable to stand up to German armor and artillery in their 
exposed locations. The description of Rangers attacking flak-
wagons and tanks with grenades, bazookas and mines highlights 
the inherent weakness of special units in conventional 
struggles. 168 Even the Rangers at Point du Hoc suffered from 
similar disadvantages when they assumed the defense of the 
point, albeit against a less well-equipped enemy. Colonel 
Rudder's force defended both the point and the highway 
165 Ronald Drez, Voices of D-Day (Baton Rouge: LSU 
Press, 1994), p. 267. 
166 Small Unit Actions, p. 21. 
167 Ibid. 
168 King, pp. 32-39. 
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position with three companies, a task which was planned for 
both battalions. At the forward position, they were hampered 
by a lack of unity of command, exposed and isolated from the 
main position and were insufficiently manned. Their expedient 
command arrangements, spreading reinforcements throughout the 
line without regard to unit cohesion and use of vigorous 
patrolling and captured weapons, were attempts to make up for 
these deficiencies. The Rangers, however, proved unable to 
hold the exposed highway position, even with reinforcements, 
and fell back to the Point. Losing some 40 personnel at the 
highway, they suffered their heaviest losses of the action 
after they achieved their primary mission. 
Finally, the transition between the specialized tasks and 
the more conventional phase of the mission again proved to be 
the most difficult part of the operations. 1st and 3d 
Battalions, of course, were caught waiting for a relief that 
never reached them. GPF proved unable to develop the combat 
superiority necessary to overcome the potential advantage lost 
by the special operation gone awry. Their inability to push 
forward to the trapped battalions doomed them to their fate. 
The seizure of the critical node at Cisterna proved beyond the 
capability of the special unit and therefore the GPF were 
forced to conduct their attack without the positional benefits 
of having two battalions astride the enemy's main line of 
communication. However, it seems unlikely that the seizure of 
Cisterna would have altered the outcome of the engagement. 
Although the trapped Rangers may have held out longer in the 
town, the casualties suffered by all the assault battalions in 
the main attack, not just to 4th Battalion, indicate the 
Germans possessed numerical superiority throughout their 
position. The plan was fundamentally flawed in its estimate 
of the enemy strength. At Point du Hoc, the Rangers gained an 
initial advantage but, encouraged by the arrival of a platoon 
from 5th Battalion, decided to maintain a perimeter too large 
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for the reduced battalion to effectively hold. This exposed 
the battalion to defeat in detail and cost the assault force 
its greatest casualties of the engagement. Thus, in both 
cases, the delay between scheduled and actual arrival of GPF 
heightened the vulnerability of the special unit. In the 
Cisterna case, it proved fatal. 
2. Organization Theory 
These case studies of WWII Rangers highlight a peculiar 
tradition in the organization and employment of American SOF. 
Americans generally disdained military elites as well as large 
standing armies. Consequently SOF are often raised for 
specific wartime contingencies and disbanded as soon as their 
mission requirements disappear or peacetime arrives. Some 
units are able to hang on, mostly because of the efforts of 
dynamic leaders to find new roles for their units. The bulk, 
however, confronted by conservative and conventionally minded 
commanders, are short lived. 169 A closer examination of the 
Rangers in terms of institutionalization and functional 
specialization will demonstrate how this tradition effected 
the WWII Rangers. 
a. Institutionalization 
Throughout the period described, Ranger commanders, 
GPF commanders familiar with their capabilities and even Army 
commanders lobbied for the creation of a Ranger 
headquarters. 17° Commanders such as Truscott, intimately 
familiar with not only Ranger capabilities, but also the 
workings of COHQ were particularly vocal. Overall control of 
the Ranger force was at best ad hoc, with a Ranger 
headquarters only being authorized shortly before Cisterna. 
169 Hogan, US Army SOF in WWII, p. 136. 
17
° Calls for a Ranger headquarters were numerous and 
can be found in King, pp. 21-22, 27-31 and 73-75 and Hogan, 
dissertation, pp. 115 and 176-7. 
80 
This headquarters was less of planning apparatus than a formal 
recognition of the informal tactical control being exercised 
over the force by Darby. 171 Command and control of these 
special units remained firmly in the hands of GPF commanders, 
and proper and improper use was more a function of individual 
proclivities than doctrine or training. Truscott consistently 
employed the Rangers in their specialized roles while more 
conventionally minded commanders, such as Allen and Clark 
preferred to employ them as "shock troops" in more 
conventional roles. 
Throughout this period, the Rangers were forced to 
do their own replacement training. The few Ranger training 
commands established stateside were designed to teach Ranger 
techniques to selected individuals of line infantry units 
rather than provide trained replacements to the Ranger 
battalions. 172 Therefore the Rangers were constantly 
struggling to keep up their strength with trained 
replacements, eventually establishing their own replacement 
training element drawing from assets of the three battalions 
in Italy. 173 
No Ranger or special headquarters existed to 
promulgate a doctrine addressing Ranger employment on 
integrated operations. Limited involvement by COHQ in the 
Normandy operation can be judged to have been successful. 
However, for the remainder of the war, Ranger operations were 
characterized by unimaginative employment and frequent 
misuse. 174 The WWII Rangers therefore represent a 
171 King, pp. 21-2. 
172 Replacement issues, such as training, 
administration and the relationship between overseas 
battalions and stateside training organizations can be found 
in Hogan, dissertation, pp. 92-94 and Lane, 14. 
173 Hogan, dissertation, pp. 112-113. 
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decentralized institutionalization of SOF, operational control 
resting almost entirely with GPF commanders. 
b. Functional Specialization 
Rangers, as mentioned, were trained primarily as 
infantrymen with additional specialized training. 
Additionally, as the war progressed, they focused on infantry 
type missions over any specialized capabilities. Some claimed 
the speed march was the essence of the rangers ability to 
defeat the enemy. This is hardly a special capability, albeit 
an important one. While this was in keeping with their most 
common means of employment, it heightened the chances for 
misuse as conventional infantry. Not that Rangers were just 
"super infantry". Rangers were screened by the same exacting 
standards used by the airborne forces, without the jump 
qualification. 175 However, according to one of their former 
commanders, their special skills were more in attitude than 
capability. 176 The fanatical resistance of the cut off 
battalions at Cisterna and the speed by which the individual 
sections moved across Point du Hoc represent actions 
physically within the capability of most units. However, it 
was the Ranger attitude, epitomized by men like Darby and 
Rudder, which made the Rangers truly a special force. 
C. SUMMARY 
Although designed for unilateral special operations, 
amphibious raiding on the Commando model, the Rangers soon 
became the special force of choice for American integrated 
operations in World War II. The Rangers placed great emphasis 
on preparation time before an operation. Realistic training, 
174 Hogan, US Army SOF in WWII, p. 135. 
175 Hogan, dissertation, p. 127. 
176 Haggerty, p. 297. 
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extensive reconnaissance and detailed planning characterized 
Ranger operations throughout the period covered. This 
preparation allowed them to employ special means of 
infiltration to arrive at the decisive point with numerical 
superiority. They sought to achieve some element of surprise 
in their operations and demonstrated a robustness that often 
allowed them to sustain advantages until relief by GPF. 
Unfortunately, at Cisterna, overwhelming numbers were clearly 
on the side of the Germans and the Rangers suffered 
accordingly. At Point du Hoc, initial success was almost 
squandered by heavy casualties sustained as the Rangers were 
tied down in a conventional defense awaiting relief by GPF. 
Both these operations highlight the dual nature of integrated 
operations and the crucial role in integrating the two 
battles. 
The success of the Rangers fostered the acquiring of 
different specialties, although not beyond the infantry 
charter of the original battalion. They evolved from a 
specialized unit into a unit whose specialty was based more on 
attitude than capability. Institutionally, they remained 
immature, with planning- and control of integrated operations 
resting firmly in the hands of GPF commanders. This 
bureaucratic weakness ensured high levels of integration with 
GPF. In fact, the longer the Rangers existed, the more they 
began to resemble the conventional units they fought 
alongside. Although a headquarters familiar with integrated 
operations was to make a substantial contribution to the 
success of the Normandy operation, the lack of accurate 
intelligence to tactical commanders doomed the Ranger force at 
Cisterna. They also suffered from poor replacement training 
and a lack of a coherent doctrine. Therefore low 
specialization and institutionalization contributed to high 
levels of integration, but established less than optimal 
conditions for integrated operations. Although many of these 
83 
proclivities can be attributed to American military tradition, 
a more contemporary set of cases highlighting a different 
.approach will now be examined. 
84 
IV. U. S. ARMY RANGERS (1974-1989) 
A. BACKGROUND 
After the frustrating experience of the Vietnam war, the 
Army rushed to realign its forces for a more conventional 
mission in the postwar era. With the decline of SOF in the 
force structure, GPF were being reoriented towards a more 
conventional defense of Western Europe under the auspices of 
NATO. 177 However, the Army recognized the value of special 
units with the capability to conduct world wide deployments on 
short notice and direct action type missions. 178 Two 
operations in the early seventies demonstrated the need for 
such units: the Son Tay raid and the Mayaguez rescue attempts. 
While both were unilateral rescue attempts, one conducted by 
a specially selected SOF and the other by available GPF, their 
conduct demonstrated the need for standing units capable of 
such missions. In spite of an overall reduction of forces, 
both SOF and GPF, the Army in particular took steps to 
revitalize select SOF elements as early as 197 4. 179 
1. The 1st and 2d Battalions, 75th Infantry (Ranger) 
In 1973 the Army Chief of Staff, General Creighton 
Abrams, decided to reactivate the Ranger battalions as austere 
light infantry organizations capable of deploying at a moments 
notice and fighting anywhere. 180 They were organized along 
infantry tables of organization with fewer personnel and 
manportable equipment. They were controlled directly by 
177 Hogan, Raiders, pp. 196-7 and Colonel William 
Boykin, "Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict 
Legislation", Individual Study Project (Carlisle, PA: US 
Army War College, 1991), p. 5. 
178 Hogan, Raiders, p. 200. 
179 Boykin, p. 6. 
180 Hogan, Raiders, p. 200. 
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Forces Command (FORSCOM), although planners envisioned them 
being employed by Corps headquarters. The 1st Battalion was 
raised at Fort Benning, Georgia and transferred to Hunter Army 
Airfield near Fort Stewart, Georgia in January 1974. The 2d 
Battalion was raised and stationed at Fort Lewis, Washington 
ln October of that same year. 181 
Other SOF were also created or revitalized during this 
period. In response to the successful German rescue of a 
hijacked Lufthansa jet in Mogadishu, Somalia, in 1979, the 
Army Chief of Staff, 
... approved the activation of a new Army special 
operations unit which would prepare for a variety 
of special missions including counterterrorism. 
182 
This unit was seen as filling a void between current 
capabilities of Special Forces and Rangers. 
183 The unit was 
known as Delta Force and was activated in November 1977 at 
Fort Bragg, North Carolina. 184 It had just completed its 
certification in 1979 when it was called on to participate in 
the ill-fated Iranian rescue mission. Rangers of 1st 
Battalion were employed during the Iranian rescue mission in 
April of 1980 to support the ad hoc task force of SOF and GPF 
elements assembled to rescue the American hostages. The 
failure of this operations would bring increasing changes to 
SOF, particularly with regard to SOF command structures. 
181 Ibid., p. 203. 
182 Boykin, p. 4. 
183 Charlie Beckwith, Delta Force (New York: Harcourt 
Brace and Jovanovich, 1983), pp. 106-7. 
184 Boykin, p. 4. 
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2. Special Operations Commands 
The failed rescue attempt and ensuing reports identified 
the need for, 
... an institutionalized command and control 
structure for joint contingency cooperation, with 
dedicated forces from the several services. 185 
Shortly thereafter, the Joint Special Operations Command 
(JSOC) was established to, 
. . . serve as a command-and-control headquarters for 
high-risk overseas contingency operations, and an 
administrative headquarters for such dedicated 
strike forces as might be assigned. 186 
JSOC was assigned to Fort Bragg and was to controlled SOF 
elements from all the services. The Army also established the 
1st Special Operations Command (1st SOCOM) in 1982 to 
consolidate all Army SOF under one headquarters. 187 1st SOCOM 
was also assigned to Fort Bragg and was organizing when a 
crisis on the Caribbean island of Grenada occurred. 
3. Grenada 
JSOC was alerted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) on 20 
October 1983 to capture the island of Grenada, establish a new 
government and rescue the American citizens on the island. 188 
JSOC was commanded by Army Major General Richard Scholtes and 
was designated JTF 123 for the operation. Initially it was 
named the supported command, indicating that GPF assets would 
be made available to support the JTF. The initial JTF plan 
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Battalions seizing the islands two airfields and Delta Force 
rescuing American citizens. Navy Sea, Air, and Land Teams 
(SEAL) and Air Force Combat Controllers would conduct 
reconnaissance prior to the invasion and provide terminal 
guidance for the insertion of the Ranger force. 
189 Commander 
in Chief, Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANT) would provide the follow-
on forces to relieve the JTF by H+4 hours. 
Debate within the Joint Chiefs soon changed the initial 
command structure. On Friday, 21 October, the JCS directed 
that CINCLANT would be the supported command. JTF 123 
provided a planning cell to CINCLANT and planning continued at 
Fort Bragg as unit planners arrived. Admiral Metcalf, 
commander of 2d Fleet, was designated as the JTF 120 
commander. As such, JTF 120 would control all elements, other 
than SOF and select air assets, including Navy, Marine and any 
Army elements required to support the invasion. JTF 123, in 
the meantime, assigned 1st (1/75) and 2d Ranger Battalions 
(2/75) the missions of seizing the Point Salines and Pearls 
airfields respectively. On Saturday, 22 October, all the 
elements conducting unilateral special operations received 
either a change of mission or change in task organization. 
190 
Additionally that day, elements of the 82d Airborne Division 
at Fort Bragg were assigned to Admiral Metcalf's forces as TF 
121 under the division commander, Major General Trobaugh, to 
provide a ground force for the operation. 
191 Since JTF 12 0 had 
no Army component commander, Major General Schwarzkopf was 
named as the deputy JTF commander and dispatched from his 
189 Major Gordon Bonham, "Airfield Seizure: The Modern 
Key to the Country", Monograph for the School of Advance 
Military Studies, US Army Command and General Staff College, 
1991, p. 18, and Adkin, pp. 136-7. 
190 Adkin, pp. 136-7. 
191 Ibid., p. 134. 
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command at Fort Stewart, Georgia to the JTF with two staff 
officers and some radio operators. 192 (Figure 8) 
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_ TF 121 
82d Abn Div (-) 
L__ TF 124 
22d MAU 
Figure 8. Command relationships: URGENT FURY. 
Early on the morning of the 23rd, JTF 123 began inserting 
its reconnaissance elements. Another change ln command 
structure and missions occurred when the JCS were briefed on 
the details of the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beruit. 
A Marine Amphibious Unit (22d MAU) was diverted to the island 
on the 20th. On the 23rd 22d MAU was directed to the 
northeast side of the island. Joint Task Force 123 would now 
seize the southern half of the island and 22d MAU, as part of 
192 Ibid., p. 135. 
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TF 124, would seize the north. The 2d Ranger Battalion, 
originally scheduled to take Pearls airfield, would now follow 
1st Battalion into Point Salines and from there attack to 
seize Calvigny barracks, a JCS directed target. (Map 28) 
On 24 October the JTF 123 commander, MG Scholtes, 
attended a briefing given by Admiral Metcalf, the JTF 120 
staff, and representatives from the state department. 
Numerous mission changes ensued from this conference, 
particularly concerning the selection of H-hour. All 
unilateral special operations were changed based on state 
department direction. Additionally, MG Scholtes was briefed 
on the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force (CPF) which was scheduled 
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Despite protests by SOF commanders, H-hour was moved from 
0130 to 0500 based on the use of marine helicopters in the 
assault on the northern end of the island. The Rangers 
launched from their departure airfield at approximately 2100 
hours, some two hours early. 193 Neither battalion was at full 
strength. Due to a limitation of airframes, each battalion 
could only employ about half of its personnel. The 1st 
Battalion, with its C Company detached to support other SOF, 
went into action with two 150 man rifle ·companies and a 50 man 
headquarters element. The 2d Battalion was limited to some 
250 personnel, with its three rifle companies bringing 50-80 
personnel each and a 50 man headquarters element. 194 
Intelligence estimates of the strength and composition of 
the forces defending the islands and the Point Salines 
airstrip were vague. It was believed that the Peoples 
Revolutionary Army (PRA) forces of Grenada were 1,200 strong, 
with a militia of anywhere from 2,000 to 5,000 and a small, 
lightly armed police force. Cuban forces were estimated at 
30-50 military advisors and some 600 construction workers, the 
latter having received some remedial para-military training. 
It was known that the PRA possessed anti-aircraft artillery 
(12.7mm and 23mm guns) as well as armored personnel carriers 
(BTR-60s). Estimates varied widely on the posture and amount 
of resistance these forces would offer, especially at Point 
Salines, where resistance was expected to be minimal. 
Calvigny barracks, on the other hand, was believed to be 
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4. Operation URGENT FURY 
While the Rangers were airborne, a number of changes 
occurred which delayed H-hour. An AC-130 orbiting over the 
runway, believed to be clear, confirmed it was blocked shortly 
before H-hour. This required the entire Ranger force to rlg 
for parachute assault instead of the planned airlanding of the 
bulk of the two battalions. 196 Due to a series of 
communications difficulties within and between aircraft, not 
all the Rangers were ready to jump at H-hour. A further delay 
of 30 minutes ensued when the lead MC-130 lost its avionics 
and had to abort its role as flight lead. The aircraft then 
rearranged themselves in flight to allow another MC-130 to 
assume that crucial role. Thus, not only was the jump 
delayed, but the insertion plan of the lead battalion was now 
irrevocably altered. 197 
The lead MC-13 0, now commanded by LTC James Hobson, 
commenced its run over the airstrip at 0531 dropping a platoon 
from B Company, 1st Battalion (B-1/75) and elements of 
battalion headquarters including the Battalion Commander, LTC 
Wes Taylor. 198 Heavy anti-aircraft fire caused the following 
two aircraft to abort their drops and an AC-130 moved in to 
suppress the anti-aircraft fire north of the runway. 
199 
Rangers already on the ground commenced clearing the runway 
and engaging enemy positions. At 0552 the next aircraft 
196 Ibid., p. 203. 
197 Bonham, p. 21. 
198 Numerous sources indicate that there was a pre-H-
hour insertion of SOF which compromised the Ranger airborne 
assault. Although it is difficult to reconcile the 
differing accounts, Ranger participants indicate they were 
met by alerted opposition during the insertion. For 
differing versions of pre-H-hour activities see Bonham, p. 
20; Adkin, pp. 202-3 and Richard Gabriel, Military 
Incompetence (New York: Hill and Wang Press, 1985), pp. 
163-5. 
199 Adkin, pp. 202-203. 
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dropped elements of A-1/75 and was followed at 0634 by the 
last MC with the remainder of A Company. By 0705 the 
remainder of 1/75 was on the ground with 2/75 immediately 
following. By 0710 all elements were on the ground with only 
one ranger wounded .on the jump. 200 Meanwhile, at 0700 hours 
the runway was cleared and Rangers began assaulting the high 
ground to the north. 201 (Map 2 9) 
At 0730 A-1/75 attacked to clear the runway and suffered 
one killed. Company B,1/75 cleared the terminal and control 
tower in the vicinity of camp hill killing one Cuban and 
taking 22 POWs. By 1000 both battalions were in position. 
(Map 30) The 1st Battalion had seized its assault objectives 
of fuel tank hill, Calliste and the True Blue campus, securing 
some 13 0 students by 07 0 0. 202 The 2d Battalion moved to occupy 
the terminal, the old camp and high ground north of the 
runway, where it remained in reserve. Meanwhile, at 0740, the 
C-130's carrying the Ranger jeep and bike teams landed to 
establish blocking positions around the airhead and reinforce 
the lightly armed rangers with mounted machineguns and 
additional recoilless rifles. Shortly thereafter, at 0930, a 
jeep team from 1st Battalion drove into an ambush losing four 
Rangers killed with only one survivor. 203 Two bike scouts from 
B-1/75 were also hit and wounded just out side B Company's 
position near the fuel tank hill at 1000. 204 It was not until 
1500 that B Company was able to rescue and evacuate the 
200 I bid., p. 200. 
201 Bonham, p. 21. 
202 Department of the Army, 'Lessons Learned: Grenada' 
(Washington: Center for Military History, General Records 
Branch), pp. III-16. 
203 Adkin, pp. 224-5. 
204 
"Lessons Learned: Grenada", p. III-16. 
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wounded scouts, impelling the surrender of some 150 Cubans.
205 
(Map 31) 
At approximately 1045 elements of the CPF began arriving, 
linked up with a somewhat surprised 2/75 north of the runway 
and were assigned to guarding prisoners. By 1405 lead 
elements of the 82d Airborne began landing to prepare to 
relieve the Rangers. During the initial landing of troops 
from 2/325th Infantry, at approximately 1540, the airfield was 
attacked by three BTR-60's which were destroyed by fires from 
Ranger recoilless rifles and an AC-13 0. 
206 By midnight, MG 
Troubaugh only had one complete infantry battalion and three 
howitzers, with elements of his second battalion, 3/325th, 
arriving during the early morning. In the face of heavier 
than expected resistance and failure of several of the 
unilateral special operations, Admiral Metcalf decided to 
detach the two Ranger battalions from JTF 123 and assigned 
them to Troubaugh. Nonetheless, elements of the 82d relieved 
1/75 in place from 1630-2230 that night.
207 JTF 123 elements 
departed shortly thereafter. Ranger casualties for the first 
day were five killed and six wounded. 
208 (Map 32) 
There was some confusion initially in the attachment of 
the Rangers to Trobaugh's task force. Nonetheless, on the 
morning of the 26th his two airborne battalions pushed out of 
the airhead and attacked towards Little Havana at 0630.
209 
(Map 33) The two Ranger Battalions were kept in reserve. At 
approximately 1000 hours, the 2/75 commander, LTC Ralph 
Hagler, was notified by General Trobaugh that his unit would 
205 Adkin, pp. 218 and 223. 
206 
"Lessons Learned: Grenada", p. III-16. 
207 Ibid. 
208 Adkin, p. 2 3 0. 
209 
"Lessons Learned: Grenada", p. III-16. 
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undertake the rescue of American students at the Grand Anse 
Campus. Lieutenant Colonel Hagler employed all three of his 
small companies in a heliborne raid, with lift assets and 
gunship support provided by the MAU's Helicopter Squadron. 
Capitalizing on intelligence gathered through earlier patrols 
and direct phone connections to the students, 2/75 executed a 
near flawless raid at 1605, rescuing some 233 students in 26 
minutes. 210 One Marine CH-46 was damaged by a blade strike on 
infiltration and another was lost on exfiltration. There were 
no friendly casualties but one Ranger squad was left behind 
and later exfiltrated to a vessel offshore. (Map 34) 
October 27th saw two more airborne infantry battalions, 
artillery and elements of the 82d Combat Aviation Brigade 
arrive at Point Salines to reinforce TF 121. At midday, the 
JCS directed Admiral Metcalf to task TF 121 .. to attack Calvigny 
Barracks. The Task Force was directed at 1220 to, " ... seize 
the area before dark ... ". 211 The 2d Battalion, reinforced by 
C-1/75 returned from detached service, was assigned to 2d 
Brigade of the 82d for the assault since, " ... no airborne 
battalions were available near the pickup zone ... "212 and it 
had been an original "D-Day mission for Rangers. "213 Lift 
assets were from the 82d Aviation Battalion, recently arrived 
on the island. H-Hour was set at 1630 hours and, because of 
expected 
scheduled. 
heavy defenses, a 30 minute preparation was 
Fires would be provided by 105mm howitzers firing 
210 US Army Training and Doctrine Command, "Operation 
Urgent Fury Assessment" (Fort Leavenworth: Combined Arms 
Command, undated), p. vii-15. 
211 
"Lessons Learned: Grenada", p. III-18. 
212 Ibid. 
213 Department of the Army, "AAR/Lessons Learned: 
Operation Urgent Fury" (Fort Bragg, North Carolina: 82d 
Airborne Division, 1984), p. 3. 
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from Point Salines, naval gunfire from the USS Caron and close 
air support from AC-130 Is and A-7 Is. 
214 The Rangers were 
briefed to expect 600 Cubans defending the complex with anti-
aircraft support. (Map 35) 
H-hour was delayed 15 minutes due to ineffective 
artillery and naval gunfire. Close air support pounded the 
objective and was followed closely by the UH-60 1 S of the 82d 
Aviation Battalion. Landing on the southern camp boundary, 
two of the first four Blackhawks overshot their landing points 
and collided causing the fourth to crash. Three Rangers were 
killed and four seriously wounded in the accident. 
215 The 
remainder of 2/75 cleared the barracks area without 
encountering any enemy. 
216 On this tragic note, the role of 
SOF forces in Grenada ended. Both battalions redeployed 
stateside the following day. 
5. Grenada to Panama 
Critical analysis of the Grenada Campaign came from all 
directions. 217 However misguided some of it may have been, DOD 
and Congress took steps in the intervening period to make 
major changes to both SOF capability and command and control. 
Some Congressmen called for a separate service for SOF, while 
others wanted to increase the capability of regional 
commanders to conduct special operations. Proposals also 
provided for the National Command Authority (NCA) to have 
II direct and immediate II access to SOF. Testimony of MG 




Adkin, p. 282-3. 
Ibid. I p. 284. 
Ibid., p. 285, quoting LT Thomas, 2/75. 
217 A summary of the critics of URGENT FURY is 
presented in Bolger, "Urgent Fury and its Critics", Military 
Review 66 (July 1986) pp. 58-69. One of the most critical 
is Gabriel, pp. 184-6. 
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difficulties of integrating forces during URGENT FURY. 218 In 
1986 Congress directed, 
... creation of a unified combatant command for 
special operations missions which would combine the 
special operations missions, responsibilities and 
forces of the armed forces. 219 
In the Goldwater-Nichols Act of that year, Congress made 
unprecedented changes to the entire command and control 
structure of the U. S. military as well as providing for the 
establishment of the United States Special Operations Command 
(USSOCOM). Congress followed with the Nunn-Cohen Act later 
that year, which clarified their vision of an organizational 
focus and streamlining of command and control of 
established deadlines for the implementation 
SOF and 
of its 
directives. 220 Meanwhile, while command issues were being 
debated and decided in the halls of Congress, steps were being 
taking to improved the capability of SOF at the unit level. 
6. The 75th Ranger Regiment and USSOCOM 
In 1984 the Army completed its long delayed plan to 
activate a third Ranger battalion, as well as a regimental 
headquarters, both at Fort Benning, Georgia. Additional 
expansion took place across the SOF community as Special 
Forces were expanded by the addition of a new group and 
bringing up to strength previously undermanned organizations. 
Numerous other special operations related activities were also 
created or reinvigorated during this period, including 
psychological operations and civil affairs units as well as 
218 
219 
Boykin, pp. 22-27. 
Ibid., p. 8. 
22
° For details on the intent and implementation of 
these acts see Henry L. Koren, Jr., "Congress Wades into 
Special Operations", Parameters (December 1988), pp. 62-74 
and Boykin, p. 7. 
97 
expanding the SOF aviation capability. 22
1 Additionally, within 
the GPF, the Army allocated resources to convert several 
standard infantry divisions into Light Infantry Divisions 
(LID), capable of worldwide deployment in a fashion similar to 
existing elements of the Army's XVIII Airborne Corps. These 
changes and expansions would soon be tested in an area 
familiar to U. S. forces: the isthmus of Panama. 
7. Operation BLUE SPOON 
America's problems with Panamanian dictator Manuel 
Noreiga became evident in the late eighties and numerous 
contingencies were developed featuring military intervention. 
Debate in military circles focused on overall control of the 
Joint Task Force which would be employed to conduct the 
contingency if needed. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) preferred 
the Panama based United States Army South, while the JCS 
favored the U. S. based XVIII Airborne Corps. 
222 Meanwhile, 
however, SOF elements, in conjunction with SOUTHCOM were 
heavily involved in preparation for a 'coup de main' to depose 
the dictator, extradite him for drug charges and disarm the 
Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF). This plan, known as 
Operation BLUE SPOON, was constantly revised by planners as 
events in Panama and Washington updated the situation and 
mission. A failed coup attempt in Panama, violence directed 
against U. S. servicemen and their families and domestic 
political concerns heightened the scope of the intervention. 
The decision to use XVIII Airborne Corps as the JTF 
headquarters placed the Joint Special Operations Task Force 
(JSOTF) , assigned the key spearhead role for the intervention, 
221 Hogan, Raiders, p. 223. 
222 Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth and Caleb Baker, 
Operation Just Cause (New York: Lexington Books, 1991), pp. 
15-20. 
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as well as the conduct of numerous unilateral special 
operations, under their control. (Figure 10) 
The commander of the Corps and the JTF, General Carl 
Stiner, was a former commander of JSOC, and was intimately 
familiar with tactics and capabilities of the JSOTF. 223 The 
JSOTF Commander, Major General Wayne Downing, was the original 
commander of the 75th Ranger Regiment in 1984. 224 While the 
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Figure 10. Command relationships: BLUE SPOON. 
223 Donnelly, pp. 39-41 and LTG (ret} Edward M. 
Flanagan, Battle for Panama (Washington: Brassey's, 1993}, 
p. 35. 
224 Flanagan, p. 63. 
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JSOTF would conduct numerous unilateral special operations 
associated with the intervention, the largest component, the 
75th Ranger Regiment was assigned the role to facilitate the 
entry of follow-on forces of the JTF by seizing Torrijos-
Tocumen airfield. (Map 36) 
8. Torrijos-Tocumen 
The bulk of two Ranger battalions were committed to a 
seizure and denial of the Rio Hato airfield against elements 
of the 6th and 7th Companies of the PDF.' Colonel Kernan, 75th 
Ranger Regimental commander, assigned 1st Battalion, 
reinforced, the mission to seize the Torrijos-Tocumen airfield 
and international airport complex. (Figure 11) 
given Task Force RED-T was, 
The mission 
... conduct an airborne assault D-day H+0003 
(200103R December 1989) to seize Omar 
Torrijos/Tocumen Airport and eliminate PDF in 
sector; to clear Tocumen Airport for airland 
operations; to be prepared to conduct battle-
turnover to JTFSOUTH; to be prepared to conduct 
follow-on combat operations as directed; and, on 
order, to redeploy to CONUS. 225 
The objective consisted of the Tocumen PDF military 
airport, garrisoned by elements of the 2d PDF Company and 
defended by three anti-aircraft machine guns and a 23mm anti-
aircraft cannon and the Torrijos International Airport (IAP). 
The Torrijos and Tocumen runways ran parallel and the 
international terminal was located in between. 226 Battalion 
2000, a modern, infantry formation equipped with nine armored 
cars which played a key role in putting down the abortive coup 
in 1988 was approximately 45 minutes away. (Map 37) 
225 Ibid., pp. 157-8, quoting 75th Ranger Regiment 
Command Briefing notes. 
226 Ibid., p. 157. 
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Although there were at least four different airfield 
seizure missions during the initial phases of the operation, 
only Torrijos-Tocumen was critical for the introduction of 
follow-on forces. Howard Air Force Base, the incountry 
staging base for many prepositioned elements, was unable to 
accommodate the massive airflow necessary for the rapid build 
Torrijos-Tocumen 
XX 



























Figure 11. Ground forces at Torrijos-Tocumen. 
7 
up and was potentially vulnerable to PDF indirect fire. 227 
Torrijos-Tocumen was also crucial because it was the country's 
only international airport, garrisoned by a unit loyal to 
Noriega, located astride the principal route of Battalion 2000 
227 Bonham, p . 21 . 
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to the PDF headquarters and, finally, was an ideal transload 
site for follow on air assault operations. 228 
The mission commenced at 0100 hours on 20 December 1989 
at which time helicopter gunships and AC-130's, already 
prepositioned at Howard Air Force base, initiated suppressive 
fires on known PDF locations. At 0103 elements of 1/75(-) 
parachuted onto the Tocumen runway while B-1/75 and C-3/75 
dropped on the international airport runway. Insertion was 
completed in three minutes as 1/75(-) secured the objectives 
around the PDF airfield without contact with the previously 
dispersed 2d Company. Company B, 1/75 derigged predropped 
vehicles and established blocking positions on the perimeter 
of the airfield complex after overcoming resistance of the 
airfield guards. Company C, 3/75, assigned to secure and 
clear the international airport terminal, encountered elements 
of the 2d PDF among two flights of recently offloaded 
civilians. In the ensuing action, the Rangers killed eight 
PDF soldiers, took 54 prisoners and secured 374 civilians.
229 
(Map 38) 
Meanwhile, at 0208 hours, elements of 1st Brigade, 82d 
Airborne Division, the initial follow-on force, began their 
drop. (Map 39) Originally supposed to insert at H+45, these 
elements were delayed by an ice storm at their departure 
airfield at Pope AFB in North Carolina. The remainder of the 
drops including vehicles and light tanks were delayed, 
occurring between 0458 and 0800, with some being dropped east 
of their planned drop zones. 230 The Rangers reported the 
runway cleared at 0520 and as early as 0745 the JSOTF 
commander began tasking the Ranger companies for follow-on 
228 Ibid. I p. 3 0. 
229 Ibid., p. 31. 
230 Flanagan, p. 164. 
102 
missions. Elements of the 82d were prepared to conduct their 
follow-on air assault operations by 1115 and at 1130 began to 
expand the perimeter around the airfield complex. 231 By 1515 
the first elements of 5/21st Infantry of the 7th Infantry 
Division (LID) began arriving to assist ln securing the 
airfield and begin security missions throughout the 
countryside. 232 
In support of operations on the airhead, but under the 
control of Task Force Black, a team from 3/7th Special Forces 
Group inserted to conduct surveillance of the Pecora bridge at 
H-hour. This bridge was located along the route Battalion 
2000 was expected to take to reinforce the airfield. Enroute 
to insertion, the team spotted lead elements of the Battalion 
moving towards the bridge and, landing only moments ahead, 
successfully interdicted the enemy employing anti-tank weapons 
and fires from an AC-130 aircraft. 233 
B. ANALYSIS 
The employment of U. S. Army Rangers in Grenada and 
Panama have been characterized as special operations as well 
as conventional airborne assaults. 234 The involvement of other 
SOF in both facilitating the entry of the Rangers as well as 
unilateral special operations conducted during the campaigns 
remain obscured by operational security, wild speculation and 
hearsay. However, by examining the airfield seizures of both 
Point Salines and Torrijos-Tocumen, these operations can be 





Ibid., p. 198. 
Ibid., pp. 76-80. 
234 See Bolger, "Special Operations and the Grenada 
Campaign", p. 56 for a characterization of the ranger 
missions in Grenada as "conventional". 
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1. Integrated Operations 
Both operations, particularly 1n their original 
incarnation, envisioned using the highly trained Rangers to 
seize critical airfields paving the way for the introduction 
of follow-on forces. Both plans envisioned the precise 
delivery of specially trained parachute clearing forces to be 
followed by an airlanding of assault elements, all at night 
and synchronized with numerous unilateral special operations 
being conducted simultaneously at H-hour. Special 
reconnaissance, both distant and on target, were planned and 
fire support was to be delivered by numerous platforms from 
different services. The planners recognized that the use of 
these tactics would allow the Rangers to potentially gain 
temporal, spacial and moral advantages over the defenders. 
This advantage would be translated into an advantage of 
decisive combat superiority with the rapid introduction of 
follow-on forces. 
These two operations varied greatly in execution, 
however. URGENT FURY was plagued by initially by an inability 
to reconcile SOF and GPF plans for the assault. The movement 
of H-hour and constant changing of the unilateral SOF missions 
robbed these unique forces of their ability to capitalize on 
detailed planning and the advantages of attacking at night. 
The SOF elements involved in the integrated operation were 
forced to surrender significant advantages in employing their 
specialized training and tactics. Although Ranger losses in 
the jump were light, insertion of two battalions was delayed, 
all assault objectives were not seized and the planned 
transition to GPF was delayed. 
BLUE SPOON, however, benefited from the primacy of SOF 
both in the planning and the crucial spearheading role for the 
invasion. The JSOTF headquarters, in close cooperation with 
GPF, controlled the initial operations, facilitating the 
ability of Ranger elements to exploit special tactics and 
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training to gain a
dvantages over the 
defending forces. 
Although the initia
l insertion was com
promised and H-hour 
moved forward, these
 frictions were overc
ome as the Rangers 
conducted a near perf
ect airfield seizure w




In both cases, the b
uild up of follow-on
 forces would 
allow the final objectives
 of the campaigns to be re
alized. 
However, in URGENT F
URY, there were num
erous problems with 
integrating SOF and
 GPF which impacted
 on the mission. 
Although 2/75 was ab
le to conduct the Gra
nd Anse raid under 
control of a GPF he
adquarters and with 
support from a GPF 
aviation unit from a
nother service, the C
alvigny raid proved 
to be a more difficul
t task. Again under 
control of GPF, the 
Rangers were paired w
ith another GPF aviati
on unit for the air 
assault which result
ed in heavy casualti
es. The ability of 
2/75 to work successf
ully with the Marine 
helicopter squadron 
stands in sharp contr
ast to their problems 
with the 82d CAB at 
Calvigny. 
During Operation BLU
E SPOON, Rangers we
re used for a 
myriad of follow on o
perations in coordina
tion with both SOF 
and GPF headquarters
 and in cooperation 
with various units. 
Although numerous mi
nor problems occurred
, in comparison with 
URGENT FURY, these
 mission were gen
erally within the 
capability of the 
SOF and represent 
the high point of 
integrated operations
 to date. 
The transition from 
SOF to GPF preponder
ance in both 
operations carried p
erhaps the greatest 
chance for mishap. 
URGENT FURY however, 
was characterized by
 numerous problems 
which occurred duri
ng this critical p
eriod. The late 
introduction of the 
Ranger force into P
oint Salines, the 
change in mission fro
m a night to dayligh
t airborne assault, 
insured that the bulk
 of the Ranger force 
would be engaged in 
a conventional styled
 operation. The diff
iculty of securing 
the airstrip in the
 face of alerted re
sistance made the 
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Calvigny barracks mission impracticable. The arrival of the 
CPF was a surprise to members of 2/75. Members of 2/75 first 
thought they were Cuban reinforcements when they initially 
debarked from their aircraft. More seriously, the Rangers 
heaviest casualties were suffered when their unarmored jeeps 
and bikes moved to expand the airhead. Four Rangers were 
killed and three wounded from these elements alone. Finally, 
the delayed introduction of follow on forces insured that the 
bulk of the SOF, in this case the Rangers, would remain on the 
island under GPF control until adequate forces were available 
to complete the mission. Instead of being relieved at H+4 as 
originally planned, or departing with the rest of JTF 123, the 
Rangers were attached to Troubaugh's TF 121. This attachment 
was not without confusion. Both Ranger Battalion commanders 
as well as the TF commander report different times varying 
from about 1900 on the 25th to 0630 on the 26th as the time 
they were informed of the new command relationship. Thus 
critical time was lost in integrating the next days 
missions. 235 
The transition from SOF to GPF at Torrijos-Tocumen was 
similarly marked by problems. None of these, however, created 
the difficulties present in Grenada. Planners recognized that 
the greatest threat to the mission lay not in the airfields 
garrison, but rather in reinforcing elements of Battalion 
2 0 0 0. The rapid introduction of follow-on forces from 1st 
Brigade of the 82d Airborne division, in spite of misdrops of 
some personnel and heavy equipment, reduced the Rangers' 
window of vulnerability to the more heavily armed Panamanian 
reinforcements. With a 0103 H-hour for the Rangers and a 0210 
drop of initial follow-on GPF, the 82d assumed control of the 
235 Adkin, p. 229. 
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airhead at 0700. The introduction of further follow-on 
forces, in the form of the 7th ID, commenced at 0800. 236 
In summary, the airfield seizures of Point Salines and 
Torrijos-Tocumen can both be viewed as integrated operations, 
rather than either special or conventional operations. Both 
highlight the complementary nature of SOF and GPF as an 
operation transitions from one of specialized assault to one 
in which conventional measures such as numbers, firepower and 
mobility will insure accomplishment of·the operation's final 
objectives. Both also demonstrate the vulnerable nature of 
the transition period as SOF, utilizing advantages gained 
during the initial phase of the operation, transfers the 
battle to the preponderant GPF. These GPF then seek to 
exploit these advantages to rapidly conclude the operation. 
2. Organization Theory 
The U. S. military underwent numerous changes in both the 
composition and command and control of SOF during the years 
between 1983 and 1989. Fundamental changes, some imposed from 
outside DOD, affected both the institutionalization and 
functional specialization of the SOF which were engaged in 
integrated operations during this period. In the end, SOF 
existed within its own unified command, and higher levels of 
integration than experienced before were to become 
commonplace. 
a. Institutionalization 
Both the establishment of JSOC, resulting from the 
Holloway commission's recommendations, and the Congressionally 
mandated establishment of USSOCOM in 1987 heightened the 
institutionalization of SOF. These changes cut across service 
lines and established SOFas an effective "sixth service". 
Although not the organization envisioned by certain 
236 Donnelly, pp. 202 and 212 states that the 7th ID 
began arriving at 0800. 
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visionaries, it was certainly a significant improvement over 
previous peacetime command arrangements. Its mixed 
performance ln Grenada can in part be attributed to its 
organizational immaturity. Not only were the senior Navy 
officers ln charge of the operation unfamiliar with the 
organization's existence, but many of the senior Army leaders 
involved had only a cursory knowledge of the command's 
capabilities. Thus, although the creation of tactical command 
for joint special operations potentially facilitated the 
performance of SOF on unilateral special operations, it failed 
to ensure the integration of SOF and GPF during integrated 
operations. 
The Congressionally mandated establishment of 
USSOCOM cannot be considered without addressing the unified 
command plan also promulgated by Congress in 1986. This act, 
in itself, fundamentally altered the way the American military 
conducted command and control of its elements. That the 
establishment of USSOCOM increased the institutionalization of 
SOF is unmistakable. Since its establishment a multitude of 
subordinate headquarters have been established for the 
training, administration and control of SOF both within the 
command, and for those forces forward deployed with the 
theater CINC' s. These headquarters and their associated 
functions give the United States the, " ... largest, most 
multidimensional, and most diversely capable SOF establishment 
in the non-communist world. "237 These comments, written in 
1989, could now probably be extended without argument. 
Critical to the success of BLUE SPOON was the early 
involvement in planning and the crucial spearhead role of the 
JSOTF. The employment of this headquarters guaranteed the 
primacy of initial special operations as well as 
synchronization of both integrated and unilateral special 
237 Kelly, p. 2. 
108 
operations. The close links between the JSOTF and the primary 
GPF headquarters, XVIII Airborne Corps, insured a smooth 
transition between SOF and GPF. Increased 
institutionalization, when combined with individual 
commanders' proclivity for special operations, served to 
facilitate the integration of SOF and GPF. 
b. Functional Specialization 
The revitalization of select SOF in the seventies 
began a trend toward increasing specialization that continued 
throughout this period. The reactivation of the Ranger 
battalions 1n 1974 and the creation of Delta are only 
indicators of the heightened specialization in all areas of 
the SOF community. Both of these units have flourished since 
their inception, with the Rangers gaining an additional 
battalion and regimental headquarters in 1983. However, as 
early as URGENT FURY, it became evident that the most likely 
contingencies for the Rangers involved working with units, 
such as the Marines, that they previously had not envisioned. 
Even without crossing service lines, as in the Calvigny 
barracks mission, there was obviously a great deal of strain 
between the SOF and GPF employed. 
The fundamental infantry training of the Rangers 
facilitated much of the integration that occurred during the 
relief in place at the airfield and the follow-on missions. 
The 1st Battalion executed an unrehearsed night relief with 
elements of 2/325 without incident because, in the words of 
the Ranger commander, " ... it was a basic infantry mission." 238 
The ability of 2/75 to quickly plan and execute the Grand Anse 
raid is also attributed to their superior infantry skills, 
rather than their specialized training. Again, if there were 
specialized skills apparent, they seem to be less physical 
238 Interview with BG Wesley B. Taylor, ASD/SOLIC, 
(former commander 1/75 in Grenada), Washington, D.C., 17 
November 1994. 
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than moral. Commanders at all levels were highly laudatory of 
the Rangers initiative, boldness and daring in all phases of 
the operation. 
The Rangers themselves established a niche as the 
force of choice for integrated operations during this period. 
Previously dedicated to the support of select special 
operations only, the Rangers are now seen as the force within 
SOF which can provide connectivity with GPF. The Rangers, 
almost exclusively among the SOF community, have become less 
specialized over time. This tacit recognition of the 
importance of integrated operations, however, fails to address 
the continuing trend in SOF towards greater specialization. 
Ranger success at Torrijos-Tocumen can also be attributed to 
a mixture of proper planning and superb infantry training. 
The handoff between Rangers and 82d was, by that time, a 
routine task, which was executed in the face of some fairly 
significant frictions of war. The Rangers' ability to 
integrate their operations with GPF contributed significantly 
to the rapid introduction of follow-on forces and the eventual 
success of the campaign. 
C. SUMMARY 
The increasing institutionalization and specialization of 
these SOF are a result of experiences both in unilateral 
special operations, as well as integrated operations. 
The integrated operations examined in this case study 
succeeded because of several considerations. Overwhelming 
numerical superiority in both cases made the eventual outcome 
determinate. Only the enemy's ability to inflict casualties 
and the length of the operation were in question. Integration 
problems, as in Grenada, occurred when SOF lacked the time and 
command structure to ensure its proper employment. Even in 
the absence of surprise, SOF were able to gain a crucial 
initial advantage. The delay in introducing follow-on forces 
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ensured that SOF would be exposed to unnecessary losses ln 
their window of vulnerability and employed later in 
conventional roles. 
BLUE SPOON allowed SOF to be involved in the planning 
process early on and within a command structure familiar with 
the capabilities of SOF. The operation at Torrijos-Tocumen, 
in spite of some significant frictions with infiltration of 
follow-on forces, was extremely successful. Detailed 
preparation allowed SOF to gain an initial advantage and the 
rapid introduction of follow-on forces worked to reduce their 
vulnerability. Again, defying conventional wisdom, this 
occurred in spite of the lack of total surprise. 
Organizationally, SOF have become more specialized and 
institutionally mature. Visionaries within the Army saw the 
potential of highly specialized forces in the aftermath of the 
Vietnam war and set in motion the creation of these forces in 
spite of declining force structure. Failure in a unilateral 
special operation (RICE BOWL) impelled DOD to establish a 
joint command to control these forces. Increasing 
specialization and institutionalization were proceeding in the 
same direction. After a decidedly mixed performance in 
Grenada, both Congress and DOD addressed increasing both the 
capability, and command structure for SOF. Organizationally, 
SOF were allowed to grow and develop mature institutions. 
Doctrine, training and command procedures were formalized 
during this period. 
BLUE SPOON provided a test case for these new command 
arrangements and force capabilities; one they conducted with 
impressive success. In particular, the Ranger organization 
expanded commensurate with the overall growth of SOF. 
Conversely, however, with the trend towards increasing 
specialization among SOF, the Rangers have actually become 
less specialized. Increasingly, they have become identified 
as the "connectivity force" between SOF and GPF. The question 
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now is whether or not the present organization of SOF is best 
suited to the challenges of the future. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
A. INTEGRATED OPERATIONS 
The six operations in this study are best examined as 
"integrated operations". Integrated operations differ from 
unilateral special operations or conventional operations in 
their duality, employment of complementary assets and 
particular vulnerabilities that will be experienced by the 
SOF. The cases examined have highlighted the interdependency 
of these dissimilar forces, the need for rapid introduction of 
follow-on forces and the dangers that occur in the transition 
between the "special" and "conventional" phases of these 
battles. Integrated operations employ a combination of 
special and conventional tactics and the cases examined 
reflect this duality. Additionally, the employment of these 
dissimilar forces places some restrictions on the employment 
of SOF, restrictions it normally would not face in a 
unilateral special operation. Finally, integrated operations 
tend to be inflexible in the initial phase due their complex 
nature, but demand increasing flexibility as the operations 
progresses. 
1. Operational Environment 
Assault Detachment Koch's operation to neutralize the 
Eben Emael fortress and seize the Albert Canal bridges 
demonstrates the duality of an integrated operation. The 
initial phase of the operation was conducted rapidly with 
extreme precision and was followed by a period in which GPF 
exploited advantages gained initially by SOF. While the 
insertion of all the detachments was extremely precise and 
assaults intricately planned, attempts to hold their gains 
were more reminiscent of conventional operations than special 
ones. At the fortress itself, Witzig noted that the relieving 
engineers launched a standard attack to reduce the fortress as 
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opposed to employing advantages gained by the Granite Force. 
239 
The Granite force was not the only det'achment to use special 
tactics 1n this operation. All three of the bridge 
detachments conducted the same extensive planning, task 
organizing and rehearsing for which the assault on the 
fortress primarily has been noted. In fact, the Germans 
attribute success at the two northern bridges to the virtual 
landing of the glider teams on top of their objectives, while 
at Canne, the gliders were forced into landing some distance 
away, allowing the Belgians to destroy the bridge.
240 The use 
of decentralized tactics to keep the enemy off balance in the 
fortress was valuable, but the security of the sappers 
depended more on the CAS and relieving engineers than their 
own actions. 241 
Similarly, the 
specialized tactics 
Rangers at Point du Hoc 
and techniques :to not only 
employed 
scale the 
cliffs, but to seize the battery position and advance to the 
239 Witzig interview, p. 56. 
240 See Schacht, pp. 2-4 for details on the rehearsals 
of bridge detachments, their task organization and the 
integration of forces on these locations. Their extensive 
planning was in part due to their excellent intelligence. 
Unlike the fortress, for which Witzig possessed no "secret 
plans" (See Luttwak, pp. II-7 to II-9 for his assertion that 
the Germans possessed the blueprints to the Eben Emael 
fortress), German intelligence had plans for the bridge 
demolitions and defenses, allowing Koch and his subordinates 
to make detailed plans and conduct rehearsals on similar 
bridges in Germany making rapid seizure of these bridges and 
disarming their demolitions possible. Witzig, pp. 33-36 and 
46, stated that his intelligence was, " ... not really 
sufficient ... (and) ... not particularly good ... " with regards 
to the fort. He only had aerial photographs and plans to 
other forts available for his planning. More detailed 
information existed at higher levels but was not available 
to him. 
241 Schacht, pp. 3-6 and Witzig interview, pp. 36-38. 
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highway. During this phase of the operation they suffered 
comparatively low casualties. Once they became engaged in 
defending their positions against enemy counterattacks, they 
used select counterattacks, captured weapons and aggressive 
patrolling to keep the Germans at a distance. They then used 
naval gunfire to augment their firepower-poor organization 
against the Germans. 242 The dual nature of integrated 
operations are reflected in this reliance on heavy fire 
support in keeping enemy GPF from recapturing key terrain. It 
is also an indication of the criticality of integrating 
dissimilar forces for such operations. Special Operations 
Forces often require GPF support early in the operation to 
maintain the positional advantages seized initially. 
Of course, SOF employed on integrated operations almost 
always face restrictions not normally considered during 
unilateral special operations. The fact that they are 
cooperating with an ultimately preponderant GPF insures that 
planners will at least consider their employment proportional 
to their commitment. SOF ideally will capitalize on the 
tactics and techniques that make it special. GPF planners in 
URGENT FURY, unfamiliar with SOF capabilities and the ability 
of forces to integrate, critically hampered SOF with unneeded 
.restrictions. 243 
242 Small Unit Actions, pp. 39 and 63 for a discussion 
of the effects of naval gunfire on German counterattacks. 
243 Much has been made over the movement of H-hour 
from a planned 0200 to 0500 on URGENT FURY. While most of 
the literature blames this on the Marines inability to 
employ their rotary wing assets at night, in fact HMM261 was 
fully NVG (night-vision goggle) qualified. The problem lay 
with the JTF staff and planners and their coordination with 
USAF planners who planned the initial insertion of the 
Rangers. Interview with BG John J. Maher (former S-3, 1/75) 
by CPT Mike Kershaw, San Jose, California, 8 November, 1994; 
Interview with BG Wesley B. Taylor (former CDR, 1/75), 
Washington, D.C., 17 November 1994 and Briefing notes, 
"Urgent Fury", by LTC (ret) Digger O'Dell (USMC-former D/J3, 
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Finally, integrated operations occur 
commensurate with their degree of complexity. 
at a pace 
Initially the 
operation will require detailed planning, resulting in limited 
flexibility once the engagement commences. The Germans noted 
this in their appraisal of Operation MERCURY. As they 
attempted to reinforce the battered Assault Regiment at Maleme 
they were unable to divert already airborne units headed for 
different areas and were forced to scrounge reinforcements 
from bumped parachutists to reinforce their scanty reserve. 
They noted the inflexibility of airborne operations at the 
time of execution, noting that such an operation is, " ... as 
rapid in execution as it is time consuming in preparation. "
244 
Similar difficulties were noted by the Rangers 
parachuting onto Point Salines. For the 2d Battalion J.n 
particular, the airfield change required a total change of 
plans. The entire Ranger force at Point Salines conducted 
their mission under fundamentally different conditions than 
those which were initially planned. As opposed to a night, 
precision airfield seizure, the Rangers executed a daylight 
airborne assault against an alerted enemy. In this situation, 
the Operations Officer of the 1st Battalion noted that the, 
" ... templated planning process for the airfield seizure ... " 
was a hindrance, and discarding it, " ... helped in planning 
contingencies against METT-T (Mission, Enemy, Troops, Terrain 
and Time) considerations ... ". 245 
Two more examples of initial inflexibility of execution 
can be found in the two World War II Ranger cases. As noted 
JSOC), who verified Marines NVG qualifications for JTF 123 
on 23 October 1983. 
244 Department of the Army, "Airborne Operations: A 
German Appraisal" in World War II German Military Studies 
(New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1979), pp. 41-42. 
245 Written comments from BG Maher interview. 
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earlier, the lead battalion commander of the infiltrating 
Rangers at Cisterna became aware of the density of German 
forces in the objective area early in the infiltration. He 
debated altering the plan by reducing the depth of the 
infiltration and attacking early to reduce the distance 
between the attacking main force and infiltrating Rangers. 
The detailed plan for the operation, however, made no 
allowance for this contingency. Unable to communicate with 
the Ranger force commander, he continued with the planned 
mission. 246 Similarly, the complexity of the Ranger operation 
at Point du Hoc necessitated the landing of a small force 
initially at the Point in the expectation that reinforcements 
would arrive on schedule. This permitted little or no room 
for flexibility. The bulk of the combat power available to 
the Ranger commander, as 
costly overland movement 
resulted in heavy losses 
defending the Point. 
a result, was diverted to a slow, 
to the Point. This inflexibility 
amongst the small assault force 
These operations were all initially characterized by 
detailed planning, rapid execution, and corresponding 
inflexibility. Actions by commanders were therefore 
especially crucial in overcoming the frictions of war 
generated by the complex nature of the initial portion of the 
operation. Leaders at all levels developed contingencies to 
meet this challenge, demonstrating the robustness of SOF ln 
these engagements. The issue of leadership and command in 
integrated operations will be revisited again once the role of 
SOF in integrated operations is more fully explored. 
2. Conditions for Success 
Each of these integrated operations was characterized by 
several conditions which impacted on the success of the 
operation. While innumerable factors influence any complex 
246 D'Este, pp. 163-4. 
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operation, only a few have been consistently identified as 
significantly impacting on the success or failure of these 
operations. It may be useful to look first to conventionally 
accepted conditions of success for unilateral special 
operations. 
Unilateral special operations are the subject of more 
myth than serious study. This is partly a result of the 
secrecy which surrounds such operations, as well as the 
general unfamiliarity of the conventional military with the 
actual capabilities of the SOF assigned to these missions. 
Whatever the case, most of the scholarly studies of these 
operations focus on the crucial role played by intelligence 
and surprise in determining success. 
247 One recent study 
proposed that special operations succeed in spite of being 
outnumbered and attacking fortified positions by employing the 
principles of speed, simplicity, surprise, security, purpose 
and repetition. 248 Without addressing unilateral special 
operations in detail, a task beyond the scope of this work, it 
is illuminating to consider how SOF in integrated operations 
achieve success in the "special" phase of these engagements. 
a. Numbers 
The best strategy is always to be very strong; 
first in general, and then at the decisive point. 
Apart from the effort needed to create military 
strength, which does not always emanate from the 
general, there is no higher and simpler law of 
strategy than that of keeping one's forces 
concentrated. No force should ever be detached 
from the main body unless the need is definite and 
urgent. 249 
247 Luttwak, et al., A Systematic Review of Special 
Operations. 
248 McRaven, The Theory of Special Operations. 
249 Clausewitz, p. 204. 
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One myth of special operations is that they attack 
outnumbered. A closer examination of forces involved in these 
cases indicates that, while SOF may reverse Clausewi tz' s 
dictum, they do so only by emphasizing "concentration ·of 
forces in space and their unification in time". The ultimate 
success of the Ranger operations at Point Salines and 
Torrijos-Tocumen were based on both overall and local 
numerical superiority. The enemy's ability to bring heavier 
firepower to bear in the short term and inflict 
disproportionate casualties represented the window of 
vulnerability the Rangers confronted on these operations. 
At Point du Hoc and Eben Emael, the assaulting SOF 
sacrificed superiority in general to achieve superiority of 
numbers at the decisive point. On the fortress itself, the 
sappers took advantage of the Belgians' limited manning of the 
manpower intensive fortification, their lack of modern AA and 
surface defenses, and related lack of available infantry to 
counter the surface attack. While outnumbered in general, the 
Germans outnumbered the Belgian artillerymen at the decisive 
point, the few surface exits to the fort. Their bold actions 
against those few openings kept the Belgians pinned down 
inside the fort while, more critically, the scheduled strikes 
against the main entrance and reinforcing infantry prevented 
the Belgians from gaining a superiority of numbers over the 
lightly armed sappers on the fort's surface. Similarly, the 
Rangers at Point du Hoc rapidly scaled the cliffs and attacked 
across the objective to gain superiority of numbers at the 
decisive point over the shocked German defenders. The 
German's ability to pin down the forces on the Point and 
overrun forces later at the highway indicate an overall 
superiority of numbers and firepower in general. However, the 
Rangers likewise proved robust enough to maintain their 
critical positions until the arrival of GPF. 
The actions at Cisterna and Maleme highlight the 
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potential disaster that can occur when SOF encounter 
numerically superior forces at the decisive point. In both 
cases, SOF suffered disproportionate casualties, at Cisterna 
virtual annihilation, and at Maleme very near so. While 
planners of both operations can be accused of motivated bias 
or wishful thinking, the results virtually eliminated these 
two elite units from further combat. 
b. Surprise 
Surprise is always desired and yet seldom achieved 
and therefore should never be critical to 
success. 
250 
Clausewitz, after commenting on the universal desire 
for numerical superiority, turns to a desire which he says is, 
... no less universal: that to take the enemy by 
surprise. This desire is more or less basic to all 
operations, for without it superiority at the 
decisive point is hardly conceivable. 251 
In other words, everybody wants surprise. Neither 
SOF nor GPF have an exclusive claim to surprise, as we have 
seen. Surprise is multidimensional. It is often described in 
both strategic and tactical terms as well as spacial, temporal 
and moral terms. In reassessing the operations in these 
cases, surprise in no case was complete and, in certain cases, 
was simply nonexistent. The Belgian defenders of Eben Emael 
and the Albert Canal bridges were fully alerted prior to 
liftoff of the glider force and engaged the gliders with AA 
fire during their infiltration. At the same time, the German 
mode of infiltration, the speed of the attack, and their 
utilization of advanced weaponry gave them advantages of moral 
surprise the Belgians could not overcome, especially when 
250 Maher interview. 
251 Clausewitz, p. 198. 
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coupled with excellent integration. At Maleme, by contrast, 
the New Zealanders were fully aware of German intentions and 
successfully repulsed the coup de main, inflicting almost 
debilitating casualties on I Bn. The robustness of the German 
plan is what established the conditions for its later success, 
not the element of surprise. 
Rangers at Cisterna almost certainly possessed a 
tactical surprise of spacial and temporal dimensions in their 
infiltration. However, the Germans, fully aware of the 
balance of forces in the immediate area, possessed the moral 
advantage of being in a position of strength. At Point du 
Hoc, the Rangers gained spacial surprise by their route and 
method of attack. Each of these two examples, however, 
highlight the fleeting nature of surprise 1n integrated 
operations. It is often achieved at some level, but must be 
reinforced rapidly with augmentation and follow-on forces. 
URGENT FURY and BLUE SPOON both suffered from a loss 
of surprise. At Point Salines surprise was lost in tactical 
terms and at Torrijos-Tocumen 1n strategic terms. The Rangers 
succeeded in both cases due to the limited strength of the 
opposition, the inability of the enemy to exploit information, 
and a reserve of infantry tactics. This allowed the Rangers 
at Point Salines to rapidly transition from a nighttime 
airfield seizure to a daylight airborne assault with little 
disruption. This again demonstrates a robustness of SOF in 
integrated operations not normally associated with more 
surgical SOF. 
c. 'l'ime 
In all of the operations examined in this study 
there is a strong correlation between preparation time and 
mission success. Eben Emael, Point du Hoc, and BLUE SPOON 
were deliberate operations conducted with the benefit of an 
extended planning sequence. Cisterna and URGENT FURY were 
both planned in a week or less. Although the Germans had 
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slightly more time to plan Operation MERCURY, staging forces 
forward in the midst of redeployments for BARBAROSSA created 
an environment of hasty preparation. 
The inherent complexity of integrated operations 
indicate that preparation is critical for operational success. 
Extensive mission preparation, especially detailed planning, 
extensive rehearsals and concentration of forces are necessary 
to conduct integrated operations with ease. In Crete, the 
Germans were ill-informed of the islands' garrison in spite of 
total air superiority. At Cisterna the Rangers were denied 
the opportunity for pre-attack reconnaissance. During URGENT 
FURY the Rangers failed to receive critical intelligence 
available to higher headquarters. In each case plans were 
developed with inaccurate information and the SOF component of 
the operation suffered accordingly. Standing forces, however, 
are less dependant on time possessing organic planning 
headquarters. 
d. Command 
Proper command and control of SOF in integrated 
operations certainly contributed to the overall success of 
each case was reviewed.' While the cases examined here do not 
present strong enough evidence to determine the sufficiency of 
command alone, even the most rudimentary involvement of SOF 
planners, such as at Point du Hoc, contributed to success. 
Their total involvement during Eben Emael and BLUE SPOON were 
critical to the success of the mission. SOF planners fell 
victim to motivated bias at Crete and Cisterna, as well as 
having inadequate preparation time. Bureaucratically weak SOF 
often lack the ability to properly plan operations. URGENT 
FURY highlights the difficulty faced by SOF when working with 
GPF planners unfamiliar with their capabilities and ability to 
integrate. 
Integrated operations place heavy demands on 
leadership. In all the cases examined leaders made crucial 
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acted to decisively to influence the outcome of the action. 
At Eben Emael, SGT Wenzel discovered that the 120mm guns were 
not knocked out and demolished them himself. Captain Gericke 
and Colonel Ramcke rallied remnants of the Assault Regiment at 
Maleme to seize and hold Hill 107. Both Ranger Battalion 
commanders were casualties leading their battalions at 
Cisterna and LTC Rudder personally accompanied the assault 
force up the cliffs at Point du Hoc. Ranger commanders led 
jumps in both Grenada and Panama. While overall centralized 
control of an integrated operation may be in the hands of a 
centralized, GPF command, SOF's critical role demands that 
leaders be up front to see the battle and make crucial 
decisions based on personal observation. 
specifically specialized planning and personal 
Command, 
leadership, 
seems to present a strong correlation for success and failure 
on these operations. 
Thus three conditions necessary for the success of 
SOF in integrated operations have been identified, as well as 
one possible sufficient condition. SOF will always seek to 
exploit surprise, but can often succeed with less than total 
surprise by developing robust plans. Achieving numerical 
superiority at the decisive point can be achieved, often at 
the expense of overall superiority. However, often, it must 
be augmented and sustained by rapid integration of follow-on 
forces. Finally, deliberate operations stand a greater chance 
of allowing SOF to exploit unique capabilities. Contingency 
operations, conducted in haste, are more apt to expose SOF to 
defeat in detail or excessive casualties. A mature and 
experienced SOF command, however, insures that SOF will be 
assigned to tasks commensurate with its capabilities, vastly 
increasing the chances of success in integrated operations. 
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3. SOF in Integrated Operations 
The cases examined highlight the crucial role SOF plays 
ln integrated operations. In contrast to unilateral special 
operations, which are performed independent of conventional 
operations, integrated operations employ SOF to seize an 
initial advantage crucial to the successful introduction of 
GPF. There are, however, two distinct engagements to be 
fought, one "special" and the other "conventional" in nature, 
as well as two opportunities to lose superiority, and possibly 
the battle. These engagements are often separated by a period 
of transition, never scheduled, but recognizable to the 
experienced planner. This period potentially holds the 
greatest dangers for the operation and a corresponding window 
of vulnerability for SOF. In one manner of speaking, 
integrated operations are multilateral events, with 
sequentially scheduled tasks for complementary assets and 
interdependent conditions for success. 
Integrated operations initially resemble a special 
operation rather than a conventional one. Success or failure 
in the initial phase can determine the nature of the remainder 
of the operation. In two instances, the special units 
employed failed to gain initial success outright. At Maleme 
airfield, the I Bn under Major Koch, as well as the glider 
detachment under the Regimental Ia, were decisively defeated 
in their bid to stage a coup de main on the airfield. This is 
not to suggest that portions of their operation did not 
succeed. Lieutenant Plessen's detachment successfully 
eliminated the AA guarding the river mouth and Major Braun's 
detachment successfully seized the bridge. However, both 
detachments were repulsed in their efforts to seize the key 
terrain overlooking the airfield and Major Koch's detachment 
was driven from the hill with terrific casualties by the New 
Zealand defenders. Their slim foothold on the bridge allowed 
the two parachute battalions dropped west of the river to move 
in force against the hill in a concentric attack, an attack 
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that was conventional in nature and repulsed initially by the 
New Zealanders. Only the perseverance of the remnants of the 
attackers and a series of incredibly poor decisions by the New 
Zealand command put this terrain in the hands of the exhausted 
Assault Regiment. 252 
In a similar vein, at Cisterna the initial failure of the 
two infiltrating Ranger battalions placed them in a precarious 
position behind German lines and jeopardized the 3rd 
Division's main attack. Although they were able to partially 
infiltrate to their objective area, they were unable to seize 
Cisterna and subsequently forced into an unequal contest with 
alerted German forces. Like the Assault Regiment at Maleme, 
the Rangers initial supporting effort, in the form of 4th 
Battalion reinforced with tank destroyers and the cannon 
company, could not generate the combat power needed to 
overcome German resistance in their conventional assault along 
the Isola Bella road. Unfortunately for the trapped Rangers, 
and in contrast to the New Zealand command at Crete, the 
German command recognized their position of positional 
superiority over the cut off battalions and exploited it. 
These two cases identify SOF' s crucial role in integrated 
operations. Failure in the initial phase places the entire 
operation in jeopardy, potentially resulting in the 
destruction of highly trained SOF and placing GPF in an almost 
252 See Stewart, pp. 246-7 for comments by CPT Gericke 
on the Assault Regiment's ability to seize and hold Hill 107 
during that first critical night. As noted in his work, the 
Germans did not occupy the critical hill until at least 
three New Zealand units had occupied and evacuated it. 
MacDonald, in his work asserts that the only contact they 
made in occupying the hill was among the two advancing 
groups, one, in fact, led by a doctor. See MacDonald, p. 
202 for Gericke's comment that his tired forces on Hill 107, 
" ... would not have been able to withstand an energetic 
counter-attack in battalion strength." In fact, it took 
them until at least 1600 that day to clear the airfield, 
which the New Zealanders had already evacuated. 
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insurmountable position of inferiority. 
Two of the cases examined feature the proper use of SOF 
to gain an initial advantage within their capability and lead 
to an almost near perfect integration of forces, albeit under 
significant frictions of war. The German operation at Eben 
Emael and the Albert Canal bridges was a sequential employment 
of special units in tasks critical to the advance of GPF. 
Conventional wisdom aside, the initial seizure of the bridges 
was the key activity and experienced success on two out of the 
three objectives. The ability of the German Air Force to 
knock out the northern CP controlling the two northern 
bridges, gave the Concrete and Steel detachments the necessary 
window of confusion to exploit. The blowing of the southern 
bridge at Canne somewhat diminished the neutralization of Eben 
Emael, since it was the only bridge that the fortress 
effectively covered. However, the Germans, effectively 
tasking Granite force with a task suited to their means, only 
intended for the sappers to neutralize the north firing 
artillery of the fort. It was the job of the special task 
force comprised of IR 151 and Engineer Battalion 51 to reduce 
the fortress, an operation which was, interestingly enough, 
planned without the assistance of the Granite force. Early 
linkup at the northern bridges insured that Koch's men were 
exposed to Belgian counterattacks for a minimum period of 
time, while Witzig's men were vulnerable until finally 
relieved in the early morning hours of D+l. It is also 
interesting to note that the Germans placed their most 
important units on the northern two routes, specifically 4th 
Panzer Division, the spearhead of Hoepner's Corps and the 6th 
Army, while the relief of the Iron and Granite detachments was 
left to a special task force. The Germans recognized the 
importance of the two northern bridges to their advance and 
the only tertiary importance of the fortress as a possible 
impediment. 
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Similarly, the airfield seizure of Torrijos-Tocumen 
allowed the U.S. to rapidly introduce forces into Panama, and 
specifically, the Panama City area. Opening another major 
airhead to support the overtaxed and relatively vulnerable 
Howard AFB allowed the JTF to not only introduce but also 
trans load and assault into different parts of the region. 
Rapid introduction of follow-on forces ensured that the SOF 
employed to seize the critical node would be exposed to a 
minimum window of vulnerability. Therefore, the two most 
successful cases examined are highlighted by SOF accomplishing 
critical tasks appropriate to their capability and the rapid 
introduction of GPF to both exploit the advantages gained by 
SOF and to reduce their window of vulnerability. 
Two of the cases, however, are not as clear and reveal 
how problems in one phase contribute to the outcome of the 
operation and affect SOF. In URGENT FURY the initial mission 
was delayed and compromised, resulting in SOF conducting a 
daylight parachute assault against an alerted enemy. The 
insertion delay virtually guaranteed a slow buildup of forces 
and SOF's inability to accomplish all D-day tasks. This slow 
buildup also insured that the Rangers would find themselves 
under control of GPF following D-day. On the other hand, the 
Rangers at Point du Hoc experienced almost complete success in 
the initial phase of their operation. However, late arrival 
of relieving GPF heightened their vulnerability. The bulk of 
the Ranger casualties did not occur in scaling the Point or 
even finding the guns, as conventional wisdom would lead one 
to believe. Rather, the Rangers suffered their heaviest 
casualties in defending an overextended perimeter with 
inadequate resources. Therefore, these two integrated 
operations reflect the interdependency of SOF and GPF. 
Initial success is no guarantee of final success. Problems, 
in these cases delays, on both the front and back end of the 
operation create difficulties for SOF and widen their window 
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of vulnerability. 
Integrated operations are multilateral events, employing 
both SOF and GPF in complementary roles. The sequential 
employment of forces allows SOF to gain a critical advantage 
to be exploited by rapid introduction of GPF. Integrated 
operations are, in effect, two distinct engagements with a 
potential window of vulnerability for SOF in the crucial 
transition between the two distinct engagements. It is this 
transition that challenges the integration of forces, 
specifically measured in terms of training and organization. 
The SOF role 1n integrated operations is crucial and, 
recognizing the nature of such operations, can often be much 
more robust than normally assumed. 
B. ORGANIZATION THEORY 
Each of the three case studies examined a SOF 
organization which conducted multiple integrated operations. 
These organization varied widely both in their degree of 
ins ti tu tionalization and functional specialization. Each 
organization will now be compared in terms of these two 
variables and the degree to which each affected that 
organization's ability to conduct integrated operations. 
1. Institutionalization 
The German Parachute Corps were, in fact, an autonomous 
organization almost exclusively devoted to integrated 
operations. They were highly institutionalized, possessing 
their own training, administration and semi-autonomous 
headquarters. Problems of integration were evident at Eben 
Emael, more at the fortress than at the bridges. The 
relieving task force conducted a deliberate, conventional 
attack to reduce the fortress, instead of fully exploiting the 
gains made by the SOF. During Operation MERCURY, problems 
with integration across service lines hampered XI Air Corps in 
their attempts to employ a viable seaborne echelon. The 
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initial repulse at Maleme, as well as failures across the 
island, led higher commanders to effectively remove Student 
from control of the battle, replacing him with Ringel, a GPF 
commander. 
The World War II Rangers, by contrast, were poorly 
institutionalized. Attempts to create headquarters, a training 
base, and rudimentary administrative functions resulted in ad-
hoc arrangements. Operational control of these forces 
remained firmly in the hands of GPF commanders. Although they 
proved to be the SOF of choice for integrated operations, 
proper employment was based on individual commander 
proclivities rather than the Rangers' organizational culture. 
They suffered from frequent misuse accordingly, with only 
rudimentary involvement of special planners (COHQ) at Point du 
Hoc. 
The modern Rangers are much more institutionalized than 
their World War II predecessors. They are centrally 
controlled by a special headquarters, although they received 
a great deal of administrative and logistical support from 
GPF. Among SOF, however, they have become the defacto 
"connectivity" force f'or integration with GPF. They are 
still, however, somewhat "fenced" from GPF for most 
contingencies. 
2. Functional Specialization 
The German Parachute Corps was a highly specialized 
organization and its assault units examined here represent the 
highest degree of specialization within the organization. 
While there were units of greater relative specialization than 
these (particularly the Brandenburg units), they were far more 
specialized than their allied counterparts. When faced with 
conventional combat at Maleme airfield, their high degree of 
specialization caused them problems integrating forces. These 
experiences led the Germans to conclude that their airborne 
forces had become overly specialized. German after action 
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reports stressed a need to focus on the ground combat aspects 
of airborne operations, rather than the means of infiltration. 
The World War II Rangers were the least specialized of 
the organizations examined. Although initially developed for 
unilateral "commando" operations, they soon became experts in 
night infiltration and amphibious spearheading, capitalizing 
on infantry skills. They worked closely with GPF and 
experienced correspondingly high levels of integration, as 
well as misuse. Throughout the period.examined, the Rangers 
adapted to the changing needs of GPF commanders and enhanced 
their skill base to support their most likely missions. 
The modern Rangers rival the Germans in their level of 
specialization, although they have a firm infantry foundation. 
This foundation proved to be the key to integration during 
URGENT FURY. Within the SOF community, however, the Rangers 
are seen as the connectivity force with GPF, because of their 
relatively low specialization in special operations. Thus 
Rangers can expect to be continued to be called on for 
integrated operations. 
3. Findings 
The implications from this analysis are complex. No 
single organization perfected integrated operations within the 
period examined. However, several lessons are clear. The 
German example highlights the need for a special headquarters 
to control the training, selection and administration of SOF 
dedicated to integrated operations. The German Parachute 
Corps established a reputation virtually unmatched in the war 
for combat effectiveness, sustained far after the period 
examined in this study. They pioneered modern airborne 
operations, employing innovative tactics and techniques and 
setting the stage for the massive allied airborne operations 
later in the war. An autonomous headquarters played a great 
part in both enhancing combat effectiveness and developing 
innovative doctrine. 
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The World War II Ranger experience highlights the dangers 
of placing SOF under the operational control of GPF commanders 
without a corresponding special headquarters to assist in 
planning, training and administrative requirements. The high 
degree of integration experience by the Rangers was offset by 
their frequent misuse. Additionally, combat effectiveness was 
affected by their organizational immaturity which proved 
unable to provide sufficiently trained replacements. 
The modern Rangers have their own specialized 
headquarters and receive extensive training and administrative 
support from within the SOF organization. GPF commanders, 
however, still remain ill-advised on SOF capabilities and 
limitations. The high degree of integration on BLUE SPOON was 
in part due to extremely lengthy preparation time and personal 
relationships of key SOF and GPF commanders. Neither of these 
conditions is presently accounted for in the present 
organization. Many of the problems of URGENT FURY, especially 
with reference to integration across GPF and service lines are 
still being struggled with today. 
4. Recommendations 
There are several alternatives to reorganizing SOF to 
meet the challenges of integrated operations. One alternative 
is, of course, to retain the organization that was proven on 
BLUE SPOON. This clearly represents the most advanced 
organization to date and has fostered the development of an 
unmatched standing SOF. However, the unique situation of the 
Panama crisis certainly represents the lesser, rather than a 
greater, challenge. Thus it is useful to consider the other 
cases for more difficult challenges. 
One alternative which would increase the level of 
cooperation between SOF and GPF would be to reduce the size of 
SOF and assign the bulk of SOF directly to the GPF. Special 
mission units (SMU) would be retained under the direct control 
of a SOF specific headquarters while "white" SOF, particularly 
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those currently used for integrated operations, would be under 
the control of GPF commanders. Proficiency of the SMU's would 
undoubtedly increase, as they would possess a command solely 
dedicated to their training, administration and control. This 
realignment closely resembles the WWII Ranger example and 
would undoubtedly foster integration, but would expose these 
SOF to many of the same problems of misuse as faced by their 
WWII counterparts. 
A second alternative would see the creation of two 
organizational divisions within SOF. More surgical SOF would 
be controlled by a SOP-specific headquarters, while "white" 
SOF would be under SOP-specific control for training and 
administration. Within the SOF community, there would be two 
vertical divisions, between surgical SOF and "white" SOF. 
Select GPF commanders would then exercise operational control 
(OPCON) of SOF for integrated operations. 
Many of the necessary command and control arrangements 
for this alternative have already been implemented. Under 
USSOCOM direction, theater commanders have Special Operations 
Commands (SOC) and even Corps level Special Operation Command 
and Control Element (SOCCE) giving them a rudimentary ability 
to assist GPF commanders in the planning and execution of both 
unilateral special operations as well as integrated 
operations. These arrangements, as well as the frequent 
deployment of JSOTF's, increase the ability of commanders to 
integrate forces. 
One method of controlling SOF for integrated operations 
may be through a proposed Special Operations Group ( SOG) . 
This combination of Special Forces and Ranger assets would be 
directly under the operational control of a theater CINC and 
provide SOF unit to meet his requirements. 
253 One problem 
with this proposal is that it places SOF devoted to indirect 
253 Harned, p. 149. 
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action and others devoted to direct action under a 
headquarters which presently conducts indirect action almost 
exclusively. However, as a concept for command and control of 
forces for integrated operations, it warrants further study. 
Another method currently being tested is the AJFP 
initiative. While increasing integration between SOF and GPF 
across service lines, AJFP commits SOF assets to forward 
basing and limits employment of these assets elsewhere once 
shipboard. AJFP also places SOF 1n an ad-hoc task 
organization, which lacks the institutional longevity of the 
proposed SOG and entails recreating SOF task forces (JSOTF) 
for the work up of each deploying Carrier Task Group. 
While the focus of this study has been on SOF, any 
reorganization of SOF assets must be accompanied by 
commensurate adjustments within the GPF. The Germans at Crete 
fell victim to "wishful thinking" and felt their special units 
could conquer the island alone. Today it is recognized that 
SOF and GPF will be involved increasingly in cooperative 
operations. Anticipating the needs for SOF in future 
integrated operations is difficult, but not without precedent. 
Bold enterprises, such as the landing of airborne 
sappers on the strategic fortress of Eben Emael and 
at the Albert Canal bridges-achieved a temporary 
paralysis of the enemy, but required swift advance 
by the Army as reinforcement. The lightly armed 
airborne units were themselves too weak to follow 
up their initial success. 254 
Whatever form the closer relationship between SOF and GPF 
takes, it must be followed by some modifications to GPF 
organization. Cooperation, when it occurs between SOF and 
GPF, is almost exclusively limited to "light" forces. 
Although these are the forces which are currently the most 
likely to cooperate with SOF in integrated operations, as the 
254 Bekker, p. 142. 
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cases in this study show, rapid follow-on of heavier forces is 
often a requirement for success. In order to forestall the 
"upgunning" of SOF assigned to integrated operations, as 
happened with Darby's Rangers, heavier forces, such as light 
armor units, should be closely integrated with SOF. 
C. CONCLUSIONS 
Integrated operations are an arena that exists between 
the more commonly accepted paradigms of conventional and 
special operations. Integrated operations are multilateral 
operations by dissimilar forces which conduct differing 
engagements. SOF in integrated operations, unlike those in 
unilateral special operations, conduct their initial missions 
under restrictions driven by the preponderant follow-on role 
of GPF. Additionally, while these operations are initially 
rapid and inflexible, as the operation evolves, they demand 
robust command functions to adapt to a changing combat 
environment. 
SOP's role in integrated operations are crucial. Their 
objective is to win the front end of the battle, facilitating 
the rapid entry of follow-on forces. A defeat for SOF 
initially can put GPF in a position of subsequent inferiority 
that they will often be ill-positioned to overcome. 
Similarly, actions delaying the introduction of follow-on 
forces widen the window of vulnerability for SOF and can cause 
initial success to be squandered. 
SOF succeeds in integrated operations when they achieve 
superiority in numbers at the decisive point. Although some 
form of surprise is always desired, a robust plan can overcome 
disadvantages lost surprise dissipates. Sufficient time, 
particularly in preparation, is necessary to turn accurate 
intelligence into detailed planning and extensive rehearsals. 
Extensive preparation, of course, is no guarantee of success. 
A strong correlation, however, exists between the time 
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available for preparation and mission success. Finally, 
commanders at all levels are crucial in determining the proper 
utilization of SOF. Although no one factor is sufficient for 
success, the role of commanders in assessing the capabilities 
and limitations of SOF and their assigned missions is 
critical. 
Finally, SOF varied greatly throughout these cases in 
their level of institutionalization and functional 
specialization. The ability to integrate operations is often 
hampered by organizational barriers between forces involved in 
operations. Autonomous organizations, with correspondingly 
high levels of institutionalization, had great difficulty 
integrating their operations. Bureaucratic growth led to the 
development of a motivated bias towards mission assessment. 
This led, in part, to the pursuit of missions unsuited for 
their unique capability alone. Bureaucratically immature and 
weak organizations experienced high degrees of integration, 
but suffered from inconsistent utilization. This misuse often 
resulted in SOF capability being diminished gradually through 
inappropriate mission taskings. In its other form, omission, 
SOF simply were often not employed in ways that capitalized on 
their abilities, and opportunities were wasted. From the 
standpoint of functional specialization, less specialized SOF 
were better able to integrate than more specialized, surgical 
SOF. Thus organization theory supported the current 
organization of SOF and GPF, with a few recommendations. 
This study shows that a higher level of integration would 
be achieved if barriers between select SOF and GPF were 
reduced. The SOF command should maintain training and 
administrative control over select SOF and provide GPF 
commanders with command and control assets to properly employ 
them as the need arises. Other, more surgical SOF should be 
retained under the sole control of a SOF-specific 
headquarters. GPF commanders would then have greater 
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effective operational control over SOF, heightening their 
ability to integrate forces. 
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Map 3. German map of fortress. Dummy positions are indicated by hatched lines. 
"Kuppel 120" indicates revolving l20mm guns in position 24. From Center for 
Military History, "Eben Emael". 
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Map 7. Attack of IR 131 battlegroup to relieve Iron and Granite detachments and 
reduce fortress. From Franz Kurowski, Deutsche Fallschirm-Iager 1939-1943. 
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Map 9. German landings and New Zealand defenses at Maleme: 20 May. From Ian 
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Map 10. Initial landings and attacks of Assault Regiment, 20 May. From Stewart. 
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Map 12. The Germans occupy Hill 107: 0800, 21 May. From Stewart. 
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Map 13. German reinforcements: 21 May. From Stewart, The Struggle for Crete. 
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Map 14. New Zealand counterattacks: 21-22 May. From Stewart. 
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Map 15. Allied strategy for landing of VI Corps at Anzio: January 1944. From War 
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Map 18. The attack on Cisterna: 29-31 January. From Donald Taggart, Historv of 
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Map 19. Assault plan for Omaha Beach showing planned landings of three Ranger 
task forces. From Small Unit Actions. 
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Map 20. Battery defenses: Point du Hoc. From Lane, Rudder's Rangers. 
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Map 21. Ranger assault plan: Point du Hoc. From Small Unit Actions. 
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Map 22. Actual landings of Ranger companies: Point du Hoc. From Small Unit 
Actions. 
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Map 24. Ranger companies on Omaha Beach: 6 June. From Omaha Beachhead. 
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Map 26. The highway position. From Small Unit Actions. 
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Map 28. Grenada: U.S. D-Day plan. From Mark Adkin, Urgent Furv. 
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Map 31. Situation at Point Salines: 1900 25 October. Rangers are on initial assault 
objectives and initial follow-on forces are arriving and moving into position. From 
Ad kin. 
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Map 32. Situation at midnight, 25 October and plan for 26 October. Two battalions 
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Map 34. Ranger air assault on Calivigny barracks: 27 October. From Adkin. 
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Map 36. Drop Zone diagram for TFR-T on Torrijos-Tocumen airfields. From 
USSOCOM Command Historian. 
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Map 37. Ranger drop onto Torrijos-Tocumen. From Donnelly, Operation Just Cause. 
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